

BRICS Research Topics

Russia promotes the BRICS practice of building a multipolar world: foundation, path and prospects

Wang Chenxing

Abstract: The history of Russian diplomacy is a "history of struggle" that repeatedly pursues a central position in the international system. In order to get rid of the disadvantageous position that was "imposed" in the existing international system due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it regains its glory as a great power and returns to the center of the international stage. Russia's strategic choice is "since it is not suitable, then break it", trying to promote changes in the international system, breaking the unipolar world dominated by the United States and the West, advocating the construction of a multipolar world, and seeking "In Russia's foreign strategic coordinates, although the BRICS mechanism is not as important as the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, etc. led by Russia, the BRICS mechanism is important in uniting non-Western powers and emerging powers. It has played an important role in the transformation of the international system. From Russia's perspective, the geopolitical value of the BRICS mechanism is higher than the value of foreign economic cooperation. It is more of a suboptimal direction in line with the main direction of foreign strategy and a way to reshape the prestige of great powers. Booster. Focusing on this strategic positioning, Russia formulates its BRICS mechanism policy at three levels: issue setting, system design, and interaction methods. Although affected by the Ukrainian crisis and the extreme suppression of the US and Western strategies in the short and medium term, Russia has adopted the BRICS mechanism platform. It chooses a "one-sided" strategy towards the non-Western world and emerging country groups. However, in the long term, it cannot be ruled out that Russia will continue to pursue a multi-dimensional composite diplomatic identity that is "both Europe and Asia, both west and east, and both north and south." By then, the BRICS mechanism will only be one of the platforms supporting Russia's composite diplomatic identity.

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associate researcher at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, postdoctoral fellow at the School of Economics, Nankai University

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The rejuvenation of a great power is usually comprehensive, comprehensive, systematic and dynamic. In terms of foreign strategy, one of the important meanings of the so-called rejuvenation of a great power is to get rid of its uncomfortable position in the international system and then pursue a reasonable goal position in the international system. In other words, pursuing a reasonable position in the international system is the key for major powers to realize their national interests. In order to obtain a reasonable position in the international system and achieve the goal of rejuvenation, major powers are required to accurately plan a strategic path and comprehensively coordinate strategic resources. Comprehensive use of strategic tools and all available elements of strategic power to steadily or even accelerate the rejuvenation process. As far as Russia is concerned, promoting the multipolarization of the world and then pursuing "one pole" status is its foreign strategic path to achieve rejuvenation as a great power. Choice, and the BRICS mechanism is the practical platform for this external strategic path.

Since Peter the Great entered the international political arena after winning the Northern War (1700-1721), the history of Russian diplomacy has been a "history of struggle" in the repeated pursuit of a central position in the international system. The disintegration of the Soviet Union made Russia once in the international system. The central position has slipped to the periphery. In December 1999, Putin admitted in the article "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium" that Russia is no longer the leading country in economic and social development in the contemporary world. At the same time, he proposed Russia's role in the international community in the 21st century. The question of what status it should occupy. In February 2022, former Russian presidential assistant Surkov (yinyin yinyin) proposed that Russia's situation after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was similar to that after the Bolsheviks and Germany signed the Brest-Litovsk Agreement in 1918. This was a "shameful" contract for Soviet Russia (yinyin yinyin), which resulted in the loss of international status and a large territory in exchange for national independence. What's more, today's Russia faces a strategic environment that it has never encountered since its founding. This is the first time in history that Russia is in the embarrassing situation of being "strong in the east and west but weak in itself". Facing the highly developed European Union and the booming Asia-Pacific region, the Eurasian heartland where Russia is located has become a place with "growth but no development". The modernization depression can either integrate the Eurasian region and create a central Eurasian pole connecting the east and west, or be absorbed by the two major development centers of the east and west, exacerbating the "dual division" of the domestic political economy and becoming a single-choice question facing Russia's ruling elite today. and must-choose questions. Obviously, Russia cannot accept such a fact and will inevitably choose the former to achieve a comprehensive reshaping of status and glory. The common judgment of Russian political circles and academic circles is that the wo

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Y Vladimir Putin Russia at the Millennium Turn Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 30, 1999

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Y Vladislav Surkov The foggy future of the obscene world Current comments y February

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Y in Eurasia: analysis based on the relationship between state, capital and society», in «Russia Eastern Europe and Central Asia Studies», Issue 5, 2018, Pages 13-25.

It is in the transition period from the old bipolar pattern to the new multipolar pattern. It can be clearly seen from this that Russia's foreign strategic goal is to seek the return of the central position of the international system. Its path is to concentrate all elements of strategic power, promote world multipolarity, and Occupy an independent and powerful "one pole" position in the future multipolar world. The BRICS mechanism plays an important role in this process. Russia regards it as the embodiment of the "multipolar world order". This provides us with a discussion on Russia's "Golden BRIC "BRIC View" and provides a basic narrative framework for the BRICS mechanism policy.

The main points of this article are: First, from the perspective of strategic value measurement, in Russia's foreign strategy, the geopolitical value of the BRICS mechanism is higher than the value of foreign economic cooperation. Second, from the perspective of strategic priority, the same as the Eurasian economy Compared with the Alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and other important supports that have built up Russia's international status, the BRICS mechanism is a second-best platform in Russia's pursuit of world multipolarity, and has the function of strengthening the non-Western forces for change in the international system. Third, From the perspective of mechanism design, the forum-based and platform-based BRICS mechanism at this stage is more conducive to the realization of Russia's national interests. In order to demonstrate the above point of view, this article attempts to analyze and discuss from the following perspectives: First, starting from the practical basis, exploring Russia's multi-polarity The second is to analyze Russia's BRICS practical path in promoting world multipolarization from the three levels of issues, systems, and interactions. The third is to summarize Russia's BRICS shaping mechanism based on the completion of the above discussion. The dynamics, resistance and prospects of

A practical basis

Since the 1990s, promoting the construction of a multipolar world has been the core concept of Russia's foreign strategy. Establishing and consolidating an independent "one pole" in multipolarity is the practical goal of Russia's foreign strategy. Russia's multipolar thinking is not achieved overnight. It has gone through stages of conception, initial practice, and comprehensive practice. After the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, and then Russia's "special military action" against Ukraine in 2022, under the profound changes in the internal and external strategic environment, new trends in Russian multipolar thinking have emerged. Adjustment. In addition to seeing objective trends such as the international power pattern rising in the east and falling in the west, and the center of gravity of the world economy continuing to shift eastward, Russia also believes that "if there are enough big countries claiming that the world is multipolar, then this pattern will come faster." From this

Concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation President of Russia November 2007 // Why the world is not becoming multipolar INF Treaty June 2007 // []

[Australia] Written by Popolo, translated by Yuan Jing et al.: «The Lonely Empire: Russia and Disorder in the New World» Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2019, page 55

2. Preliminary practice period (1997-2000) After

Primakov proposed Russia's multipolar idea, he quickly put it into practice. Overall, under Primakov's promotion, Russia basically established its position among the ranks of emerging powers. As a composite diplomatic identity representing developed countries and emerging powers in the group of developed countries, its diplomatic space has been significantly expanded, and its international influence has also bottomed out. Specifically, 1998 was a bumper harvest for Primakov's diplomacy. In 2008, Russia achieved two major diplomatic achievements. First, it participated in the G7 (Birmingham Summit) as a full member, realizing its "desire" to join the "world's industrially developed democracies". Under the historical conditions at that time, Russia believed that in the process of setting the agenda of globalization, Western developed countries are undoubtedly the leading party. Therefore, joining the G7 is a necessary measure to demonstrate the status of a major country and maintain the dignity of a major country. The second is to advocate the establishment of a China-Russia-India trilateral mechanism and begin to pay attention to cooperation with China. Relations with non-Western powers, and actively build a dialogue platform with emerging powers. During his visit to India, Primakov first proposed the concept of developing trilateral strategic cooperation between China, Russia and India, using this as a practical platform to promote the construction of a multi-polar pattern on a global scale. Russian diplomatic circles generally regard the

establishment of the China-Russia-India trilateral

mechanism as the prelude to Russia's promotion of world multipolarity. 3. Comprehensive promotion period (2000-2014) From

2000, Russia entered the Putin era, until the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Before the outbreak, Putin basically continued Primakov's multipolar thinking. The two foreign ministers Ivanov (伊万诺夫) and Lavrov (拉夫罗夫) were the staunch implementers of this idea. Lavrov put Primakov's series of diplomatic thoughts centered on building a multipolar world are collectively called "Primakov Doctrine". In summary, Russian diplomacy must adhere to the three principles of non-conflict, pluralism and practicality. Here During this period, Russia's multipolar thoughts and practices were comprehensively promoted, its composite diplomatic identity was further demonstrated, and its strategic environment was greatly improved compared with the 1990s. In 2005, leaders of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and other countries Attending the dialogue between emerging economies and the Group of Eight (G8), Russia's composite diplomatic status as both a developed country and an emerging economy reached its "peak moment." Especially before the financial crisis from 2005 to 2008, a certain kind of political thinking emerged in Russian academic circles. "Strategic excitement". Many scholars believe that Russia has ushered in a "strategic opportunity period", which means that Russia is the only major country that can dialogue with developed countries and emerging powers at the same time. Russia is no longer on the edge of the northern foothills of Eurasia. It is not only a belt, but a bridge connecting the Eurasian continent. It is also a link that runs through the east and west and connects the north and the south. It occupies a "central position" in the new pattern of global governance.

Lavrov: in the near future, historians will formulate such a concept as "doctrine" Primakov" TASS October 2008: // 拉夫罗夫 / 拉夫罗夫 / 拉夫罗夫 [拉夫罗夫]

Lavrov spoke about Primakov's idea to create a "triangle" Russia India China RIA News: // 拉夫罗夫 / 拉夫罗夫 / 拉夫罗夫 [拉夫罗夫]

The relative weakness of the Russian economy has provided an opportunity for the West to achieve this goal. In addition, the Ukraine crisis has also profoundly changed Russia's diplomatic logic and behavioral narrative since it pursued a multipolar strategy in 1996. The foundation of its composite diplomatic identity has undergone fundamental changes. The Ukraine crisis Since the upgrade, the European Council has suspended Russia's membership, Russia has been expelled from the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the Russia-NATO Council has been suspended. The dialogue channels that Russia and the West have jointly operated for nearly 30 years have almost become ineffective. There are also voices saying that the European continent A new "Iron Curtain" is rising between the East and the West. It should be said that this relationship pattern has also objectively pushed Russia to the "East" or "non-West", and its composite diplomatic identity has gone bankrupt in stages.

In the context of the protracted crisis in Ukraine, Russia's multipolar thinking has undergone new adjustments. First of all, the biggest obstacle to realizing world multipolarity is the United States' support for a unipolar world and global hegemony. Secondly, Russia's pursuit of "one-polarity" in its Eurasian periphery is still It is the core support of the "Eurasian Economic Union+" cooperation model, but it is not limited to this. Russia relies on the "Eurasian Economic Union+" cooperation model to try to build a regional integration mechanism with the Eurasian Economic Union as the core and connect to other regional integration mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN. Ultimately, Build a "Greater Eurasian Partnership". Again, a multipolar world must emerge from struggle. Russia's main target of struggle is US and Western hegemony. Finally, Russia must not only continue to pursue a pluralistic diplomatic line and continue to expand its external strategic space, but also It is necessary to unite the majority of non-Western developing countries to build a global anti-hegemony united front. Especially under the Ukraine crisis, Russia has strengthened its alliance with China, Iran, Turkey, etc. to build a Eurasian land power camp to check and balance the maritime hegemony group dominated by the United States and the West. Against this background, Russia's policy towards the BRICS mechanism has also undergone certain adjustments. On the basis of the original policy objectives and tasks, it has added the content of hedging against the strategic

suppression of the United States and the West. (2) BRICS mechanism: Russia's practical

carrier for building a multi-polar world, driven by Russia, "BRICS" has transformed from an investment concept proposed by Goldman Sachs in the United States in 2001 into an important international cooperation mechanism. It is generally believed that the institutionalization of BRICS has benefited from Russia's diplomatic "wisdom" and "art". As can be seen from the above, The BRICS mechanism was born during the comprehensive promotion period of Russia's implementation of multi-polar thinking, and entered a period of profound adjustment. Russian academic circles generally believe that the BRICS

Plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum President

Russia June 2021: // www.kremlin.ru/press/press_releases/2021/06/20210619-11-19

Regarding the institutionalization process of the BRICS countries, there has been a wealth of research in the academic community. This article

will not go into details. See Xiao Huizhong: «Analysis of Russia's BRICS

diplomacy Several questions», Published in "Russian Studies", Issue 4, 2012, Pages 21-42, Shen Chen: "Hedging Strategy or Functional Cooperation? - Analysis of Russia's Participation in the BRICS Agenda", Published in "Russia Research», Issue 1, 2022, Pages 124-142.

Russia wants to lead Eurasia. In short, Russia believes that in order to become a "one pole", it needs a fixed and exclusive sphere of influence as strategic support. Therefore, there is no doubt that integrating the Eurasian periphery is the key to Russia's foreign strategy.

After understanding this principle, we can find that compared with the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which Russia dominates around Eurasia, the BRICS mechanism is an extended platform for the backbone support of Russia's "one pole" status. In recent years, the strategic value of the BRICS mechanism in the Eurasian Economic Union's expansion of international cooperation space has been further highlighted. Russia advocates using the BRICS mechanism as a link to promote the cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the African Union, the Southern Common Market, ASEAN, etc. Regional integration mechanisms are connected to realize the

concept of "integration of integration". Second, the BRICS mechanism is a necessary tool for Russia to promote changes in the international order. As mentioned above, the Eurasian periphery is the core of Russia's "one pole" status. However, without the blessing of the BRICS mechanism, the effectiveness of Russia's multipolar world strategy will be greatly reduced. In Russia's foreign strategy, the primary purpose of proposing the establishment of the BRICS mechanism is to promote the transformation of the international order and build a new multipolar world order. Russia believes that the basis of the new world order is the collective leadership of major powers. The BRICS mechanism provides an important platform for Russia to win over emerging powers and thereby strengthen non-Western forces for change in the international order. In the early stages of the development of the BRICS mechanism, Russia made it clear The strategic positioning of the BRICS mechanism. The "Conception of Russia's Participation in the BRICS Mechanism" released in 2013 clearly stated at the outset that the institutionalization of the BRICS is an important geopolitical event in the new century and fully embodies the

development trend of world multipolarity. Russian BRICS countries The Executive Director of the Research Committee Toloraya put forward straightforwardly that the BRICS mechanism was established to build a new international order and is a tool to optimize the distribution of world power. To this day, Russia's positioning of the BRICS mechanism is still unclear . Changes: Russia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Lyabi

[Australia] Written by Popolo, translated by Yuan Jing and others: «The Lonely Empire: Russia and the New World of Disorder», Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2019, pages 55-56

I session of the UN General Assembly President of Russia September BRICS Plus Meeting President of Russia June year [grace of integration" and prospects for BRICS World economy and international relations No. st y y

Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Nezavisimaya Gazeta February Concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation President of Russia November Concept of participation of the Russian

Federation in the BRICS association President of Russia March

Georgy Toloraya Why does Russia need BRICS? Russia in global politics No. st y y

The BRICS mechanism can become one of the pillars of the new international order. It is not difficult to see from this that Russia has a special enthusiasm for the "BRICS+" initiative and the expansion of the BRICS mechanism. Because in Russia's strategic vision, the expansion of the BRICS mechanism This means that the number of countries promoting multipolarity in the world has increased and their strength has grown, and it will help further consolidate the global anti-hegemony united front. According to Lisovorik (project director of the Valdai International Debate Club in Russia, the expanded BRICS mechanism The "bottom-up" route should be followed in the selection of cooperation paths, that is, taking world economic issues as the starting point and gradually moving towards revising international institutional arrangements. He believes that the specific contents are: First, we must give full play to the role of a trade and investment platform and expand bilateral cooperation. The scale of multilateral cooperation. Secondly, we must strengthen the coordination of policy positions in international organizations. Thirdly, we must promote development bank cooperation at all levels with the participation of the New Development Bank. Fourthly, we must establish a local currency settlement system. Fifthly, we must build a global and regional financial center and improve the efficiency of member countries. Inter-local currency reserve ratio

Third, the BRICS mechanism is a useful boost to Russia's prestige as a great power. Ancient Chinese strategists have long made judgments about national prestige. The Zuo Zhuan put it this way: "If you rebel but don't repent, why demonstrate? If you submit but don't submit, how can you show your sympathy? "If it is neither prestige nor ambition, how can we show virtue? Without virtue, how can we show alliance?" In modern international relations, national prestige and the distribution of power among countries together constitute the control elements of the international system. Power only refers to the system that forces the other party to obey. The difference between sexual coercion and coercion is that prestige refers to the reliability of a country's power and its willingness to achieve its own goals and contain other countries. It is obvious that a country's international prestige is mainly based on its own strength and international recognition. On the basis of this, both are indispensable. In the reality of international relations, prestige among countries is divided into levels. A high level of prestige of a country means that it has high authority in the international system. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue as much as possible in the prestige level system between countries. High status is one of the important interests of a great power. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Soviet Union's prestige as a great power also dissipated. An important task for Russia's foreign strategy after independence is to reshape the prestige of a great power. From Russia's perspective, the foundation of its national prestige is mainly based on the following four aspects: first, emphasizing Russia's status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; second, participating in global large and small multilateral mechanisms; third, establishing a hierarchy of Eurasian peripheral regions under Russian leadership system. The fourth is to consolidate the nuclear and energy powers.

Ryabkov stated that the BRICS countries will become the basis of the new world order RBCy March

2017y No. 69y pp 4-5 «Zuo

Zhuan»y Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2012, pp. 629-630y [US]

Written by Robert Gilpin, Translated by Song Xinning and others: « War and Change in World Politics»y Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House , 2007, Page 36

Written by Yu Keping: «Power and Authority: Some Important Issues in Political Philosophy», Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2020, Page 6, [US]

Written by Robert Gilpin, translated by Song Xinning and others: «War and Change in World Politics», Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House Society, 2007, page 37.

status. Therefore, comprehensively mobilizing the above four basic elements and using the BRICS mechanism is not only Russia's way of enhancing its national prestige among emerging powers and developing countries, it is also a way to hedge and balance the United States and Western developed countries and to limit its national prestige. Loss strategy selection




Figure 1 Russia's positioning and policy transmission of the BRICS mechanism

Source: Drawn by the author

To sum up, in Russia's foreign strategic narrative, the positioning of the BRICS mechanism is clear, that is, the second-best direction in the foreign strategic order, a tool to promote the transformation of the international system, and a platform to pursue national prestige (Figure 1). Russian Gold The policy transmission mechanism of the BRICS mechanism is to achieve the overall strategic goal of promoting the multi-polarization of the world and seeking "one pole" status through the setting of cooperation issues, institutional design arrangements and selection of actor interaction models. In the process of BRICS mechanism cooperation, Russia decides based on its specific interests Determine the priority of the above three positioning options. Therefore, Russia's BRICS policy behavior can be roughly divided into suboptimal directions based on foreign strategy, based on promoting changes in the international system, based on the pursuit of national prestige, and based on the pursuit of national prestige. And four major types that combine the above three types.

Two practice paths

Generally speaking, the goal of national foreign policy is to promote changes in the international system in a way that increases national interests. In Russia's foreign strategy, the BRICS mechanism has high strategic value in promoting the profound evolution of the international pattern.

[US] Written by Robert Gilpin, translated by Song Xinning and others: "War and Change in World Politics", Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007, page 56.

It can be seen that in 2009, the leaders of the BRICS countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, and in the joint statement after the meeting, they only stated that "the primary content of the reform of the world financial and economic system is to require the democratization and transparency of decision-making by international financial institutions", which did not involve The content of world multipolarity. The statement of world multipolarity was formally written into the BRICS leaders' joint statement document after the Brasilia Summit in 2010. It was not until the 2012 New Delhi Summit in India that Russia formally proposed the BRICS. The issue areas of national mechanisms must not only involve the world economy, but also touch world politics.

The second stage is that since 2014, Russia's multipolar thinking has undergone profound adjustments in the context of the Ukraine crisis. Against this background, Russia's topic selection in the BRICS mechanism framework has shifted from "economics first, politics later" to both economics and politics. Shift to a policy of "politics as the mainstay and economy as the supplement". Take the 2015 Ufa Summit and the 2020 Moscow Online Summit, in which Russia serves as the chair, as examples. Compared with the first joint statement of BRICS leaders in 2009, the "Ufa Declaration" drafted by Russia in 2015 explains the international political demands at great length. For example, it emphasizes the authoritative status of the United Nations, safeguards the victory of World War II, opposes the "double standards" of hegemonic countries, the principle of indivisible security, and opposes unilateralism and Economic sanctions, etc. The "Moscow Declaration" drafted by Russia in 2020 goes a step further. Different from previous declarations or joint statements, the "Moscow Declaration" drafted by Russia puts political and security cooperation first, followed by economic cooperation, and finally humanities Communication. It can be seen that the weight of political and security issues in Russia's policy towards the BRICS mechanism has increased significantly.

(2) Institutional level

Institutions are norms and habits. The core of institution construction is to build the legitimacy and legality of collective behavior behind such norms and habits. The reason is that institutions play an motivating and constraining role on people (country), thereby affecting the goals of people (country). Cooperation between countries occurs not because they have completely consistent values, or how complex the mutual power relationship is, but because all parties to the cooperation see the possibility of benefiting. Therefore, the actual choice of state behavior is The above is the choice of system, which is the right

Joint statement by the leaders of the BRIC countries President of Russia, June 2009: // [http://www.fmprc.gov/web/gjhdq/676201/gjhdqz/681964/jzgj/682158/zywj_682170/201507/t20150717_9383530.shtml](#) [2022-05-21]

Speech at the BRICS summit President of Russia, March 2011: // [http://www.fmprc.gov/web/gjhdq/676201/gjhdqz/681964/jzgj/682158/zywj_682170/201507/t20150717_9383530.shtml](#) [2022-05-21]

The Seventh BRICS Leaders' Meeting "Ufa Declaration", Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, July 9, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov/web/gjhdq/676201/gjhdqz/681964/jzgj/682158/zywj_682170/201507/t20150717_9383530.shtml [2022-05-21]

Author of Zhang Yuyan: «Economic Development and Institutional Choice: An Economic Analysis of Institutions», Beijing: Renmin University of China

Press, 2017, Page 11, [English] Author of Andrew Hurrell, Translated by Lin Xi: «Global Order and Global Governance» Beijing: Renmin University of China Press,

2018, page 33 Men Honghua: "Wings of Hegemony: American International Institutional Strategy", Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005, page 35

The adaptation process of beneficial institutional arrangements. At the same time, the system also reflects the interest game and demands of different countries. Institutions by no means exist in isolation. There is a mutually cooperative relationship between various systems. Knowing this, we can see that Russia is The path and context of promoting the BRICS mechanism at the global, regional and domestic institutional levels.

At the global institutional level, Russia tends to shape the BRICS mechanism into an aggressive platform to promote world multipolarity, unite and strengthen the power of emerging powers. On the one hand, Russia hopes that the BRICS mechanism will play the role of a "promoter" and strengthen the power of change in the international system. Specifically, the BRICS mechanism plays different "promoter" roles when facing different global international mechanisms. Facing the United Nations, the BRICS mechanism advocates and upholds the role of the United Nations in maintaining world peace and stability and promoting the democratization of international relations. Play a central role. In the face of the Group of Twenty (G20), the BRICS countries actively coordinate their positions and jointly advocate that the G20 strengthen the policy coordination function among member states in the post-financial crisis period and expand the space for dialogue and cooperation with developing countries. For functional cooperation mechanisms such as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and World Health Organization, the BRICS mechanism focuses more on promoting their reforms and increasing the voice of emerging countries and developing countries in them. On the other hand, Russia supports the BRICS mechanism Establish a "parallel governance" system in certain areas to break away from the shackles of the economic hegemony of the United States and the West. Russia values the strategic value of establishing a New Development Bank, emergency reserve arrangements, and institutionalizing cooperation in a series of fields such as agriculture, economy, trade, and energy within the framework of the BRICS mechanism. From Russia's perspective, these multilateral cooperation mechanisms that exclude the participation of developed Western economies have the characteristics of emerging countries and are not restricted by the developed economies of the United States and the West. At the same time, they also reflect the BRICS countries' support for the global economic governance system dominated by the United States and the West. For example, Putin proposed to increase the proportion of the currencies of BRICS member countries in the investment projects of the New Development Bank. This will not only help promote the internationalization of national currencies, but also effectively avoid additional risks.

At the regional institutional level, Russia adopts the method of institutional superposition to promote the connection between the BRICS mechanism and international organizations in the Eurasian region. Russia has three purposes for this move: First, it provides Eurasian regional support for the BRICS mechanism, because the so-called global governance system is It is a collection of many regional governance systems. The second is to improve financial

«[«](#)», Shanghai: [2012](#) Marina Larionova, Cooperation for growth and development - "Group of Twenty", BRICS and APEC in the system of international institutions: good news for global governance Journal of international Organizations No. 1 Article 3

National Research University Higher School of Economics BRICS development strategy and priorities for Russia M : Publishing Home Higher School of Economics st

Putin proposed increasing the share of the national currencies of the BRICS countries in development bank projects Kommersant November // / / []

In 2009, the first BRICS leaders' summit held by Russia as the country's chairmanship, Russia held the BRICS leaders' meeting and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization heads of state summit at the same time and achieved good results. Since then, it has also held BRICS leaders' summits in Brazil and India. Leaders of other Latin American and South Asian countries are invited to attend and

participate. Wang Chenxing: "Challenges and Paths for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to Improve Global Governance Capabilities", published in "New Vision", Issue 6, 2021, Pages 110 - 116

The third is to promote the closeness of cooperation between the BRICS mechanism and the Eurasian regional mechanism, and to shape its position as a link between the global emerging powers platform and the regional Eurasian integration process. The third is to promote the connection of Eurasian and non-Western countries with the BRICS mechanism and enhance the Eurasian continent. to break the stranglehold of U.S. maritime power on the east and west fronts of Eurasia. Since 2009, Russia has held the rotating presidency three times. The BRICS leaders' summits hosted by Russia are often closely related to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the later Eurasia The economic union will be held at the same time or on an ad hoc basis. From Russia's perspective, the driving factors for promoting the connection between the BRICS mechanism and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are as follows: first, to increase the economic growth rate; second, to expand the scale of mutual investment; third, to improve the quality of human capital. The fourth is to check and balance the economic hegemony of the United States and the West.

At the domestic institutional level, Russia has established a number of domestic platform institutional arrangements at both the official and private levels to connect with cooperation related to the BRICS mechanism. This move will further expand Russia's space for international cooperation, expand opening up to the outside world, and improve the internationalization of economic development and cultural exchanges. level provides opportunities. Especially with the United States and Europe continuing to impose sanctions on Russia after the Crimea incident in 2014, cooperation with BRICS countries has become one of the important channels for Russia to "go out and bring in". At the official level, Russian diplomacy The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a deputy ministerial-level coordinator for BRICS affairs, and set up a "Russian Participation in BRICS Mechanism Affairs Office" in the Policy Planning Department. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Cooperation Agency, and the St. Petersburg Municipal Government jointly sponsored the "BRICS+ International City" Forum" aims to promote Russia to become a center for international urban cooperation. At the private level, the Russian Academy of Sciences and the "Russian World" Foundation jointly established the National Committee for BRICS Research, with the purpose of strengthening research on the BRICS mechanism and its member states. As well as organizing various public diplomacy and think tank research activities. In addition, with the support of former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov (Шувалов), Irkutsk Polytechnic University established the BRICS Institute, which is the first Russian university to have a "BRICS Institute". Entity teaching institutions named

"BRICS", etc. (3) The level of interaction varies according to the priority in selecting strategic partners to promote world multipolarity. Within the framework of the BRICS mechanism, Russia's handling of interactive relations with other member states reflects differentiated characteristics. From Russia's perspective, in the BRICS mechanism, relations with China are the main strategic direction, relations with India are the secondary strategic direction, and relations with Brazil and South Africa are strategic extension directions.

First, China and Russia are the backbone forces in promoting world multipolarity. Since the establishment of the China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination, promoting world multipolarity and building a new international order have always been the common diplomatic concepts of the two countries. On the issue of the new order, the heads of state of China and Russia issued three heavyweight joint statements. The first is the "Joint Statement on World Multipolarity and the Establishment of a New International Order" in 1997, which states

— Elena Andreeva Artem Ratner Potential BRICS and SCO World economy and international relations 2015 —

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It is clearly stated that one of the important purposes of the China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination is to promote the development of world multipolarity and the establishment of a new international order, and believes that the vast number of developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement are important forces in promoting world multipolarity and establishing a new international order. The second is the 2005 "Joint Statement on the International Order in the 21st Century". The statement pointed out that world multipolarization and economic globalization are the general trend of human development. Although interdependence among countries has increased, the process of establishing a new international order is complicated. The third is the 2022 "Joint Statement on International Relations and Global Sustainable Development in the New Era". This statement emphasizes that the power base of world multipolarity tends to be reconstructed. Unilateralism and power politics are the building blocks of a new international order. More importantly, China and Russia clearly pointed out that China's concept of a community with a shared future for mankind and Russia's concept of a multi-polar international relations system complement each other and connect with each other, further enriching the common diplomatic concepts of China and Russia. There is a common understanding in Russia that the strategic proximity of China and Russia gave rise to the "China-Russia-India mechanism", and on this basis promoted the formation of the "BRIC". After South Africa joined, it became today's BRICS mechanism. Therefore, if there is no Sino-Russian relations as the foundation, the BRICS mechanism cannot be discussed.

Second, give full play to the role of the China-Russia-India mechanism and strengthen the core of the BRICS mechanism. Compared with the special global value of the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, the Russia-India relationship has more bilateral significance and regional value in terms of level, content and impact. The China-Russia-India trilateral mechanism is more of an interactive relationship structure of "China-Russia + India". Russia's demands for relations with India are mainly focused on the following aspects: First, stabilize the bilateral strategic partnership and shape India into the southern part of the Eurasian heartland. The second is to ensure that India becomes an important consumer market for Russian weapons and equipment in the long term. 75% of Indian weapons and equipment are Russian-made equipment. The third is to expand bilateral energy cooperation and continue to play the role of energy as the "ballast stone" in the economic and trade relations between the two countries. , especially in the field of nuclear energy, India's demand for Russian technical equipment has increased. For this reason, Russia's policy choices for relations with India are: First, continue to strategically win over India, improve the level of bilateral relations, and avoid its deep involvement in the U.S.-Japan-India The Quad-Australia Mechanism (QUAD) will be launched in December 2021, and the "2 + 2" dialogue mechanism between the Russian and Indian Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers will be launched.

Department of Eurasia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: "Compilation of Important Documents on the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Russia", Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2010, pages 296-297

«Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the International Order of the 21st Century», China Government Network, July 2005

«Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on International Relations and Global Sustainable Development in the New Era», State Council Information Office, February 4, 2022

Alexander Lukin Consolidation of the non-Western world against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis: Russia and China year

Which weapons from Russia received Indian registration TASS April

The second is to do a good job in strategic communication, release positive signals, ease China-India relations, and maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the China-Russia-India trilateral mechanism. The third is to compete with the United States and Europe for the Indian weapons and equipment and energy market, and further consolidate the vested advantageous position. From Russia's perspective, China and Russia can cooperate with each other to jointly develop relations with India. Russia mainly focuses on energy, military and technological cooperation, while China focuses on digital economy and commodity trade, thereby further consolidating the material foundation of the China-Russia-India trilateral mechanism. Let the China-Russia-India trilateral

mechanism better play a strategic core role in the BRICS mechanism. Third, use the BRICS mechanism to develop strategic partnerships with Brazil and South Africa and expand Russia's strategic influence in the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Independent Russia's global influence has shrunk sharply. In Latin America and Africa, except for sporadic strategic fulcrum countries (such as Cuba and Venezuela), there has been a regional cooperation vacuum. After Putin came to power, he regarded restoring Russia's global influence as an important strategic goal, and Kim The BRICS mechanism provides a useful platform for Russia to restore its international influence in Latin America and Africa and shape its national image. Under the framework of the BRICS mechanism, the bilateral relations between Russia and Brazil have further developed. After Russia and Brazil implemented visa-free cooperation in 2010, bilateral economic and trade exchanges, People-to-people and cultural exchanges have 70% longer , advanced by leaps and bounds. In 2021, bilateral trade increased by 78% in the first quarter of 2022 compared with that in 2020 and by 78% compared with the same period in 2021. In addition , South Africa is one of Russia's priority partners in "Return to Africa". Russia divides its "Return to Africa" policy into It is implemented at three levels: the first level is to connect with the African Union as a whole; the second level is to promote cooperation in functional areas; the third level is to develop priority partnerships, such as South Africa and Egypt. In the 30 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Russia and South Africa have More than 80 documents have been signed, covering all aspects of cooperation between the two countries. After Putin's first visit to South Africa in 2006, he visited South Africa twice more in 2013 and 2018 and participated in the BRICS Leaders' Summit.

Three practical prospects

In the future, in the process of Russia promoting world multipolarity and pursuing "unipolar" status, how big a role can the BRICS mechanism play? In summary, Russia's BRICS mechanism policy will continue to maintain continuity, and major developments will occur.

Andrey Kortunov On the eve of the summit: letter to Indian friends of the RIAC December

Alexander Korolkrov Trade of the Russian Federation with Brazil: the worse the better RIAC August

Andrey Maslov Dmitry Suslov Return to Africa: how to make it Russian Russia's priority in global politics

Ilya Rogachev Russia and South Africa: 30 years of diplomatic relations International life No. Article

The probability of adjustment and change is low. In the overall Russian foreign strategy, the development of the BRICS mechanism has both opportunities and challenges. The so-called opportunities mainly refer to the rise in the international political power base in the east and the decline in the west, the flexibility in the institutional design of the BRICS mechanism, and the international cooperation between China and Russia. Under the combined effect of factors such as collaboration dividends, the BRICS mechanism still has unique strategic value in Russia's promotion of world multipolarity. The so-called challenges mainly refer to the limitations of Russia's comprehensive national strength, the complexity of cognitive contradictions, and the non-neutrality of the BRICS mechanism system. Under the multiple effects of factors such as Russia, the BRICS mechanism has shown certain limitations in the process of realizing Russia's foreign strategic goals. Overall, the BRICS mechanism will continue to have great potential in the short to medium term. It will continue to be an important platform for Russia to unite non-Western forces and counteract the strategic suppression of the United States and the West. However, in the long term, it is not ruled out that the relationship between Russia and the United States and the West will break after the Ukraine crisis is completely resolved, and it will use the BRICS mechanism to return to its composite diplomatic status and continue to explore the possibility of expanding diplomatic space between east and west and between north and south.

(1) Opportunities

First, the power base of the international system is undergoing profound changes. The trend of rising in the east and falling in the west is irreversible. The current international system and international institutional arrangements are mainly the result of the distribution of power and interests between developed countries in the United States and the West. Emerging countries and the vast development of China has succumbed to the status of "follower" and "dominated". As Andrew Hurrell said, for a long period of history, the "world" first revolved around Europe and the European colonial order, and then surrounded by the United States and the "Greater West". However, as the international power status of the United States, the dominant country in the current international system, continues to decline, its ability to solve global risks and challenges has significantly declined, which makes it difficult to repair the international system and maintain its world hegemony. At the same time, emerging powers are rising collectively, and their ability to participate in global governance has been significantly improved. The shift of the center of power in the international system from west to east is a general trend. The basic characteristics are the decline of existing hegemonies and the rise of new world powers. The trend of "rising in the east and falling in the west" is irreversible. In the historical development background of "rising in the east and falling in the west", the original international system centered on the West is transitioning to a new international system of "balance between east and west". It should be said that the power of the international system has fundamentally changed, which has objectively contributed to the aggregation of BRICS countries. Russia's promotion of the BRICS mechanism is just following the trend.

Second, the institutional flexibility and elasticity of the BRICS mechanism can help Russia promote the construction of issues, expand the space for interaction, and avoid excessive institutional constraints. Generally speaking, the lower the level of international institutionalization, the less autonomy a country has in its actions. The fewer constraints there are on the country, the lower the cost of contracting between countries. Because

[English] Written by Andrew Hurrell, translated by Lin Xi: «Global Order and Global Governance», Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2018, Page 7.

Wang Chenxing: «Challenges

of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in improving global governance capabilities and Paths», Published in "New Horizons", Issue 6, 2021, Pages 110-116.

Tian Tian: «Institutional Choice in International Relations: A Transaction Cost Perspective», Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2018, pp. 125-127.

Therefore, the BRICS mechanism at a low level of institutionalization is more conducive to the realization of Russia's national interests. To sum up, the main purposes that Russia wants to achieve with the help of the BRICS mechanism are: First, to unite non-Western power centers geostrategically to form a non-Western power center. The group of Western powers aims to create a non-Western power source that promotes world multipolarity. The second is to enhance international prestige and promote the internationalization and globalization of Russia's major diplomatic initiatives. The third is to expand cooperation with Russia space for external economic cooperation. In the eyes of Russia, the BRICS mechanism needs to play its external strategic expansion function.

Rather than playing the role of shaping exclusive leadership (Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization) or shared leadership (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Therefore, within the framework of the BRICS mechanism, what Russia wants is to maintain and make full use of the BRICS. The flexibility and elasticity of the mechanism are not advocated, and it is not advocated to improve the level of internal institutionalization.

Third, the dividends of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership of coordination continue to be released. The BRICS mechanism is a global extension of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership of coordination and an important platform for international cooperation between the two countries. Currently, Sino-Russian relations are at the best period in history. There can be two interpretations here. One is literally. Under the strategic guidance of the two heads of state, Sino-Russian relations have indeed achieved high status. The other interpretation is that Sino-Russian relations are in the most equal period in history. Whether from the perspective of comprehensive national strength or international influence, China and Russia are in a stage of strategic mutual adaptability. China and Russia both have strong shaping power for common concepts and strategic collaboration. Under the framework of the BRICS mechanism, China and Russia have more similarities in interests than differences. For example, both countries regard promoting world multipolarity as a foreign strategic goal. Both countries are willing to unite developing countries and build a global anti-hegemony united front. They both support diversity of civilizations and development paths. Diversity and diversity of democratic models, common Fight back against the singleness of civilization, development path, and democratic model that the United States and the West uphold.

(2) Challenges

First, the limit of comprehensive national power restricts the performance of Russia's international cooperation capabilities. The limit of Russia's comprehensive national power is mainly reflected in two aspects. First, the comprehensive national power structure is "partial". In Russia's comprehensive national power structure, it is related to energy, military, diplomacy, and territory. Compared with other strong factors, the economy has always been a weak point. The reason is that national security and geopolitical influence have long occupied a priority position in Russia's national strategy, while economic interests and geoeconomic influence have taken a secondary position. The vast territory and empire Factors such as mission, autocratic tradition, intermittent turmoil, and pursuit of great power status have always been the background for Russia's dealings with the outside world. Second, economic shortcomings limit the depth and breadth of Russia's participation in the BRICS mechanism's cooperation on economic issues. Gold

Alexander Lukin Consolidation of the non-Western world against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis: Russia and China's SCO and BRICS International life

of common sense: twenty years of Russian economic reforms

Whole World article

[US] Edited by Robert Pastor, translated by Hu Liping: "Journey of the Century: A Century of Diplomacy of the Seven Major Powers", Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2001, page 172.

After all, the BRICS mechanism started with economic issues. Among the economic cooperation issues under the existing BRICS mechanism framework, Russia does not dominate. Taking the BRICS Civil Society Forum hosted by Russia in 2020 as an example, Russia strongly promotes digital economic cooperation. However, in dialogue and exchanges, this topic is basically dominated by Chinese experts.

Second, there are contradictions in Russia's domestic understanding of the BRICS mechanism. In Russia, there are two main opposing views on the BRICS mechanism: One is to recognize the effectiveness of the BRICS mechanism, which mainly refers to the BRICS mechanism. It can play an important role in achieving Russia's foreign strategic goals. The second is that the BRICS mechanism is considered ineffective, or at least has limited effectiveness. The main reasons are the low level of institutionalization of the BRICS mechanism and the large differences in political and economic development and demands among member states. etc. In fact, self-contradiction is one of the genes of the Russian nation. As Berdyaev said, "For the Russians, they are characterized by the mixture and combination of self-contradiction and extremely opposite principles. Only by using The word "contradiction" is used to describe the characteristics of Russia and the Russian nation." In dealing with foreign relations, the inherent contradiction of the Russian nation is also vividly reflected. Minkler once pointed out: "In the historical memory of Russia, the eastern part It is a land of alienation, and in the West, Russia feels inferior to others, so Russia strives to catch up with the development level of the West. In the eyes of Westerners, Russia in history is a conqueror who has not yet been fully civilized. In the East, Russia is regarded as a conqueror. "Praised as a great civilized country" This is also reflected in Russia's handling of the BRICS mechanism and its relations with other member states. A typical example is that Russia does not recognize itself as an "emerging power", but rather positions itself more as an "emerging power". "Reviving a great power" in order to "draw a clear line" with other BRICS member states.

Third, the BRICS mechanism itself has institutional non-neutral characteristics. International institutions all reflect the interest games and demands of actors. Any institutional arrangement has non-neutral characteristics, that is, the benefits of different actors under the same system. But they are not the same. The BRICS mechanism is no exception. Within the framework of the BRICS mechanism, the interest demands of the member states are also different. In terms of how to view the issue of world multipolarity, the positions of the member states of the BRICS mechanism are different. For example, Russia tends to deconstruct the existing international order dominated by the United States and the West, and then build a multipolar world composed of multiple power centers to achieve collective leadership of the international order by major powers. India prides itself on pursuing independent diplomacy and advocates cooperation between the United States and the West. The non-Western world strives to achieve balance among the non-Western world and seek great power status through a balancing strategy. Brazil and South Africa have no intention of "overthrowing" the existing international order. They hope to use the BRICS mechanism to enhance their influence and get rid of their marginal position in the international system. Therefore,

In September 2020, the author was invited to participate in the BRICS Civil Society Forum hosted by Russia. Intuitive feelings.

[Russian] Written by Nikolai Berdyaev, translated by Qiu Yunhua and others: «Religious Interpretation of Russian Thought», Beijing: Oriental Publishing House, 1998, page 11, [Germany]

Written by Herfried Minkler, translated by Cheng Weiping: «From Ancient Rome to the United States: The Logic of Imperial Rule», Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2021 Year, page 89, Xu Xiujun: "Institutional non-

neutrality and BRICS cooperation", published in "World Economy and Politics", Issue 6, 2013, pp. 77-96, Zhang Yuyan: "Interest groups and institutional non-neutrality" » "Reform", Issue 2, 1994, pp. 97-106.

Opportunities for a diplomatic identity

Four Conclusions

In the international system, the process of major countries pursuing their ideal orientation is not a smooth road. Instead, challenges and opportunities coexist, and long-term and short-term influencing factors are intertwined. Therefore, anchoring orientation goals, strengthening strategic will, planning strategic paths, and integrating Strategic resources and the comprehensive use of various strategic elements are rational strategic choices for major powers to pursue their ideal orientation. From this perspective, the BRICS mechanism is undoubtedly Russia's way of promoting world multipolarity, reforming the existing international system, and getting rid of the "being" caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is an important strategic tool and practical platform to impose an unfavorable international status and then seek to achieve "one pole" status. However, it is worth noting that in the embodiment of Russia's external strategic coordinates, the BRICS mechanism is far less important than the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective. Regional integration mechanisms led by Russia, such as the Security Treaty Organization, are the second-best platform for Russia's international institutional strategy, a necessary tool to promote the reform of the international system, and an effective assist in pursuing the prestige of a great power. Therefore, in line with the main line of Russia's foreign strategy, it is necessary to realize Russia's strategic interests. Global extension is the value of the BRICS

mechanism. Based on this basic positioning, Russia's BRICS policy has the following characteristics: First, the agenda setting shows a shift from "economics first, politics second" to "politics first, economics first". The second is to make full use of the advantages of the institutional flexibility of the BRICS mechanism, and realize the mutual nesting and docking of institutional strategies and arrangements at the global, regional and domestic levels around the BRICS mechanism cooperation platform. The third is to demonstrate the Sino-Russian strategic coordination is the axis of interaction, with the China-Russia-India trilateral mechanism as an important lever, and the major-country relations that drive the participation of Brazil and South Africa as the backbone and an interactive model of large and small multilateral linkages. Although in the short and medium term, it will be affected by the Ukrainian crisis and the strategic limits of the United States and the West. Due to the impact of suppression, Russia has chosen to "lean to one side" in its foreign strategy towards the emerging power groups and Eurasian continental powers. However, in the long term, as the international situation changes, it cannot be ruled out that Russia will continue to seek a multi-dimensional and integrated diplomatic status.

(Editor in charge Xu Rui)