

Identity Topics

The history, reality and enlightenment of contemporary Brazil's national identity crisis — an empirical analysis based on the World Values Survey**

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Abstract: In recent years, the rise of right-wing populism in Brazil has received more and more attention, but the Brazilian national identity crisis behind it has not yet been in-depth analysis. Based on the existing literature and related theories, this article is originally This paper comprehensively applied relevant data from the World Values Survey (1991-2018) to conduct an empirical study on the national identity of the Brazilian people. The results show that since 1997, the national identity of the Brazilian people has experienced a serious and sustained decline. The interviewees The proportion of those who expressed "very proud" dropped by about 40 percentage points. Individuals born earlier, with stronger religious beliefs and lower education generally showed stronger national identity, while the patriotic enthusiasm of young secular elites was generally low. The impact of political trust on national identity is not robust and may be moderated by religious beliefs. Therefore, Brazil's national identity has deep historical and religious origins, but the actual political construction has not been successful. On this basis, this article This paper puts forward the causal mechanism of the origin and evolution of the contemporary Brazilian national identity crisis under the intertwining of cultural changes and political dilemmas, and analyzes the long-term risks and challenges faced by the construction of Brazilian national identity. Drawing on the experience and lessons of Brazilian national identity in history and reality, this article provides some insights into our country's national identity. Identity

construction puts forward certain suggestions. **Keywords:** national identity, Brazilian political empirical

research, populism. **Author profile:** Lu Yizhou, Assistant Researcher, Institutional and Think Tank Evaluation Research Office, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

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On October 28, 2018, Jair Bolsonaro was elected as the 44th President of Brazil amidst controversy. This became another important footnote to the continued turmoil in world politics following the British referendum to leave the European Union and the election of President Trump in the United States. This is both a symbol of As the wave of populism reaches a new historical height in Brazil and even Latin America, it also marks the "right turn" of global political ideology, which has spread from developed countries in Europe and the United States to the third world. The political opinions of right-wing populism are not only against the establishment It is a rebellion against the specific policies of the political elites. It is also a denial of the path of human modernization and globalization. It is a "cultural counterattack" by nationalism, authoritarianism, conservatism and even religious forces against liberal and pluralist values such as openness, democracy and secularity (Cultural Backlash) . Therefore, the rise of right-wing populist forces is not only due to frequent and specific political and economic crises, but also due to sustained and widespread social and cultural crises, especially the decline and fragmentation of national identity. Brazil is obviously no exception. Boss Naro's 2018 presidential campaign slogan was "Brazil above all, God above all" (Brasil acima de tudo e Deus acima de todos), which undoubtedly clearly demonstrates his ideological concepts and cultural value orientation. After being elected, he couldn't wait to announce that he would provide compulsory "patriotism" education to Brazilian students. After taking office, the Foreign Minister of the Bolsonaro government also emphasized that Brazil would abandon its previous globalist policies and instead focus on "patriotism." These examples all prove that Brazil's right-wing populist forces clearly understand Brazil's long-term national identity crisis and successfully leverage it.

At present, the above phenomenon has not received widespread attention and in-depth analysis by the academic community, and corresponding empirical research is even rarer. On the one hand, domestic and foreign scholars' research on populism, national identity and other issues are still concentrated in Western developed countries and regions such as Europe and the United States. Not enough attention has been paid to the Third World, including Brazil. On the other hand, scholars who have been paying attention to Brazil for a long time are more interested in the country's economic development and party struggles, but have paid less attention to the more profound political and psychological phenomena behind them. In fact, Brazilian scholars themselves admit that important political phenomena and social psychological issues such as national identity have not even been recognized by Brazilian academic circles.

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism New York: Cambridge University Press 2019 Lu Yizhou: «Analysis of

the reasons for the rise of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe—an explanation based on causal mechanisms», published in «Socialist Research»

Issue 2, 2020, Pages 135 - 145 Isonaro Wants to Transform Brazil" in The Atlantic January

«The rise of right-wing populism: A global trend» / «The rise of right-wing populism: A global trend» / «The rise of right-wing populism: A global trend»

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For recent relevant domestic research, please see Xiao Yu: «The trend of ideological polarization and its impact among Latin American people», published in «Latin American Studies», Issue 2, 2020, pp. 60-84, Fang Xufei: «The divide between left and right political parties in Brazil, Changes and Prospects» Published in «Latin American Studies», Issue 5, 2020, Pages 49-68, Research Group of the Institute of Latin America, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations: «New trends, motivations and influences in the evolution of Latin American political ecology» Published in «Latin American Studies», Issue 3, 2021, pp. 50-67, etc. These studies are very enlightening, but they do not deeply explore the national identity crisis behind the rise of right-wing populist forces in Brazil.

It is not surprising that scholars from other countries have ignored this issue.

Based on this, this article attempts to use large-scale, long-term survey data to explore the historical development and realistic characteristics of Brazil's national identity crisis, thereby filling in an important missing piece of the puzzle to explain the rise of contemporary Brazilian right-wing populist forces.

A theoretical basis

In the history of nation-state construction in modern times and the wave of populism in the contemporary world, Brazil's national identity crisis not only follows the universal laws of human social, political and cultural development and individual psychological evolution, but also shows some problems that are rooted in history and reflected in reality. Special

issues (1) Brief description of

national identity National identity is one of the core issues in contemporary humanities and social sciences. The relevant literature is voluminous and controversial, and spans political science, history, sociology, linguistics, and communication. , psychology and many other disciplines. In the 1980s and 1990s alone, classic works such as "National Identity", "Ethnicity and Nationalism", and "Imagined Communities" emerged. More recent research has seen a hundred flowers blooming and a hundred schools of thought contending . Considering the purpose of the research and the length of the article, this article will not pay too much attention to the differences or even contradictions between the existing literature, but will try to conduct a more value-neutral empirical research on the basis of seeking common ground while reserving differences.

Based on a review of existing literature, this article defines national identity as an individual's cognition of belonging to a certain nation-state and the positive emotions it generates. Obviously, countless scholars are as curious as us about such an extremely special and extremely strong identity. How are knowledge and emotions formed and maintained? This constitutes the main line of national identity research. In summary, existing research results can be organized into two perspectives.

From a cultural perspective, national identity originates from innate blood relationships and common memories, and is a human

“National Identity” is a complex and multi-dimensional concept. It is not only a historical and cultural inheritance, but also a dynamic and changing process. In the context of globalization and the rise of populism, the study of national identity has become an important topic in contemporary political science and sociology.

This article will explore the historical development and realistic characteristics of Brazil's national identity crisis, and analyze the reasons for the rise of contemporary Brazilian right-wing populist forces. Through a combination of historical analysis and empirical research, this article aims to provide a theoretical basis for understanding the complex relationship between national identity and political development.

Leonie Huddy and Nadia Khatib “American Patriotism, National Identity and Political Inequality” in *Journal of Democracy*, 2017, 38(1), pp. 1-16.
Ludwig Stendahl “National Identity: A Blessing or a Curse? The Divergent Links from Nationalism to Social and Political Trust” in *European Political Science Review*, 2020, 13(1), pp. 1-20.
Ma Deyong: «National Identity, Patriotism and Nationalism—A Review of Recent Empirical Research Abroad» Published in "World Nations", Issue 2012 Issue 3, pages 8-16.

The product of groups shaped by history. Shared language, symbols and transcendental beliefs and ideas "mark" the similarities between individuals, prompting them to regard the nation-state as a big family with a "feeling of kinship". In other words, national identity is rooted in the cognition of human beings that "people who are not my race must have different minds." Of course, the form and intensity of expression of this nature in different groups and different individuals are different. From this perspective, we can explain national identity. The key variables include ethnicity, generation, religion and values, personality and upbringing, etc.

From a political perspective, national identity originates from acquired individual choices and community construction, and reflects the social exchange between national citizens and political elites. On the one hand, political elites provide public goods such as security, education, infrastructure, and medical services. On the other hand, it also shares political power with citizens (at least to a certain extent), and citizens participate in the political activities of elites through electing representatives and other methods and reciprocate their loyalty to the nation-state community. From this perspective, explain national identity The key variables include education and socialization, personal circumstances, government performance, etc.

For classic empirical research, please see Ronald Inglehart and Marita Carballo's "Does Latin America Exist? (and Is There a Confucian Culture?): A Global Analysis of Cross-Cultural Differences" in *PS: Political Science and Politics* Vol 30 No 1 1997 pp 34-47; Jim Sidanius et al. "National Attachment: Ethnic Pluralism or Ethnic Dominance?" in *The Public Opinion Quarterly* Vol 6 No 1 1997 p 102-133; James Tilley and Anthony Heath "The Decline of British National Pride" in *The British Journal of Sociology* Vol 58 No 4 2007 pp 661-678; Jordi Muñoz "From National-Catholicism to Democratic Rectification of National Pride: The Case of Spain (1981-2000)" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol 32 No 4 2009 pp 616-639; Danny Osborne and Petar Milojev "Authoritarianism and National Identity: Examining the Longitudinal Effect of SDO and RWA on Nationalism and Patriotism" in *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* Vol 43 No 8 2017 pp 1086-1099; Ma Deyong, Lu Yizhou: "National Identity and Its Changes: A Macro- and Micro-Cross-Country Comparative Analysis", published in *World Politics Research*, Issue 2, 2018, pp. 47-77.

For classic empirical research, see Mikael Hjerm "Education and Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis" in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol 27 No 1 2001 pp 37-60; Wang Heng: "National identity, democratic concepts and political trust—Empirical research based on Hong Kong", published in *Comparison of Economic and Social Systems*, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 147-161; Yuan Yuzhi: "The impact of education on citizens' sense of national identity: the mediating effect of media use", published in *Education Research*, Issue 12, 2021, Pages 95-104.

Although this article recognizes the rationality of these two perspectives, contrary to the views of some literature, this article opposes the ontological clear distinction between national identity into cultural dimensions and political dimensions. This article believes that the essence of national identity is a psychological phenomenon. Both cultural factors and political factors can only partially affect it, and the two influences are likely to have certain interactive effects. In addition, it should be noted that in the long run, the boundaries between political factors and cultural factors are not clear. For example, community memory at the cultural level is likely to come from the selective historical writing of political elites. For example, although contemporary language, symbols, and ideas may have extremely distant historical origins, these cultural factors can pass the test of history and be passed on. So far, it involves complex political elite behavior and social evolution process. In this article, the rough division of cultural factors and political factors is mainly to facilitate the conceptual operationalization and classification discussion of relevant variables.

(2) Populist world nation-states and

their predecessors have a long history. National identity and similar large-scale group identity phenomena are by no means new. However, in today's world politics where populism is prevalent, national identity and its Nationalism based on the foundation has been given extremely prominent significance of the times. The 2021 American "Political Yearbook" published an article stating that "in the past half century, the relationship between nationalism and politics has never been as close as it is today." Also For this reason, before specifically analyzing Brazil's populist politics and national identity crisis, we need to review the populist wave in major countries around the world.

It is generally believed that although populism has been "lurking" in the liberal democratic capitalist world for a long time, it emerged intensively after the global financial crisis in 2008. The mature multi-party system in Europe has given rise to

Frank L Jones and Philip Smith Commonality in National Identities: An Exploratory Analysis of the United States - China Journal of Sociology Vol 37 No 1 2001 pp 45 - 63 Matthew Wright Jack Citrin and Jonathan Wand "Alternative Measures of American National Identity: Implications for the Civic - Ethnic Divide" Journal of American Studies Vol 46 No 4 2012 pp 469 - 482 Chen Ji, Wang Zhihao: «On the development form of nationalism and its practical reflection» published in «Journal of Hubei University for Nationalities» (Philosophy Social Science Edition), Issue 5, 2019, Pages 140-145

See Margaret Canovan "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy" in Political Studies Vol 47 No 1 1999 pp 2 - 16 Lin Hong: "The polarization trend of contemporary populism and its institutional roots", in "International Politics" Research, Issue 1, 2017, Pages 36-51.

See Margaret Canovan "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy" in Political Studies Vol 47 No 1 1999 pp 2 - 16 Lin Hong: "The polarization trend of contemporary populism and its institutional roots", in "International Politics" Research, Issue 1, 2017, Pages 36-51.

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Giving populism a broad stage, some radical right-wing populist parties have moved from the political margins to the center of the stage, becoming the first "black swans" to attract widespread attention in this round of world populism. The common feature of these parties is their opposition to mainstream culture consensus on pluralism and multilateralism, and emphasizes an extreme identity. For them, domestic corrupt elites, foreign intervention forces, global financial capital, immigrants, refugees, "get something for nothing" and various subcultures and subgroups They are all harmful "others", and only they themselves can truly represent the pure people of their country. Because of this, these parties can always find space to incite issues from the decline and fragmentation of national identity.

The above-mentioned ideologies are highly contagious. Therefore, the rise of populist forces not only led to the overall rightward shift of European party politics, but also rapidly spread to the entire capitalist world. In 2016, driven by the British Independence Party and other forces, the United Kingdom officially In the same year as the referendum on Brexit, Trump was elected as the 45th President of the United States. The slogan "America First" resounded around the world, marking that the world's populist wave has reached an unprecedented historical height. The anti-globalization after globalization has gradually become a groundless worry. It has become a fait accompli. In such a powerful wave, it is difficult for Brazil to stay out. In fact, from their attitudes towards immigration and other issues to their tough rhetoric, Bolsonaro and Trump have many similarities. The former even Known as the "Trump

of the Tropics". In addition, it should also be noted that as a developing country with a large population, Brazil has not yet fully participated in the process of economic globalization compared to other major countries. Transnational trade has affected its economic development. The gains are limited. This may explain to a certain extent why some Brazilian elites and people are prone to cater to anti-globalization and no longer cherish globalization.

(3) Brazil's cultural particularity. Existing

literature shows that Brazil has obvious particularity in terms of religion, ethnicity, culture, etc. Therefore,

Also known as "far right party" (far right party), "extreme right party" (extreme right party) - wing party), "populist radical right party" (populist radical right party) or "authoritarian populist party" (authoritarian populist party), etc. Specific cases include the French National Front, the German Alternative for Germany, the Sweden Democrats, etc. For relevant reviews, please see Cas Mudde's *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: University Press, 2007) and Matt Golder's *Parties in Europe* in *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 19 (2016), pp. 477 - 497. How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018)

“The rise of populist radical right parties in Europe is a result of the decline of the welfare state and the rise of the neo-fascist movement. This movement is characterized by its extreme nationalism and its opposition to the liberal democratic system. It is a threat to the stability of the European Union and the world as a whole.”

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Therefore, when examining the issue of national identity, we should pay special attention to these factors and their possible impacts. First of

all, Brazil is the most populous Catholic country in the world. The influence of religion on Brazil is reflected in politics, economy, society, Culture and other aspects. Although the Constitution of the Brazilian Republic at the end of the 19th century stipulated the principle of separation of church and state, as of 1970, more than 90% of the Brazilian people still believed in Catholicism. However, in the context of social and cultural changes and political and economic crises in recent years, Next, Brazil began to accelerate secularization and modernization. This was not only reflected in the general decline of religious belief, but also in the decline of traditional and rigid Catholicism and the rise of more pragmatic and open Christian evangelicals. It is generally believed that in countries with strong religious backgrounds, Elite-led nationalist movements and patriotic education and propaganda are likely to use rituals and symbols from religion, and the people's national identity is also likely to come directly from their cognition and emotions of religion. If the above theory is also true in Brazil Then it is not difficult for us to make an inference: at the micro level, the Brazilian people's religious beliefs and national identity should be positively correlated. At the macro level, the contemporary process of secularization and modernization in Brazil is likely to lead to the decline of national identity.

Secondly, Brazil's ethnic composition is very complex. As a former colony and a major importer of the slave trade, Brazil's Native American groups have almost disappeared or been assimilated. The descendants of white Europeans and African blacks and various mixed-race people currently constitute the main ethnic groups in Brazil. In addition, since the 20th century, Asians and people from other regions from Japan, China, South Korea and other places have also poured into Brazil at an accelerated pace. Immigration and post-immigration

Zhou Yan: "The participation and influence of Christian evangelicals in Brazilian institutional politics", published in "World Religions and Culture", 2019 Issue 3, pages 60-67.

Liu Waner: "The political expansion and influence of Christian evangelicalism in Brazil", published in "Latin American Studies", Issue 2, 2021, No. Pages 42 - 63

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This generation has intensified the heterogeneity of ethnic groups in Brazil. It is generally believed that for a country of immigrants, the heterogeneity of the population is likely to lead to cultural heterogeneity, that is, some groups are outside the mainstream culture, which ultimately leads to the challenge of national identity and crisis. In addition, different ethnic groups are likely to mean different political and economic status. It is difficult for ethnic groups with weak status to be proud of their national identity. If the above theory is also true in Brazil, then it is not difficult for us to infer: At the micro level, At the macro level, Brazilian people of different ethnic groups will show significantly different national identities. At the macro level, the influx of immigrants and ethnic differentiation will lead to the decline and fragmentation of contemporary Brazilian national identity.

Finally, Brazil has extremely profound traditional culture and unique values. In short, the authoritarian values introduced from the Iberian Peninsula are still the cultural heritage of Brazil and even Latin America. Therefore, the vast majority of ordinary people in Brazil will show Rigid and conservative hierarchical concepts and the admiration for charismatic leaders and tough styles. Of course, with the passage of generations and the process of modernization, globalization, and democratization, pluralist culture also has a certain market in Brazil, especially among young people.

In political psychology, micro-level authoritarian values are also called authoritarian personality. 5) It is generally believed that the level of authoritarian personality reflects how an individual weighs group authority/consistency and individual autonomy/diversity. 6) A high degree of authoritarian personality reflects the height of an individual. For the vast majority of individuals, the nation-state is undoubtedly the most important and powerful group. Therefore, authoritarian personality is likely to promote individual national identity. If the above theory is also true in Brazil, then us

See Pedro Henrique Soares Lewis and Anderson Mo Reira Aristides Dos Santos "Horizontal Inequality and Ethnic Diversity in Brazil: Patterns and Implications" in Oxford Development Studies 8(4) 348 - 362 Li Taohong: «Brazil: Ethnic Paradise Trap», Published in "Ethnic Forum", No. 8, 2015, Pages 51-56, Chai Yalin: "Imaginary Border Residents: Brazilian Japanese Immigrant Society on the Ethnic Boundary before and after World War II", Published in "World Ethnics", Issue 3, 2020 Issue, pages 104-116.

See: "The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition" New Haven: Yale University Press 2001 Howard J Wiarda and Margaret Macleish Mott "Political and Social Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition?" (Fourth Edition) London: Praeger 2003 Huang Jie, Lin Jue: «Strongman Politics and Brazilian Right-Wing Populism The logic of the rise of socialism—an explanation based on the institutional and cultural perspectives», published in "Contemporary World and Socialism", Issue 6, 2020, Pages 115-125.

See: "The Origin and Evolution of Authoritarian Personality - An Explanation of Social Evolution", published in "Journal of Tsinghua University" (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), Issue 2, 2022, Pages 14-24, Karen Stenner "The Authoritarian Dynamic" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005 p 14 John Duckitt "Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct" in "Journal of Personality and Social Psychology" 79(1) 1-14

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Ma Deyong: "The Origin and Evolution of Authoritarian Personality - An Explanation of Social Evolution", published in "Journal of Tsinghua University" (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), Issue 2, 2022, Pages 14-24, Karen Stenner "The Authoritarian Dynamic" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005 p 14 John Duckitt "Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct" in "Journal of Personality and Social Psychology" 79(1) 1-14

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It is not difficult to make an inference: at the micro level, there should be a positive correlation between the authoritarian personality of the Brazilian people and national identity. At the macro level, the rise of contemporary multiculturalism in Brazil is likely to lead to the decline of national identity.

(4) The political particularity of Brazil. In

addition to its unique culture, the political phenomena in Brazilian history and reality also have certain particularities. This is mainly reflected in the instability of the Brazilian regime, government and political parties. These political particularities are very important. It may have an important impact on the national identity of the Brazilian people: First of all, in modern times, Brazil has gone through various regime forms such as colonial rule, monarchy, military dictatorship, democratic republic, etc., and elite coups, repressions, and popular protests and movements have come and gone one after another. Secondly, Problems such as corruption, inefficiency, and abuse of power in the Brazilian government have not been substantially improved for a long time. The Brazilian people generally lack political confidence. Finally, the ideological opposition of the major political parties in Brazil is obvious and increasingly polarized, which makes it difficult to build consensus in Brazilian party politics. It intensified the rifts between different classes and groups. It should be pointed out in particular that although the Brazilian Labor Party basically rejected the radical claims of left-wing populism after coming to power and achieved "left-right co-governance" to a certain extent, the essence of its policies is not conducive to the development of the middle class, thus leading to further intensification of social conflicts.

In addition to the difficulties of political construction, since the interruption of Brazil's "economic miracle", its economic development has been stagnant for a long time, and the gap between rich and poor has been widening. This "deficit" in people's livelihood will undoubtedly greatly damage the government's political resources to shape national identity. As Brazil's political and economic crisis continues to deepen, Brazil's national identity is likely to fall into a continued decline. However, it should also be noted that there is another completely opposite possibility, that is, various crises have strengthened the national identity: On the one hand, the uncertainty in the crisis and insecurity may inspire people's instinctive motivations for solidarity and xenophobia, resulting in a "rallying around the flag" effect. On the other hand, when faced with domestic crises such as the wealth gap, elites also tend to incite nationalism

Sebastian Edwards' Left Behind: Latin American and the False Promise of Populism Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 2010 p xi Fang Xufei: «The division, changes and

prospects of Brazil's left and right political parties» Published in "Latin American Studies", Issue 5, 2020, Chapter 49 - Page 68

Chen Junfeng, Si Haifeng: "The Measures and Significance of Brazilian Lula Government's Response to Social Problems" published in "Journal of Southwest University of Science and Technology" (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), Issue 2, 2022, Pages 1-8.

Huang Qixuan: «Why did Brazil's "economic miracle" end», published in «Journal of the National Academy of Administration», Issue 1, 2013, No. 115 - 120 pages

Yang Yuanhao: "People's Livelihood: Political Resources for Post-Developing Countries to Build National Identity - Chinese Experience and World Significance", published in "Nanjing

Social Sciences", Issue 7, 2022, pp. 71-80, Ronald F. Inglehart's Motions Are Changing and Reshaping the

World: A New Paradigm of Modernization Theory and the Role of the State

Therefore, it is difficult to infer the relationship between Brazilian political issues and national identity from a macro level.

In addition, although generally speaking, individual political trust and national identity are closely related and go in the same direction, this relationship does not necessarily hold true in Brazil. On the one hand, due to the instability of the government, unsustainable policies, and inconsistent representativeness of political parties, Comprehensive, the Brazilian people who have benefited within a certain time and space are likely to only respond with loyalty and votes to specific political elites, and will not have more favorable impressions of the nation-state community. On the other hand, because the average political trust of the Brazilian people is too high Low and small variance, its impact on national identity is likely to face limitations similar to the "floor effect".

2. Research design

Any intuitive experience and theoretical analysis of Brazil's national identity crisis cannot replace direct investigation.

Empirical research on data, this is a shortcoming in the existing research literature, and it is also the direction that this article will try to

work towards. (1) Purpose and

hypothesis Based on the existing literature, following the problem awareness mentioned above, the following will specifically focus on two aspects Gradually promote the research on the national identity of the Brazilian people. At the macro level, this article attempts to explore the changing patterns of the overall national identity level of the Brazilian people, and to find empirical evidence support for the theoretical Brazilian national identity crisis. At the micro level, this article attempts to explore cultural factors, This paper examines the specific impact of political factors and demographic variables on the national identity of individual Brazilian people, and then tests the specific causal relationships in the theory. This article believes that through research in these two aspects, the history and reality of Brazil's national identity crisis can be further clarified and the reasons for it can be explored. Causal mechanism, and then draw scientific laws with certain universal significance and lessons with certain reference significance.

See also Matthew Lital Trust and the Public Realm" in Critica I Review of International Social and Politica I Philosophy Vol 12 No 2 2009 pp 279 - 296 Klára V Iachová " This Country Is Not for Anyone: Explan Ations of Low National Pride in Wang Ruyi: «How corruption perception affects political trust - the mediating role of national identity and the moderating role of authoritarian personality» Published in «Journal of Tianshui Institute of Administration» Issue 3, 2020, Pages 35-4 José Álvaro Moisés "Democracy Trust" he Case of Brazil" Democracy and Citizens Dist Rust of Public Institutions in Brazil in Comp site Pillay "Public Trust and Good Governance: A C Omparative Study of Brazil and South Africa" in African Journal of Public Affairs Vol 9 No 8 2017

Trust" he Case of Brazil" Democracy and Citizens Dist Rust of Public Institutions in Brazil in Comp site Pillay "Public Trust and Good Governance: A C Omparative Study of Brazil and South Africa" in African Journal of Public Affairs Vol 9 No 8 2017 31 - 47

Based on the above theoretical analysis, the following core hypotheses can be put forward: First, under the dual pressure of cultural changes and political dilemmas, the national identity of contemporary Brazil will show an obvious trend of decline and fragmentation; second, under the influence of religion and traditional culture Brazilian people who are more deeply immersed and have benefited more politically, economically or socially may show stronger national identity. Thirdly, in terms of the impact on national identity, the actual political construction is not as strong as the historical religious and cultural factors. Robust

Investigating its mechanism, the national identity crisis in contemporary Brazil is not only a product of the times, but also a product of generations: on the one hand, Brazilian people in this era are no longer so attached to religion and traditional culture, and have many dissatisfactions with the political, economic and social status quo. On the other hand, the former patriotic generational group may be able to maintain lifelong enthusiasm after their values are finalized, but they cannot escape the end of growing old and leaving in the evolution of time.

(2) Data and variables The data

used in this article comes from the World Values Survey (WVS) database. WVS was created under the leadership of the late famous political scientist Ronald F. Inglehart and others. It is currently the world's largest One of the most famous cross-national social survey projects, WVS has so far completed seven rounds of probability sampling surveys, covering major countries around the world many times, and retaining core political attitudes and cultural values items for a long time, which provides the possibility for longitudinal tracking analysis. Specifically, this article uses all samples from Brazil in the WVS data, including five sample surveys in 1991, 1997, 2006, 2014, and 2018. This data spans nearly 30 years and has witnessed many Presidential campaigns and party rotations have valuable political science research value, but they seem to have not been fully utilized by scholars.

Based on the discussion and inference in the theoretical foundation part, combined with the publicly available items in WVS, this article mainly focuses on the following variables:

The outcome variable - national identity. Referring to the existing literature, this article operationalizes its concept as "national pride". The optional options of the corresponding questions in the WVS questionnaire and the recoded rating are "very proud" (4), "proud" (3), "not proud" (2), "not proud at all" (1)

The explanatory variables mainly include religious belief and authoritarian personality as cultural factors, as well as government trust and political party trust as political factors. Referring to existing literature, this article operationalizes the concept of religious belief as "the importance of religion in life". Corresponding questions The optional items in the WVS questionnaire and their recoded assignments are: "very important" (4), "important" (3), "unimportant" (2), "not important at all" (1). Reference There is literature. This article operationalizes the concept of authoritarian personality as "the importance of obedience in children's character." The optional options in the WVS questionnaire and the recoded assignments of the corresponding questions are: "Important" (1), "Not Important" (0). The optional options of trust in government and trust in political parties in the WVS questionnaire and the scores after recoding are evenly divided.

More specific information can be found on its official website <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org> [2022 - 08 - 24]

The results of other models will serve as a robustness check.

To sum up, the theoretical expectations of the core variables we focus on in the model and their effects are as shown in Table 1

Shown

Table 1 Core variables and their expected effects

core variables	expected effect
religious beliefs	Significantly positive
authoritarian personality	Significantly positive
government trust	Significantly positive or not significant
party trust	Significantly positive or not significant
year of birth	Significantly negative
Survey year	Significantly negative

Source: Compiled and drawn by the author

Three data analysis

According to the established research design, the following is from the statistical description, regression analysis, interaction effects and robustness.

Examine four aspects for data analysis.

(1) Statistical description

Based on the research design mentioned above, we first analyzed the Brazilian people's national identity in each survey.

The overall situation. The origin in Figure 1 represents the sample mean, and the vertical line represents the 95% confidence interval. As shown in the figure

As shown, the national identity of the Brazilian people was not significantly different at the time of the 1991 and 1997 surveys, but subsequently

However, it shows a straight downward trend, and the annual difference is very obvious. Further analysis of the data can reveal

Now, in two surveys in 1991 and 1997, nearly 65% of the Brazilian people answered

"Very proud" and then continued by 2000, this proportion dropped sharply to less than 40%

The latest survey in 2018 shows that less than 1/4 of Brazilians answered "very proud". Although

Although the process of globalization may lead to the general decline of national identity around the world, but from the perspective of the author,

Judging from the experience and literature we have, such a continuous decline in Brazil's national identity has no historical or national significance.

They are actually very rare.

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


Figure 1 Mean values and confidence intervals of Brazilian people's national identity in different years

Source: Drawn by the author

The following is an attempt to describe the national identity of the Brazilian people in groups. Based on the birth year of the respondents and the political history of Brazil, this article uses the military coup in 1964 and the fall of the military government in 1985 as the dividing line, and divides the Brazilian people in the sample into It is divided into three groups: the "old generation" (born before 1964), the "middle-aged generation" (born between 1964 and 1985) and the "young generation" (born after

1985). As shown in Figure 2, vertical It can be seen that the national identity of the three generational groups in Brazil has shown a downward trend. However, from a horizontal comparison, the national identity of different generations still shows obvious differences. Overall, Generational groups born earlier will show higher national identity. For example, further analysis of the data shows that in the 2018 survey, more than 35% of individuals in the older generation group answered "very proud".




Figure 2 Historical changes in the level of national identity in different generations in Brazil

Source: Drawn by the author

But this proportion is only 11% among the young generation .

The following groups describe the national identity of different ethnic groups in Brazil. As shown in Figure 2, vertically, the national identity of the three generational groups in Brazil shows a downward trend, but the change in the national identity of the brown ethnic group is relatively small. Horizontally, Although there are obvious differences in the national identity of different ethnic groups in some years, they do not seem to show a universal pattern. Judging from the intuitive results in the figure, ethnic groups do not seem to have a significant impact on the national identity of the Brazilian people. This is consistent with our It is contrary to the above inference.




Figure 3 Historical changes in national identity levels of different ethnic groups in Brazil

Source: Drawn by the author

## (2) Regression analysis is

based on statistical description. The following attempts to conduct regression analysis on the survey data. The result variables of each model in Table 2 are national identity. Among them, Model (1) to Model (5) are for each survey. Regression analysis of year data. Model (6) is a regression analysis for the entire sample and adds the control variables of the survey year. Model (7) is a regression analysis for the entire sample and adds year fixed effects. Since the 1991 questionnaire did not include the government items about trust and trust in political parties, so the corresponding variables only appear in models (2) to (5).

In terms of cultural factors, religious belief has a statistically significant positive effect on national identity in all models, while the impact of authoritarian personality is not as significant and robust as expected. In other words, in different survey years, religion Brazilian people with stronger beliefs generally show stronger national identity. In contrast, only in the latest 2018 survey, Brazilian people with stronger authoritarian personality showed stronger national identity. In the models of other survey years This relationship was not observed. In terms of political factors, political trust and party trust also had a statistically significant

positive effect on national identity in some models. In the 1997, 2006 and 2014 surveys, Brazilian people with stronger political trust generally show stronger national identity. In addition, in the 2014 survey,

Brazilians who have stronger trust in political parties also show stronger national identity.

Taken together, religious beliefs have the most significant impact on the national identity of the Brazilian people. Further analysis of the data can be found that 51% of individuals in the group who think religious belief is "very important" chose "Very proud", only 35% of those who believe that religious beliefs are "not important at all". In addition, it is worth noting that in the most recent 2018 survey, the cultural variables all showed statistical significance. However, none of the political variables showed statistical significance. This clear distinction between political trust and national identity is likely to reflect the intensification of political polarization and the failure of national construction in Brazil in recent years.

In terms of demographic variables, year of birth and educational level both play a role in national identity in most models. There was a statistically significant negative effect. In general, those born earlier and with lower education levels show stronger national identity. The Brazilian people generally show stronger national identity. It is not difficult to infer that with the passage of generations and education, the national identity of Brazil is likely to face a more serious national identity crisis. In addition, from model (6) and model (7) it can also be found in type (7) that the coefficients of survey year as a control variable or fixed effect are almost all significant and negative, which once again proves the declining national identity of Brazil.

Table 2 Linear regression model explaining Brazilian people's national identity

|                           | Model(1) | Model(2) | Model(3) | Model(4) | Model(5) | Model(6)     | Model(7)      |   |   |
|---------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|---|---|
|                           | 1991     | 1997     | 2006     | 2014     | 2018     | Control year | fixed effects |   |   |
| Male                      | -0.013   |          |          | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| Year of birth             | -0.007   | ***      | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| brown people              |          |          | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| White race                | 0.048    |          | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| Black race                | 0.107    |          | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| Income level              | -0.055   |          | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| Education level           | -0.156   | ***      | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| Religious beliefs         | 0.155    | ***      | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| Authoritarian Personality | -0.048   |          | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             | β | β |
| 1997                      |          |          |          |          |          |              |               |   | β |
| 2006                      |          |          |          |          |          |              |               |   | β |
| 2014                      |          |          |          |          |          |              |               |   | β |
| 2018                      |          |          |          |          |          |              |               |   | β |
| government trust          |          |          | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             |   |   |
| party trust               |          |          | β        | β        | β        | β            | β             |   |   |



|             |        |                                                                    |                                                                    |                                                                    |                                                                    |                                                                    |                                                                    |
|-------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Survey year |        |                                                                    |                                                                    |                                                                    |                                                                    | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ |                                                                    |
| Constant    | 16.199 | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ |
| Sample size | 1664   | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ |
| R Square    | 0.071  | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma}$ |

Note: \*\*\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ;  $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} < 0.01$ ;  $\hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} \hat{\gamma} < 0.05$

Source: Calculated by the author.

(3) Interaction effect

Since many variables in the above model involve politics, culture and other aspects, it is necessary to further explore to discuss the possible interaction effects between variables. Therefore, the author used the regression model in each survey year to Add the interaction terms of different variables in turn and calculate their average marginal effects. Due to space limitations, this section only shows shows two significant and practical meaningful interactive effects.

As shown in Figure 4, in the 2006 model, religious belief and government trust showed a positive interaction. Effect. As individual religious beliefs strengthen, the impact of government trust on national identity also strengthens. No. It is difficult to find. Except for individuals with strong religious beliefs, the vertical lines indicating the 95% confidence interval in the figure all pass through The horizontal line with  $\gamma = 0$  indicates that the impact of government trust on national identity is not significant. A possible explanation Yes, only individuals with strong religious beliefs will consider their evaluation of the government when generating national identity.




Figure 4 Marginal effect and confidence interval of government trust on national identity (2006)

Source: Calculated and drawn by the author.

As shown in Figure 5, in the 2006 model, religious belief and political party trust also showed a positive correlation. Interaction effect. As individual religious beliefs strengthen, the impact of party trust on national identity also strengthens. Except for individuals with strong religious beliefs, the impact of party trust on national identity is not significant.




Figure 5 Marginal effect and confidence interval of party trust on national identity (2014)

Source: Calculated and drawn by the author.

The above two interactive effects further reveal the importance of religious belief to the political psychology of the Brazilian people. Influence. On the one hand, religious beliefs will steadily and directly affect the national identity of the Brazilian people. On the other hand, On the other hand, religious belief will also moderate the impact of other factors on Brazilian people's national identity. Therefore, Brazilians The national identity of the Western people is likely to be more rooted in historical religious culture than in real politics.

governance structure

(4) Robustness test

This section uses two nonlinear models to conduct a robustness test on the main models mentioned above. First, By recoding, the national identity is set to only two options, namely "proud (1)" and "not proud". "How (0)" is a dichotomous dummy variable, and a logistic regression model is established. Secondly, we define national identity as Treated as ordinal categorical variables (ordinal categorical variable), and based on the ratio between adjacent options Compared with the established ordinal logistic model, the results of the two models are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. It can be found that Now, the main conclusions above are basically still valid.

Table 3 Logistic regression model explaining Brazilian people's national identity

|                       | Model(1) | Model(2) | Model(3) | Model(4) | Model(5) | Model(6)     | Model(7)      |     |         |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|-----|---------|
|                       | 1991     | 1997     | 2006     | 2014     | 2018     | Control year | fixed effects |     |         |
| Male - 0.075          |          |          | ŷ ŷŷŷ    |          | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ  |              | ŷ ŷŷŷ         |     | ŷ ŷŷŷ   |
| Year of birth - 0.015 | ŷ        |          | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ  |          | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ  | ŷ            | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ       | ŷŷŷ | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ |
| Brown people - 0.206  |          |          | ŷ ŷŷŷ    |          | ŷ ŷŷŷ    | ŷ            | ŷ ŷŷŷ         | ŷŷŷ | ŷ ŷŷŷ   |
| White race - 0.365    | ŷŷ       |          | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ  |          | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ  |              | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ       | ŷ   | ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷ |

|                                        |  |                   |                 |                  |                   |                   |                   |
|----------------------------------------|--|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| black race                             |  | β̂                | β̂              | β̂               | β̂                | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>†</sup>   |
| Income level 0.497                     |  | β̂                | β̂              | β̂               | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                |
| Education level 0.549                  |  | β̂                | β̂              | β̂               | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                |
| Religious beliefs 0.445 <sup>***</sup> |  | β̂                | β̂              | β̂ <sup>**</sup> | β̂ <sup>**</sup>  | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| Authoritarian Personality - 0.156      |  | β̂                | β̂              | β̂               | β̂ <sup>†</sup>   | β̂                | β̂                |
| 1997                                   |  |                   |                 |                  |                   |                   | β̂ <sup>†</sup>   |
| 2006                                   |  |                   |                 |                  |                   |                   | β̂ <sup>†</sup>   |
| 2014                                   |  |                   |                 |                  |                   |                   | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| 2018                                   |  |                   |                 |                  |                   |                   | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| government trust                       |  | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>†</sup> | β̂ <sup>**</sup> | β̂                |                   |                   |
| party trust                            |  | β̂                | β̂ <sup>†</sup> | β̂ <sup>†</sup>  | β̂                |                   |                   |
| Survey year                            |  |                   |                 |                  |                   | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |                   |
| Constant 31.384 <sup>†</sup>           |  | β̂                | β̂ <sup>†</sup> | β̂ <sup>†</sup>  | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| Sample size 1674                       |  | β̂                | β̂              | β̂               | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                |

Note: <sup>\*\*\*</sup> p < 0.001, <sup>\*\*</sup> p < 0.01, <sup>†</sup> p < 0.1. Data source: Calculated by the author.

Table 4 Sequential logistic regression model explaining Brazilian people's national identity

|                                        | Model(1) | Model(2)        | Model(3)          | Model(4)          | Model(5)          | Model(6)                   | Model(7)          |
|----------------------------------------|----------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
|                                        | 1991     | 1997            | 2006              | 2014              | 2018              | Control year fixed effects |                   |
| Male 0.017                             |          | β̂              | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                         | β̂ <sup>†</sup>   |
| Year of birth - 0.022 <sup>***</sup>   |          | β̂              | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                | β̂ <sup>***</sup>          | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| Brown people - 0.070                   |          | β̂              | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                         | β̂                |
| White race - 0.503 <sup>***</sup>      |          | β̂ <sup>†</sup> | β̂ <sup>**</sup>  | β̂ <sup>**</sup>  | β̂ <sup>**</sup>  | β̂ <sup>**</sup>           | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| black race                             |          | β̂              | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                         | β̂                |
| Income level - 0.063                   |          | β̂              | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                         | β̂                |
| Education level 0.132                  |          | β̂              | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                         | β̂                |
| Religious beliefs 0.340 <sup>***</sup> |          | β̂ <sup>†</sup> | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>***</sup> | β̂ <sup>***</sup>          | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| Authoritarian Personality - 0.095      |          | β̂              | β̂                | β̂                | β̂                | β̂ <sup>**</sup>           | β̂ <sup>†</sup>   |
| 1997                                   |          |                 |                   |                   |                   |                            | β̂                |
| 2006                                   |          |                 |                   |                   |                   |                            | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| 2014                                   |          |                 |                   |                   |                   |                            | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |
| 2018                                   |          |                 |                   |                   |                   |                            | β̂ <sup>***</sup> |








Figure 6 The causal mechanism of contemporary Brazilian national identity crisis

Source: Drawn by the author

#### Five conclusions and prospects

In the context of the increasing concern about the rise of right-wing populism in Brazil, this article attempts to use survey data to conduct empirical research to further reveal and explain the national identity crisis in contemporary Brazil. On the basis of theoretical analysis, the empirical results of this article can be mainly divided into three. Firstly, data show that since 1997, the national identity of the Brazilian people has experienced a severe and sustained decline. National identity crises of this degree are relatively rare in the history of world politics. Secondly, the national identity of the Brazilian people has been mainly affected by There is a significant impact of religious belief and birth year. The impact of political trust on national identity is relatively limited and is likely to be moderated by religious belief. In the most recent survey years, political trust has almost no effect. Third, due to the birth year of contemporary Brazil, Individuals who are older, more religious, and less educated generally show stronger national identity. Therefore, if the process of secularization and modernization is not fundamentally reversed, the revival of Brazil's national identity will be difficult to achieve overnight. In addition, Contrary to expectations, we found no evidence of clear divisions of Brazilian national identity among different ethnic groups, which seems to prove the success of Brazil's immigration and ethnic policies to a certain extent.

To sum up, this article believes that the national identity of contemporary Brazil has relatively deep historical and religious origins, but the real political construction of contemporary Brazil is likely to fail to complete the political mission of benefiting people's livelihood, uniting people's hearts, and enhancing national identity. Cultural changes and Politics are intertwined, making Brazil's national identity crisis so severe, widespread and profound, and it still has a tendency to get worse. Because of this, "Brazil is above everything, God is above everything" has become a slogan of the times that directly hits the pain points.

"People's hearts are the greatest politics", "Enhancing people's livelihood and well-being is the fundamental purpose of development". The national identity crisis in contemporary Brazil is not only an important material for social science research, but also provides valuable experience and lessons for contemporary China's political practice. 1 In terms of aspects, in the wave of modernization, cultural changes are inevitable for all countries around the world to experience. Cultural identity is the deepest level of identity. Whether the relationship between traditional culture and foreign culture can be correctly handled in the process of modernization will depend to a large extent. It determines the success or failure of national identity construction. For China's political practice in the new era, it is necessary to combine the basic principles of Marxism with China's specific reality and with China's excellent traditional culture. On the other hand, "Democracy is not a decoration, it is not used for decoration, but to solve the problems that the people need to solve." The improvement of people's livelihood cannot be separated from scientific theoretical guidance, a firm fighting spirit, a strong party organization and a team of clean cadres. All in all, China To build a modern modernization path and China's national identity, we must uphold and strengthen the party's overall leadership.

It must be admitted that there are certain flaws and regrets in the empirical research of this article. Due to limitations of data, this article failed to discuss the national identity of the Brazilian people before 1991 and after 2018, and failed to further distinguish different types of religions. Beliefs, and failed to incorporate other variables such as major events, elite behavior, media information, etc. into the model. In addition, the empirical research in this article is essentially a post hoc analysis of observational data. Although relevant variables have been controlled through modeling, compared with There is still a certain distance between randomized controlled experiments. Therefore, the causal relationship advocated in this article is still only a subjective inference based on statistical correlation. The causal mechanism proposed in this

article also needs to be tested by more empirical studies. However, on the basis of existing research, this article It is still innovative to a certain extent. The author hopes to draw inspiration from this, so that more readers can see the national identity crisis behind the rise of right-wing populism in Brazil, and calls on scholars to conduct more and better empirical research while theoretically discussing, to fully explore, Use data scientifically to answer questions about China, the world, the people and the times.

(Editor Huang Nian)

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