Jan 13, 2026 — Washington’s Path to Displacing Rivals in Post-Maduro Venezuela: China , Russia , and Iran have played distinct but complementary roles in supporting Venezuela and countering the United States . China has been Venezuela’s most consequential partner, providing over $100 billion in oil-backed loans since the early 2000s. Through joint ventures in the Orinoco Belt and long-term supply agreements, Beijing secured preferential access to heavy crude reserves. Its engagement has been pragmatic—focused on energy security, infrastructure, and technology, deeply embedding Chinese firms in Venezuela’s oil sector. Russia’s role has centered on military cooperation and geopolitical signaling. Through arms sales, defense ties, and roughly $20 billion in credit, Moscow reinforced Caracas politically but did little to reverse economic collapse. Its presence serves primarily as strategic deterrence against U.S. influence. Iran’s involvement has been smaller but symbolically potent, emphasizing sanctions evasion, fuel swaps, logistics networks, and limited military assistance, reinforcing anti-U.S. alignment. Together, China provides the economic backbone, Russia strategic support, and Iran sanctions cooperation, creating layered resistance to U.S. pressure and complicating future policy recalibration, even beyond Nicolás Maduro .
Brian Fonseca, Martin Brown Americas Quarterly
Feb 12, 2026 — The Venezuela-Iran connection and what Maduro’s capture means for Tehran, explained: Iran and Venezuela developed a durable partnership rooted in shared opposition to the United States, formalized after Iran’s 1979 revolution and significantly expanded under Hugo Chávez. During the Chávez era, hundreds of agreements covered infrastructure, industry, and political coordination, with billions in Iranian loans and investments aimed at stabilizing Venezuela’s oil sector and fiscal crisis. As sanctioned oil producers, both states deepened cooperation through energy investment, technical assistance, and sanctions-evasion mechanisms. Venezuelan gold exports reportedly helped finance Iranian support and oil-sector services. Venezuela also became a strategic foothold for Iranian-aligned actors in the Western Hemisphere. Hezbollah networks have been linked to money laundering and trafficking activities, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—particularly its external operations arm—maintained structured engagement supporting the Maduro government. The U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro represents a strategic setback for Tehran, potentially disrupting sanctions-evasion logistics, oil-linked financial flows, and proxy infrastructure. More broadly, it highlights Iran’s strategy of cultivating extra-regional authoritarian partnerships to buffer against U.S. pressure—and signals that such networks remain vulnerable to coordinated legal and financial action.
Jose Pelayo, Kirsten Fontenrose, Ellie Sennett Atlantic Council
Jan 9, 2026 — On Venezuela: An expert, expats share perspectives: Dr. Brian Fonseca emphasizes that the removal of Nicolás Maduro marks a significant setback for the regime responsible for widespread repression and mass emigration. With Maduro detained on drug-trafficking charges in the U.S., Washington has framed Venezuela’s long-standing oil nationalization and alleged expropriations as one of the “largest thefts of American property,” using this as part of its justification to control and market Venezuelan crude that had been trapped on sanctioned tankers. Fonseca also highlights the substantial challenge of rebuilding Venezuela’s institutions and reviving diplomatic, military, and private-sector relationships. He describes a “valley of transition” — a difficult interim period before democratic restoration is feasible, potentially taking one to two years as governance and economic structures are reconstructed. Notably, he points out that U.S. actions have effectively sidelined Russia and China from their deep involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector — a shift Washington regards as a strategic advantage in reducing rival influence.
Alexandra Pecharich FIU News
Dec 22, 2025 — Latin America Outlook 2026: The region’s trajectory will depend heavily on how the United States manages Venezuela’s political transition, whether through sustained pressure, economic isolation, negotiated restructuring, or potential military measures. Each path carries significant implications not only for internal stabilization in Venezuela but also for broader hemispheric dynamics. Washington’s approach will likely shape how neighboring states recalibrate their positions toward extra-regional powers and external state actors. Policy choices could generate ripple effects across migration flows, security cooperation frameworks, energy markets, and regional political alignments. A hardline strategy may reinforce polarization, while a managed transition could encourage diplomatic realignment and institutional rebuilding. In either case, U.S. decisions will serve as a signal to the region regarding the limits of external influence and the costs of strategic alignment against Washington.
Evan Ellis FIU's Jack D. Gordon Institute
Nov 3, 2025 — Chinese Scholars See Russia’s Venezuela Strategy as a Model of Hybrid Power Projection in the U.S.’ Backyard: The strategic relationship between Russia and Venezuela evolved significantly after the Cold War and Venezuela’s Bolivarian shift toward anti-hegemonic politics. Deep cooperation expanded particularly under Vladimir Putin, as Moscow sought to assert global influence and challenge the United States dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Military cooperation reflects shared opposition to U.S. regional influence, with Russia supplying technical military support, hardware, and conducting symbolic engagements such as strategic visits and defense coordination. Recent reports indicate deliveries of advanced air defense systems and continuing defense ties amid heightened regional tensions. On the economic side, Russia has supported Venezuela’s oil sector through credit mechanisms, investments, and energy cooperation. Both countries have deepened coordination in energy markets and sought to stabilize output in the face of Western sanctions. Engagement in OPEC+ and collaborative energy initiatives have reinforced their mutual interests. In 2025, Moscow and Caracas signed and ratified a comprehensive Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Treaty that broadens collaboration across energy, mineral resources, transport, communications, security, counterterrorism, and financial infrastructure, elevating bilateral ties and signaling long-term multipolar alignment.
Han Zhen China Global South Project
Feb 20, 2026 — China as the Keystone of a Global Network of Autocracies: China is widely assessed by U.S. policymakers and analysts as pursuing an explicit strategy to challenge and ultimately displace the United States as the most influential global power. Beijing’s leadership has articulated a long-term vision that seeks to expand its strategic reach and reshape global norms, institutions, and rules in ways that favor the Chinese Communist Party and undercut traditional democratic leadership structures. In Latin America, closer cooperation between China, Russia and other sympathetic governments—including those in Venezuela and Cuba —strengthens narratives that criticize U.S. policy while promoting authoritarian governance models as stable and reliable alternatives. Beijing’s export of digital infrastructure and technological standards, such as components of its Digital Silk Road, has proven attractive to some authoritarian states and may bolster state capacity to surveil and control populations. China is seen as the “keystone” of a broader network of authoritarian states. Since Xi Jinping consolidated power, Beijing has deepened strategic cooperation with Russia, Iran , North Korea , and others—not merely transactional relationships but coordinated efforts to influence global norms, expand surveillance-oriented technologies, and counter democratic models. This cooperation helps partner states undermine democratic rivals, export repression-enhancing technologies, and resist international democratic norms.
Christopher Walker National Endowment for Democracy
Feb 12, 2020 — Venezuela and Cuba: The Ties that Bind: The Cuba–Venezuela alliance emerged in the late 1990s under Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, rooted in shared socialist ideology, anti-U.S. sentiment, and ambitions to reshape regional influence. Over two decades, the relationship evolved into a strategic partnership encompassing economic exchange, political coordination, and deep security cooperation. Its core mechanism was an “oil-for-services” model: Venezuela supplied subsidized crude vital to Cuba’s energy needs, while Cuba deployed thousands of doctors, teachers, and security advisers to support Venezuelan social programs and governance. This arrangement produced mutual regime dependence—Cuba relied on Venezuelan oil for economic stability, while Venezuelan leaders benefited from Cuban institutional, intelligence, and administrative expertise to manage dissent and consolidate political control. Ideologically, both governments aligned against perceived U.S. hegemony and promoted alternative regional integration through initiatives such as ALBA, seeking cooperative development outside U.S.-led economic frameworks. Despite rhetoric of equality, the partnership remained asymmetrical: Venezuela’s energy wealth subsidized Cuba, while Cuban advisers bolstered Venezuela’s governance capacity. As Venezuela’s economic crisis and oil production decline intensified in the 2010s, the alliance grew more strained, exposing Cuba’s vulnerability to Venezuelan instability. Overall, the partnership illustrates how ideologically aligned authoritarian regimes can leverage economic integration and security cooperation to sustain political survival and resist external pressure.
Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, Richard E. Feinberg Wilson Center
Apr 12, 2019 — Pompeo: China financing of Maduro prolongs Venezuela crisis: Mike Pompeo argued that China’s extensive financial support to Nicolás Maduro’s government played a central role in precipitating and prolonging Venezuela’s political and economic crisis. He claimed Beijing invested more than $60 billion “with no strings attached,” providing the regime with resources that allowed it to remain in power despite hyperinflation, humanitarian shortages, and mass displacement. According to Pompeo, these funds were not used to stabilize the economy or alleviate suffering but instead enabled the Maduro government to reward loyalists, repress pro-democracy activists, and sustain ineffective social programs that entrenched authoritarian rule. He further framed China’s involvement as part of a broader strategic approach in which trade and financing serve geopolitical, technological, and national security objectives rather than purely commercial goals. In this view, China’s economic engagement in Venezuela reinforced regime durability while advancing Beijing’s influence in Latin America. Overall, Pompeo’s core claim is that Chinese financial intervention functioned as a lifeline for Maduro’s government, contributing to governance failure, delaying political accountability, and embedding Venezuela more deeply within China’s strategic orbit.
Eva Vergara AP News
May 1, 2015 — Russia and Latin America: The New Frontier for Geopolitics, Arms Sales and Energy: Russia’s renewed engagement in Latin America reflects a broader effort to reassert itself as a global power and counterbalance U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, even though the region remains secondary to Moscow’s priorities in Europe and Asia. Its strategy emphasizes selective partnerships with ideologically aligned governments—such as Venezuela and Nicaragua—to expand geopolitical reach and promote a multipolar international order. Diplomatically, Moscow relies on high-level visits, symbolic signaling, and strengthened state-to-state ties to present itself as an alternative partner to Washington. This political messaging often outweighs the scale of Russia’s economic footprint, which remains far smaller than that of the United States or China. Arms sales and defense cooperation constitute a central pillar of Russia’s regional presence, with military equipment, loans, and training helping deepen ties with partners like Venezuela and Nicaragua while expanding Moscow’s diplomatic leverage. Energy cooperation—especially in oil and gas—complements this outreach by embedding economic links that reinforce strategic alignment. Overall, Russia’s Latin American engagement serves as geopolitical signaling, multilateral leverage, and alliance-building among governments skeptical of U.S. influence, intersecting with broader great power competition and occasionally complementing China’s larger economic role in the region.
Stephen Blank, Younkyoo Kim ResearchGate
Jan 15, 2026 — Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere: The article argues that Russia condemned the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro but avoided substantive retaliation, reflecting both its limited capacity and competing priorities. Despite this restraint, Venezuela remains strategically valuable to Moscow as a platform for projecting influence beyond Cuba, gaining access to major oil reserves, and sustaining an anti-Western geopolitical alignment. Economically, Russian state-linked energy firms have secured stakes in Venezuelan oil projects and loan-for-oil repayment arrangements, allowing Moscow to convert political backing into physical crude flows and long-term leverage. Financial cooperation and joint ventures, alongside Venezuela’s cryptocurrency experiment (the “petro”), provided testing grounds for sanctions-evasion mechanisms and alternative payment systems later studied or adapted by Russia. Security and influence efforts extend through arms transfers, military cooperation, and information partnerships via outlets such as RT en Español, which broaden Russia’s narrative reach across Latin America. However, the article notes that Russia’s investments face limited financial returns and increasing vulnerability due to U.S. sanctions and political pressure, meaning Moscow’s engagement is driven more by geopolitical signaling and strategic positioning than by clear economic gains.
Sergey Sukhankin Jamestown
Jan 10, 2026 — Russia and Venezuela discuss military cooperation: Major General Alexei Orehkov, head of Russia's Directorate for International Military Cooperation, and Venezuela's military attache discussed: developing military and military-technical cooperation; greater cooperation between both military departments; reaffirmed mutual commitment to consistent contact; cooperation will be developed based on previous bilateral agreements; and Venezuela emphasized its right to self-defense (referring to the U.S. extraction of Maduro).
Nov 28, 2025 — Venezuela and Russia Sign 42 New Agreements: At the 19th Russia–Venezuela High-Level Intergovernmental Commission, both countries signed 42 cooperation agreements spanning energy, mining, finance, health, trade, and cultural sectors, underscoring the breadth of their strategic partnership. In energy, Venezuela extended by 15 years its alliances with Russian-linked oil joint ventures such as Petroperijá and Petroboquerón, reinforcing long-term hydrocarbon collaboration and production stability. Financial cooperation advanced through continued use of Russia’s MIR payment cards by Russian tourists in Venezuela, with plans underway to allow Venezuelans to use the system in Russia—an effort to expand alternative payment channels amid sanctions pressures. The agreements also included cooperation on strategic minerals and exploration in Venezuela’s Mining Arc, one of the world’s richest zones for gold and diamonds, highlighting Moscow’s interest in resource access. Beyond extractive sectors, the partnership broadened to economic and technological areas: joint initiatives in cocoa and seafood trade, medical cooperation including a Russian-led cancer vaccine protocol, and technology transfer enabling domestic insulin production by 2026. Cultural, sports, and broader trade protocols further institutionalized bilateral engagement. Overall, the agreements reflect a multidimensional alliance aimed at deepening economic integration, sanctions resilience, and long-term strategic coordination.
Oct 1, 2025 — Putin Ratifies Russia–Venezuela Strategic Partnership Treaty to Deepen Economic and Military Ties: In October 2025, Putin ratified a Russia–Venezuela strategic partnership treaty committing both states to oppose Western sanctions, expand oil trade, jointly develop new oil and gas fields, and boost output from existing projects. The agreement also calls for cooperation in electric power infrastructure and capacity and supports creating an independent bilateral financial system. Venezuela continues to operate Russian Su-30MK2 fighter jets acquired in the 2000s, and U.S. concerns persist over potential deployment of Russian Kh-31 anti-ship missiles, underscoring the treaty’s energy, financial, and defense implications.
Dariia Mykhailenko United24
Nov 7, 2024 — Venezuela Signs Defense, Energy Deals With Russia: In November 2024, Venezuela and Russia signed 17 agreements covering defense, intelligence, and energy cooperation during a high-level visit to Caracas. The deals included collaboration on intelligence-gathering, counter-espionage, drone use, and petroleum exploration technology, alongside potential Russian provision of advanced military equipment to Venezuela’s armed forces. Maduro said the agreements would deepen bilateral cooperation through 2030 and beyond. The accords reinforced Moscow’s political backing of Maduro and expanded security and energy ties, reflecting a broader effort to consolidate a long-term strategic partnership amid sanctions and geopolitical alignment
Jan 13, 2026 — China-Venezuela Fact Sheet: A Short Primer on the Relationship: Venezuela has been one of China’s closest partners in Latin America; Beijing has developed deep economic ties with Venezuela over the last 20 years (through loans and purchases of Venezuelan oil); and Venezuela is the largest purchaser of Chinese military equipment in Latin America. Also, a snapshot of Venezuela-China cooperation related to investment, debt, oil, sanctions, and military cooperation.
Joseph Federici, Nicole Morgret, Benton Gordon, Graham Ayres U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Jan 23, 2026 — How China’s oil-backed lending in Venezuela fell into distress—and what might come next: China’s oil-backed lending involves 3 elements: a Chinese policy bank to loan the money, a commodity purchase contract requiring the borrower to sell commodities (sometimes at a pre-agreed price or quantity) to a purchaser in China, and a repayment channel that directs commodity sale proceeds toward debt service. Moreover, it i ncludes graphics on China’s “collaterized, commodity-backed lending,” the top recipients of China’s oil-backed loan commitments from 2000-2023, and four-party agreement and cash-flow controls in the Joint China-Venezuela Fund as well as its timeline.
Oshin Pandey, Pavan Raghavendra AidData
Apr 12, 2022 — China's Growing Influence in Latin America: Venezuela is the largest borrower, receiving nearly $60 billion worth of Chinese state loans, mostly in the energy and infrastructure sectors (that amount nearly double that of the second largest borrower, Brazil), and Venezuela is China’s comprehensive strategic partner. Also, Venezuela is the region’s top buyer of Chinese military hardware after the U.S. banned all commercial arms sales to Venezuela in 2006, and stated the argument that President Trump’s hard-lined approach drove authoritarian regimes (Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua) closer to China.
Diana Roy Council on Foreign Relations
Dec 17, 2025 — China-Venezuela Relations: Prior to Maduro’s extraction, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged support for Venezuelan sovereignty and economic autonomy; China replaced U.S. as #1 trading partner in 2019; China is an eessential telecommunications, infrastructure, and transportation provider; 85% of total Venezuelan crude production is intended for Chinese refineries, Venezuela’s top exports are petroleum coke, iron ore, and acrylic alcohols; and aspires to replicate China’s Shenzhen SEZ Model and industrial success.
Feb 16, 2024 — China-Latin America Space Cooperation: An Overview: PRC-military-affiliated Great Wall Industrial Corporation (GWIC) built and launched the Venesat-1 communications relay satellite under a $405 million contract mainly funded by Chinese funds- however lost the satellite in 2020. The PRC has trained at least 150 Venezuelan space personnel and built two ground control facilities: the El Sombrero tracking station at the Manuel Rios airbase and the Luepa backup facility at Fort Manikuyá.
Evan Ellis The Diplomat
Jan 30, 2024 — China’s space diplomacy in Latin America: Partners for its Lunar station: Venezuela was the first country to sign a cooperation protocol in relation with the Chinese Lunar station; Venezuela’s Venesat 1 communications satellite was made and launched by China; the VRSS 1 remote sensing craft was made and launched in China as well (in 2012). Venezuela was the first to join the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), an alternative to the Western-led Artemis Accords; Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities (ABAE) is Venezuela’s national space agency and agreed with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) in July 2023 to in-depth cooperation in “demonstration, engineering implementation, operation and application of the ILRS.”
Teresa Carrelli Palombi Universidad de Navarra
Jun 11, 2022 — Iran, Venezuela sign 20-year cooperation plan during Maduro visit: Iran and Venezuela signed a 20-year “cooperation road map” that formalizes their strategic partnership across energy, trade, agriculture, science, and tourism. Both governments framed the agreement as a long-term mechanism for jointly resisting U.S. sanctions, elevating the relationship to a “strategic” level and positioning their cooperation as part of a broader anti-imperialist alignment. Furthermore, m aduro announced the launch of a direct flight route between Tehran and Caracas, scheduled to begin July 18, as part of the broader cooperation roadmap. This air corridor is intended to facilitate the movement of officials, technical personnel, and commercial delegations while also promoting tourism between the two sanctioned states.
Maziar Motamedi Aljazeera
Jun 1, 2023 — Iran’ Re-engagement with Latin America: Following a period of reduced visibility under former President Hassan Rouhani, Iran re- activated its Latin America portfolio around 2020. This surge coincided with increased Iran– U.S. tensions after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, prompting Iran to seek alternative partners and political space in the Western Hemisphere. Also, b etween 2021 and 2023, Iran supplied Venezuela with Zolfaghar-class boats, Nasr-1 anti-ship missiles, and additional drones, including systems used by Venezuelan forces in operations against FARC dissidents in Apure in 2022. Iran also began training Venezuelan naval special forces in underwater demolition at Bandar Abbas.
Evan Ellis Atalayar
May 17, 2022 — Iran and Venezuela sign agreement to recover El Palito refinery: In May 2022, Iran’s National Iranian Oil Engineering and Construction Company signed a €110 million contract with Venezuela’s state oil firm PDVSA to repair, commission, and restore the El Palito refinery, which has a capacity of approximately 146,000 barrels per day. Under the agreement, Naftiran Intertrade Company will finance the project and supply