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Venezuela and Cuba: Future Scenarios, Risks, and Strategic Opportunities
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Jan 20, 2026 — Venezuela: A 2026 Snapshot: Venezuela’s macroeconomic situation remains very fragile, with very high inflation, widespread poverty, and a still weak oil sector; the article views stabilization (including receiving 30-50 million barrels of oil to sell at market prices) and reconstruction as long-term tasks. Washington still has major leverage through trade, diplomacy, and sequencing of economic relief, but any gains will be limited unless political and institutional conditions improve. Includes graphics on GDP growth, inflation rate, economic indicators, and key figures (notably, GDP is projected to steadily decrease while inflation is projected to steadily increase).
Emilie Sweigart Americas Quarterly
Jan 20, 2026 — The Way Forward for Venezuela: Focuses on what a post-crisis path could look like, especially sequencing for governance, sanctions, and recovery planning. Warns that Interim President Delcy Rodríguez’s administration is less stable than appearances suggest, having to contend with powerful figures General Vladimir Padrino and Diosdado Cabello, who maintain influence with the military and colectivos.
Michael Reid Americas Quarterly
Mar 18, 2026 — How Can Venezuela's Opposition Regain Momentum: The opposition remains fragmented and is struggling to convert political openings into sustained leverage, which means any transition remains vulnerable to reversal or elite co-optation. Tensions are rising in Venezuela, evident by a public transportation protest and the first strike in years to publicly demand minimum wage increases and better pensions. Includes a graphic detailing Venezuela’s Chavismo-Controlled National Assembly, which is supplemented by political leaders’ concerns about the integrity of the electoral authority (CNE).
Omar Lugo Americas Quarterly
Mar 11, 2026 — Two months without Maduro in Venezuela: Democratic transition or authoritarian adaptation?: Venezuela has entered a changed political moment, but not a democratic transition yet; WOLA says the main risk is that the regime adapts and preserves authoritarian control rather than genuinely opening up. Some real shifts have occurred, including political releases and renewed U.S.-Venezuela diplomatic contact, but the core coercive apparatus remains in place: political detentions, weak courts, non-independent electoral institutions, and restrictions on opposition activity. For U.S. policy, the key lesson is that sanctions relief or economic engagement alone will not deliver democratization; any support should be tied to concrete institutional reforms, human-rights protections, and accountability. Includes a timeline of events two months post-Maduro.
Laura Cristina Dib Washington Office on Latin America’s
Feb 2, 2026 — Proposed Amnesty and Jail Closure Stir Hopes for a Venezuelan Spring: Argues that Venezuela is experiencing a real opening signaled by the shift seen by an amnesty law, the closure of the Helicoide detention center, and the release of nearly 350 political prisoners. Economic stabilization is already changing conditions on the ground, with U.S.-managed oil revenue, a stronger currency, and the possible return of flights and foreign business interest helping to ease pressure on regular Venezuelan citizens. Warns that amnesty alone will not dismantle the security-state apparatus; lasting change will require purging abusive forces, ending censorship, repealing anti-dissent laws, and rebuilding a credible opposition that can pressure both Caracas and Washington.
Phil Gunson International Crisis Group
Jan 5, 2026 — Making sense of the US military operation in Venezuela: Argues that Venezuela’s transition would depend on immediate humanitarian aid, military unity under civilian authority, and a sequenced approach to accountability; otherwise, the result could be fragmentation, civil conflict, or expanded violence. For military planners, the biggest warning is escalation risk: if Maduro’s remaining network does not comply, or if the operation triggers internal resistance or war, Washington may face pressure to expand the mission beyond what was originally intended.
Scott R. Anderson, Alex Brockwehl, Marcela Escobari, Marcela Escobari Marcela Escobari Senior Fellow - Global Economy and Development Vanda Felbab-Brown, Samantha Gross, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Ted Piccone, Elizabeth N. Saunders, Caitlin Talmadge, David G. Victor, Valerie Wirtschafter, Kelebogile Zvobgo Brookings Institute
Jan 7, 2026 — The global implications of the US military operation in Venezuela: Argues that the willingness of the U.S. to take unilateral action in the hemisphere undermines U.S. credibility when it argues for restraint, rules, and sovereignty elsewhere. Concern that the operation to extract Maduro may embolden other powers, such as Russia, who can read the Venezuelan operation to extract Maduro as a precedent for big-power intervention. China uses the operation to criticize U.S. “hegemonism” and present itself as the defender of international law.
Scott R. Anderson, Sarah A. Binder, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Daniel S. Hamilton, Kari Heerman, Jonathan Katz, Patricia M. Kim, Suzanne Maloney, Steven Pifer, Dafna H. Rand, Douglas A. Rediker, Melanie W. Sisson, Constanze Stelzenmüller, Andrew Yeo Brookings Institute
Jan 23, 2026 — How China’s oil-backed lending in Venezuela fell into distress—and what might come next: The structure of China’s oil-backed lending is based on money now and oil later, with loans repaid through future oil shipments. In Venezuela, loans were issued primarily by the China Development Bank; oil was supplied by state-owned PdVSA; revenues from oil sales were used to service debt via Chinese-controlled accounts; and repayment relied on a single source of revenue (oil exports), even when loans funded non-oil sectors. Includes a diagram of the four-party agreement or blueprint of China’s collaterized, commodity-backed lending. Includes a timeline of the Joint China-Venezuela Fund. Venezuela is the largest recipient of Chinese lending in Latin America (4 th largest globally). There have been multiple defaults and restructurings (2014, 2020), China issued repayment delays instead of full relief, and more than $10 billion remains outstanding.
Oshin Pandey, Pavan Raghavendra William and Mary's AidData
Jan 16, 2026 — China’s divorce from Venezuela wasn’t caused by the US. It already happened a decade ago: China’s relationship with Venezuela began deteriorating in the mid-2010s, not due to recent U.S. actions. China maintains massive exposure to Venezuela: over $105B in loans from 2000-2023 and about 91% backed by oil (around $95B), and the restructurings in 2016 and 2020 caused China to de-risk via: Cutting off major new lending after 2017 and replaced with minimal engagement (small aid, scholarships, etc.) Oil output in 2015 dropped from 1.65M bpd to about 570K bpd in 2020, also contributing to the de-risking strategy. U.S. sanctions made repayment harder, so China pivoted to other regional partners such as Brazil, Guyana, Colombia, and Peru.
Bryan Burgess, Lea Thorne William and Mary's AidData
Jan 5, 2026 — AS/COA Statement on the Situation in Venezuela: Calls for a legitimate, democratically elected government in Venezuela; calls for investment, social peace, and rule of law; highlights backing for pro-democracy leaders like María Corina Machado and civil society and private sector actors; and stresses that Venezuela-led efforts (activists, private sector, and civil society) will be decisive moving forward.
Mar 25, 2026 — José Enrique Arrioja on ABC about the State of Venezuela Post-Maduro: Argues that the political and economic system is trying to survive intact rather than fully transform. Delcy Rodríguez is attempting to maintain cooperation with the U.S. and keep this arrangement as long as possible. Despite leadership changes, political repression and lack of free speech persist, and the citizens remain afraid to speak out or demand reforms. María Corina Machado is still a widely popular opposition leader, and her return to Venezuela is uncertain due to security risks.
Victor Oquendo AS/COA
OIL FOR REPRESSION: The $63.8 Billion Audit Of Cuba’s Intelligence Occupation in Venezuela: The Cuba-Venezuela alliance functioned as an “oil-for-repression” system, where Venezuela financed Cuban-led intelligence control (GRUCE), effectively outsourcing its sovereignty to Havana. Venezuela’s collapse in January 2026 directly weakened Cuba’s economic survival model and regional influence. Even as Cuban personnel withdraw, their institutional and doctrinal footprint remains embedded in Venezuelan security forces, showing that Cuba’s influence is structural, but its erosion, combined with internal crises, contributes to a growing inflection point where both regimes face declining control and legitimacy.
Rethinking the Cuban Regime: Implications for Transition Paths and Comparative Cases: Cuba has evolved from a totalitarian regime into an early-stage post-totalitarian system, with less ideological control, reduced mass mobilization, and limited social/economic flexibility, while the Communist Party retains power. The regime is adaptive and pragmatic rather than static, prioritizing survival through controlled reforms while maintaining strong political control and repression. A sudden democratic transition is unlikely; the most probable path is gradual economic reform, which could eventually lead to either continued authoritarianism or a slow shift toward democracy.
Aimel Rios Wong The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Jan 21, 2026 — The Geopolitics of Maduro’s Capture: Cuba’s Inflection Point.: Examines the geopolitical shock of Nicolás Maduro’s capture and how it has upended Cuba’s long‑standing alliance with Venezuela, undermining Cuba’s economic lifelines and forcing its leadership to reassess strategic assumptions. Highlights the psychological and political impact on the Cuban regime, including anxiety within the leadership, demoralization after Cuban casualties, and a broader legitimacy crisis fueled by economic hardship and social strain.
Christopher Hernandez-Roy CSIS
Contemporary Crises in Cuba: Economic, Political, and Social: Examines the geopolitical shock of Nicolás Maduro’s capture and how it has upended Cuba’s long‑standing alliance with Venezuela, undermining Cuba’s economic lifelines and forcing its leadership to reassess strategic assumptions. Highlights the psychological and political impact on the Cuban regime, including anxiety within the leadership, demoralization after Cuban casualties, and a broader legitimacy crisis fueled by economic hardship and social strain.
Silvia Pedraza, Carlos Romero FIU Law Review
Dec 6, 2024 — China’s Intelligence Footprint in Cuba: New Evidence and Implications for U.S. Security: Open-source analysis and satellite imagery indicate at least four Cuban sites likely supporting China’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations targeting the U.S. and regiona l activities, including tracking satellite communications, U.S. military launches, and naval movements.
Matthew P. Funaiole, Aidan Powers-Riggs, Brian Hart, Henry Ziemer, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy CSIS
Mar 13, 2026 — Five Takeaways from the "Consequences for Cuba of a Course Correction in Venezuela" discussion with a panel of experts: FIU experts met in March to discuss Cuba’s future after Maduro’s removal and increased attention on Cuba’s oil dependence. Cuba’s repression system remains intact, and the U.S. is not expected to intervene militarily. Experts predict a 2-3 year maximum pressure campaign leading to continued deterioration and possible humanitarian crisis or regime collapse. Rebuilding Cuba would be extremely difficult without major political, economic, and cultural reforms. The Cuban population believes a U.S. military intervention is unlikely.
Alex Bassil Cuban Research Institute
Infinite War: Faces of the New Global Conflict: This book provides insight into the history of the Castro regime and its relationship with transnational crime as a means of economic survival, dating back to peak of Bolivian drug lord Suárez’s reign. It examines the “Cubazuela” relationship, highlighting how ties between Cuba and Venezuela may sustain illicit economies and drug trade. It uses firsthand and secondhand accounts to explore Cuba’s history of transnational crime and its ongoing medical missions in Latin America, which may also function as an extension of its security apparatus.
David Spencer, Leonardo Coutinho, Juan Antonio Blanco Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba
The Strategic Importance of Resolving the Cuba Question as Part of an ‘America First’ Policy: The Cuban government collaborates with U.S. adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, including hosting intelligence facilities and military activity that can monitor or challenge U.S. operations. Cuba plays a destabilizing role in the region, supporting authoritarian regimes (like Venezuela) and influencing leftist movements across Latin America, while also engaging in espionage against the U.S.
Evan Ellis Expediente Abierto
The Vatican acts as a mediator between the U.S. and Cuba in a complex diplomatic scenario: The Holy See is attempting quiet mediation, with diplomatic contacts in Rome involving Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla and Mike Hammer, acting as an important factor in a possible regime transition. Cuban Church leaders warn that U.S. pressure can lead to a humanitarian crisis and collapse of the state, highlighting current living conditions and calling for major change.
The Vatican’s Role in the Reconciliation Between the US and Cuba: The Holy See played a key diplomatic role in restoring relations between the United States and Cuba (2014-2015), acting as a neutral mediator and facilitating dialogue, including prisoner exchanges that helped enable the reopening of embassies. Pope Francis was central to this process, promoting a “culture of encounter” through letters, quiet diplomacy, and direct engagement with leaders like Barack Obama and Raúl Castro. The Vatican’s long-term strategy and neutrality made it an effective “honest broker”, building on decades of engagement with Cuba and prioritizing humanitarian and diplomatic solutions over political or economic interests.
Edward G. Stafford Inter-American Defense College