June 2022 Volume 44 Issue 3 Journal of Latin American Studies

ÿÿÿ ÿÿÿÿ ÿ Vol ÿÿ ÿÿ ÿ

international relations

## U.S. Cold War Strategy and Regime Change in British Guiana (1961-1964)

Shu Jianzhong

Abstract: Based on the consideration of implementing the global Cold War strategy and curbing the penetration and expansion of so-called communism in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has tried to influence the political process of British Guiana since the early 1960s. To this end, the United States has made careful policy planning and layout. At the same time, it continued to exert pressure on the United Kingdom, forcing the United Kingdom to agree to replace the Jagan government. At the level of specific policy actions, the United States instigated a general strike in British Guiana through covert methods, with the purpose of creating a political and social crisis in order to create a favorable environment for subverting the Jagan government. Environment. On the other hand, in order to help the opposition parties win the election, the United States also used political and diplomatic means to suppress Jagan and the People's Progressive Party led by him. At the same time. it used secret and public means to support the opposition parties headed by Burnham. With the help of By combining covert and overt policy actions, the United States achieved its policy goal of subverting the democratically elected and legitimate Jagan government and fostering a pro-American regime. The British Guiana incident in 1964 was an example of the United States embedding its Cold War strategy and anti-communist policies into Caribbean politics. A major event in the process, it is also a typical case of the CIA using covert political actions to seek to instigate regime change in other countries. The regime change in British Guiana showed that in the context of the Cold War, the United States would never allow the so-called communist infiltration and threat to appear in the Western Hemisphere. Even for regimes that pursue social reform, the United States will deliberately label them communist and eliminate them.

Keywords: Cold War strategy, British Guiana, communist covert action, trade union organization, Anglo-American relations. About

the author: Shu Jianzhong, Ph.D. in history, professor and doctoral supervisor of the history of international relations, School of History, Nanjing University, Nanjing University-Johns Hopkins University Professor of American Culture

Research Center. CLC classification number: K14 Document

identification code: A Article number: 1002 - 6649 (2022) 03 - 0063 - 18

超丁美酒研究 Issue 3, 2022

Guyana is located in the northern part of South America. It has been under colonial rule by Spain and the Netherlands since the 15th century. In 1814, Guyana became a British colony and was called British Guiana. With the rise of the national liberation and independence movement after World War II, Guyana became a British colony. Guyana obtained autonomous status within the Commonwealth in 1953. In 1961, the United Kingdom agreed to the establishment of an autonomous government in British Guiana. However, the United Kingdom continued to retain defense and diplomatic rights until Guyana achieved fully independent status. During this period, the United States continued to monitor the situation in British Guiana. Paying close attention to the development of Guyana. In order to implement the global Cold War strategy and curb the penetration and expansion of communism in the Western Hemisphere, the focus of the United States' policy towards Guyana is to foster a pro-American and anti-communist regime. For this reason, since 1961, the United States has tried to influence The political process in British Guiana intervened in the affairs of British Guiana through a combination of overt and covert means, and ultimately achieved regime change in the autonomous government of British Guiana in accordance with the wishes of the United States. The special feature of the British Guiana incident is that the United States Intervention activities based on the Cold War strategy began when British Guiana was transitioning from internal autonomy to complete independence. This process was intertwined with the intricate relationships between the United States and British Guiana, and the United States and the United Kingdom. Since the United Kingdom still owned the defense and defense of British Guiana. Diplomatic power, the United States used covert political actions as the main means to intervene in British Guiana affairs and achieve regime change. In this sense, the British Guiana incident in 1964 was a typical example of the United States using both overt and covert political actions to achieve regime change. The case was a quasi-coup instigated by the United States to overthrow the Jagan

government and support a pro-American regime. ÿ Regarding the British Guiana incident in 1964, foreign academic circles have made corresponding discussions, and the results are relatively fruitful. ÿ However, there is no special explanation of the U.S. intervention. Compared with the 1964 British Guiana incident, the results were relatively limited. In the article "Empire's "New Frontier" in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in British Guiana (1961-1964)", Cary Fraser focused on the perspective of power transfer. An analysis of the relationship between the United States and Britain surround

The policy debate and diplomatic game that unfolded over that issue. ÿ Stephen Raab's book "American Intervention in British Guiana: A History of the Cold War" is a masterpiece on the British Guiana issue. It analyzes the United States' intervention in British Guiana from 1953 to 1969. In the article "The World's Longest General Strike: The AFL-CIO, the CIA and British Guiana", Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels discuss the AFL- CIO - CIO), the relationship between the CIA and the British Guiana General Strike. ÿ In contrast, Chinese academic circles paid less attention to the 1964 British Guiana incident. There are almost no specialized research results, especially the lack of a system based on archival materials. This article uses declassified U.S. archives to explore the process of U.S. intervention in British Guiana affairs through overt and covert means and its relationship with the U.S. Cold War strategy from the aspects of policy design and policy actions. It focuses on examining the U.S.'s use of covert political The historical track of intervening in British Guiana affairs and achieving regime change was to further clarify the relationship between the United States' secret interference in British Guiana affairs. Nature of action and policy means

A British Guiana election and the United States' policy response under the Cold War strategy

After the end of World War II, the national liberation and independence movements surged. The world's largest colonial empire, the United Kingdom, faced unprecedented international pressure. As an important part of the world's national liberation and independence movements, the independence movement in British Guiana was in the ascendant. In 1950 In January, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) led by Cheddi Jagan announced its establishment and became a new force in the independence movement of British Guiana. In the face of the rising independence movement, the United Kingdom had no choice but to agree to Guyana's accession to the Commonwealth in 1953. Internal autonomy status. In the autonomous parliamentary elections held in April 1953, the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan won a majority of seats and formed an autonomous body. However, the British government led by Churchill was deeply dissatisfied with the election results and determined to interfere. For this reason, Britain and the United States deliberately promoted the People's Progressive Party as a communist party in order to create an excuse for Britain to send troops to overthrow the Jagan Autonomous Institution. With the joint intervention of Britain and the United States,

拉丁美湖研究 Issue 3, 2022

The autonomous agency led by Jagan was forced to disband in October.ÿ

Despite the British backbiting, the independence movement in British Guiana continued to develop. Against this background, the British Macmillan government, which came to power in 1957, had to adjust its policies and agreed to the establishment of an autonomous government in British Guiana and the eventual achievement of independence. In August In the election, the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan won 9 of the 14 seats in the Autonomous Assembly. In the subsequently formed new British Guiana Executive Council, Jagan was elected Chief Minister of the Executive Council and took charge of the specific administration of British Guiana. Affairsiÿ

As the administrative head of British Guiana, Jagan was committed to promoting economic reform and social development. In terms of foreign relations, Jagan advocated maintaining relations with the United States and other Western countries, while seeking to improve and develop relations with socialist countries. Although Jagan was They held different views on measures to develop relations with socialist countries. However, the United Kingdom recognized Jagan's economic policies, admitted that the intervention in 1953 was a mistake, and believed that the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan was not a communist party. The United States has always regarded Latin America as the "backyard" of the Cold War and firmly believed that British Guiana led by Jagan would become a base for the expansion of communism in the Western Hemisphere. After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Jagan actively developed despite the obstruction of the United States. relations with the Cuban regime, which aroused strong dissatisfaction from the United States, which believed that the development of relations between British Guiana under Jagan and Cuba under Castro would accelerate the expansion of communism in the Western Hemisphere and harm the United States in the Caribbean ÿ It can be seen from this that since

1957, the United States and Britain have had obvious differences on the issue of British Guiana. Faced with the development of national liberation and independence movements around the world, the Macmillan government had to announce that it would British Guiana elections will be held in May and an autonomous government will be formed. With the prestige of the leader of the independence movement, Jagan is very likely to win the election and become the first prime minister of the British Guiana autonomous government, and then lead British Guiana to obtain fully independent status within 2 to 3 years. ÿ

ÿ For a detailed discussion of the joint British and American intervention, see Gerald Horneÿ Cold War in a Hot Zone: The United States Confronts Labor and Independenc eStruggles in the British West Indiesÿ Phila delphia: Temple

For a detailed discussion of the internal and external policies of the Jagan administration and its relations with the United States and Britain from 1957 to 1960, see Stephen ÿ G Rabeÿ U S Interv Ention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story pel Hill: The

Facing the 1961 election, the United States relied on its global Cold War strategy and once again labeled the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan as a communist. The purpose was to provide a basis for opportunistic interference in the British Guiana election. To this end, the United States began new policy planning. On March 21, 1961, the CIA prepared a special intelligence assessment report (referred to as the "3 21 Report") to make a preliminary judgment on the electoral situation in British Guiana. The "3 21 Report" emphasized that the political situation in British Guiana has been controlled by the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan and influenced by international communism. Although Jagan is not a recognized communist, his words and deeds have the brand of communism. "3 21 Report" pointed out that the People's National Congress (PNC) led by Forbes S Burnhamÿ is the main opponent of Jagan, and Peter S A group of business elites led by D'Aguiar The United Forces (United Force, UF) is also a political force that opposes Jagan. The "3 21 Report" believes that the 1961 election is a key step for British Guiana to become independent. It is of great significance to the political direction of Guyana. The United States should pay close attention to it. Risks posed by Jagan winning the electionÿÿ

As an important step in policy preparation, the release of the "3 21 Report" shows that while paying attention to Jagan's political tendencies, the United States has regarded Burnham as Jagan's competitor and the CIA's tool to fight against Jagan. At this point, the United States has opposed The policy ideas of Jagan and the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan and the opposition parties represented by Burnham were basically formed. After experiencing the "Gilon Beach Incident" in which the attack on Cuba failed in April 1961, the Kennedy administration became more clear Taking British Guiana as an important agenda and priority target of foreign policy, and determined to use all means to prevent communism from taking over British Guiana.ÿ

On the other hand, the United States knew very well that before British Guiana achieved formal independence, its policy towards British Guiana could not bypass the United Kingdom. For this reason, starting from April 1961, the United States and the United Kingdom launched intensive consultations on the situation in British Guiana. The British believe that Jagan has the strongest leadership in British Guiana and is therefore difficult to replace. As of early August, the U.S.-British consultations had not made substantial progress. The British not only failed to take measures to prevent Jagan's campaign, but also failed to agree with the United States. Take corresponding actions. In view of this, the US believes that there is no suspense that Jagan will win the election. However, the US position against Jagan has not relaxed at all.

ŷ Forbes Burnham co-founded the People's Progressive Party with Jagan and became one of its important leaders. After the autonomous institutions led by Jagan were forced to disband, Burnham and Jagan parted ways and

Ϋ ÿ ŷ founded the People's National Congress in 1958. ÿ ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ b United States (cited as FRUS)ÿ 1961 -1963 ÿÿÿ ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ ÿ ÿ y u s G Overment Printing Officeÿ 1996ÿ pp 514 - 517

snow snow snow snow  $\ddot{y}$  "Sh snowflake a snowflake s a snowflake"g

ÿ ÿ ÿÿÿ ÿÿ ÿÿÿ ÿ ÿÿÿ

佐丁美酒研究 Issue 3, 2022

Said that the United States will never allow another Castro-type regime to emerge in Latin America. To this end, the United States continues to put pressure on the United Kingdom. On August 11, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk called British Foreign Secretary Alexander Home, frankly admitting that he would let President Trump go. Root's takeover of British Guiana would be the most frustrating setback for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and would seriously affect U.S.-British relations. Home dismissed Rusk's appeal and believed that British Guiana could achieve independence by following the Indian model. ÿ It can be seen that although the British side rejected the United States' request for joint intervention in Guyana's political situation, driven by the Cold War strategy, the United States was still determined to get involved or even interfere in the affairs of British Guiana.

On August 21, 1961, the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan won the election with an absolute advantage and formed the British Guiana government headed by Jagan. Based on the Cold War strategy of maintaining the security of the "backyard", the United States began to plan to disrupt and even subvert Jagan. Due to the special status of the British government in British Guiana's transition period to independence, the United States had to seek cooperation with the United Kingdom again. On August 26, Rusk called Home, hoping that the United States and the United Kingdom would jointly deal with the post-election crisis in British Guiana. The new situation includes taking relevant actions in the political, economic and intelligence fields. Rusk particularly emphasized that the United States attaches great importance to actions in the covert field. ÿ It is not difficult to see from Rusk's cable that the United States has initially established a response plan from political, economic and other aspects. The policy path of the situation in British Guiana proposed the policy option of covert action for the first time. The United States comprehensively The policy strategy of using overt and covert means to interfere with the Jagan government is beginning to take shape.

While seeking cooperation from the United Kingdom, the United States also intensively designed and formulated intervention plans. On August 30 and 31, 1961, the U.S. State Department submitted two memorandums to President Kennedy (referred to as the "August Plan"), starting from co-opting and subverting. The U.S. policy on British Guiana was outlined from the perspective of the United States. As for the options to win over the Jagan government, the U.S. State Department's recommendations mainly include: providing economic and technical assistance to the Jagan government, and integrating the independent British Guiana into the Organization of American States and the "Progress" "Alliance". Regarding the strategy to subvert the Jagan government, the State Department recommended the development of a covert plan that would first focus on gathering intelligence to expose communist activities in British Guiana, while also cultivating anti-communist forces in British Guiana through covert political action in order to Seeking to replace the Jagan government if necessary. Regarding the State Council's recommendations, Kennedy agreed in principle and requested a more detailed plan. ÿ

On September 4, 1961, the U.S. State Department notified the United Kingdom in a top-secret manner of the "August Plan" approved by Kennedy. The U.S. pointed out that Jagan and his People's Progressive Party maintained close ties with international communism. Despite this, the U.S. was still willing to Work with the British to "educate" and "rescue" Jagan. At the same time, the United States insists that the United States and the United Kingdom must be prepared to deal with the "trap" in Guyana. To this end, the United States hopes to use the United States to

— ӱӱ —

The country's action plan was used as the basis for U.S.-British consultations, including discussions of covert plans. ÿ In order to prepare for the U.S.-British talks, Secretary of State Rusk called David Bruce, the U.S. Ambassador to the UK, on September 5, asking him to reiterate the U.S. position during the talks: Jagan is "Sleepers" under communist control and seeking to establish a Castro-style communist regime in Guyana. Therefore, making a deal with Jagan was extremely difficult. As a strategy to avoid provoking the British, Rusk instructed Bruce to The importance of intelligence collection should be emphasized and the tone of covert political operations should be reduced. ÿ

Starting from September 11, 1961, the United States and Britain held a series of talks in London, specifically discussing the issue of British Guiana. The British side recognized the U.S. policy of co-optation, but the British side was concerned about the U.S. hidden plan to expel the Jagan government. Clearly opposed, refused to allow the CIA to conduct covert operations in British Guiana, and only agreed to the joint collection of relevant intelligence by the United States and Britain.ÿ

In short, based on the Cold War strategy of containing communism in Latin America, the Kennedy administration established the policy goal of opposing Jagan when it first came to power. As the People's Progressive Party led by Jagan won the election in 1961 and established a party headed by Jagan, The British Guiana government formed the basic framework of the United States' policy of using overt and covert means to interfere in British Guiana affairs. In view of the fact that the United Kingdom has considerable reservations about the United States' intervention policy and refuses to cooperate with the United States, under this situation, it is inconvenient for the United States to intervene rashly. This is the main reason why the United States has designed two strategies of co-optation and subversion. On the other hand, the United States does not have any hope for the co-optation policy. It is just pretending to be hypocritical and conciliatory towards the United Kingdom, and at the same time creating the illusion of cooperation with the Jagan government. Based on the global The Cold War strategy, including the subversive policy of covert operations, is the core of the United States' "August Plan." In view of the fact that the United States' covert action plan was opposed by the United Kingdom, the policy of bluffing and co-optation became a means of covering up the United States' subversive plan and was an expedient for the United States. Plan

## 2. The spread of U.S. policy towards British Guiana

Through the London talks in September 1961, the United States was well aware that there were huge differences between the United States and Britain on the issue of dealing with the Jagan government. The posturing strategy became the first step in the development of U.S. policy. For this reason, the United States decided to invite Jagan to visit Washington. In view of Jagan's several requests for assistance, the United States believed that aid with political conditions was both a tool to win over Jagan and a means to put pressure on Jagan. In a report on October 17 regarding the provision of aid to British Guiana, In its position paper, the United States emphasized that once Jagan takes office

— ӱӱ —

ÿ yyyyy yyyy y yyyyy yyy yyy yy yyy y yyy

In order to take advantage of the Georgetown riots to intensify the situation in British Guiana, it is seeking to launch a new round of negotiations with the United Kingdom.

capital of British Guiana, Protests against the Jagan government's fiscal austerity and tax increase policies broke out and triggered riots. Burnham and Daguire, who were secretly supported by the United States, were the direct organizers of the Georgetown riots. At the same time, as the United States implemented measures against the Jagan government As part of the covert operation, the CIA used secret financial support to help intensify the Georgetown riots. The purpose was to use the political turmoil to force the British Macmillan government to delay the independence process of British Guiana. Based on this, Rusk announced on February 19 Calling Home, claiming that the United States continued to receive reports that Jagan had maintained ties with communism, and that the Georgetown riots had also proved that Jagan was not a suitable leader. Rusk reiterated that Jagan's continued power would not only damage US-British relations, but would also create problems for the Americas. The system creates trouble. 5 It can be seen that the Georgetown riots provided an excuse for the United States to abandon its co-optation policy. For this reason, the United States stepped up its policy planning to subvert the Jagan government.

assistance. In response, Kennedy responded that the United States was concerned about the political freedom and independence of British Guiana. Within this framework, the United States Will consider providing assistance to British Guiana. Kennedy particularly emphasized that British Guiana's trade relations with the Soviet bloc will most likely lead to British Guiana's economic dependence on the Soviet Union, thereby giving the Soviet Union a tool for political pressure. October 26, Jagan continued to discuss aid matters with U.S. government officials, but Kennedy refused to meet with Jagan again, citing his tight schedule. The U.S. reiterated that based on the U.S. government's aid standards and procedures, the U.S. must review development plans and projects in British Guiana in advance. ÿÿ It can be seen that Jagan had no knowledge of the subversive intentions of the United States. Therefore, when he was invited to visit Washington, Jagan had high hopes for the United States to provide assistance. On the other hand, based on the established policy strategy, the United States only pretended to be submissive. He expressly expressed his intention to provide assistance with conditions attached, but did not make a specific commitment. Jagan left Washington empty-handed. ÿ As

of early 1962, the United States still had not provided any assistance to the Jagan government. In February, Georgetown, the

The United States would never provide any assistance as the government's policies led to international communist control of British Guiana. ÿ It can be seen that based on its previous policy assessment and Cold War strategy, the United States had already decided to refuse to provide assistance before Jagan's visit to the United

States. According to the arrangement, Jagan held talks with Kennedy in Washington on October 25, 1961 and made a request for

超丁美海研究 Issue 3, 2022

At the same time, Kennedy ordered the intelligence agencies to take emergency action in February 1962 to strengthen the intelligence and operational capabilities of the United States in British Guiana, and then prepare for the spread of covert operations. ÿ According to Kennedy's instructions, the CIA further penetrated the country based on the previous penetration . Intensified covert operations against British Guiana, Covert political operations have become an important focus of the CIA. To this end, the CIA has increased its support for covert political funds and continues to provide large amounts of money through indirect channels to the People's National Congress Party, the largest opposition party in British Guiana led by Burnham. secret funds to support its political activities against the Jagan government. In fact, taking a firm stance

to expel the Jagan government has always been the policy goal pursued by the U.S. State Department and the CIA. But on the other hand, the United Kingdom cannot be completely bypassed by the United States. In view of this, the relevant agencies of the U.S. government jointly formulated a policy document entitled "National Security Action Memorandum No. 135" (NSAM 135) on March 8, 1962, and it was signed by Kennedy. The document held that in La Before the talks between Skok and Home, the United States is still unable to make a final decision on British Guiana policy. To this end, the United States must consider three issues: First, whether the United States can urge the United Kingdom to agree to delay the independence of British Guiana; second, if the United Kingdom refuses to delay The independence of British Guiana, and whether British Guiana can hold a new round of elections before independence. Third, based on the above factors, the United States should weigh the possibility and limits of taking action. It can be seen from this that the policy direction of the United States is very clear: urge the United Kingdom to agree Delay the independence of British Guiana and hold a new round of elections to create conditions for the United States to formulate policies and take action.

On March 13, 1962, Rusk and Home met in Geneva to discuss the issue of British Guiana again.

On the topic, Home said that the British side understood the United States' concerns about the situation in British Guiana and the emergence of another Castro-like regime in the Western Hemisphere, and agreed to appropriately postpone the independence of British Guiana. As for the covert action plan that the United States was concerned about, Home did not It can be seen that in the face of pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom had to make a compromise and was willing to postpone the independence process of British Guiana to a certain extent, but it was hesitant about covert actions. From

the perspective of the United States, the United Kingdom agreed to postpone the independence of British Guiana. The independence process creates a certain space for the United States to take policy actions, including covert actions. To this end, the U.S. State Department issued a policy on March 15, 1962.

ÿ

超丁星海研究 Issue 3, 2022

On the one hand, it advocated urging the United Kingdom to postpone British Guiana's independence plan to 1964 in order to leave more policy space for the United States. On the other hand, the State Department believed that it should follow the established covert plan. Expelling the Jagan government. The State Department emphasized that the main way to implement covert plans is covert political action. To this end, the United States should find Jagan's replacement and be prepared to deal with the exposure of the operation. ÿ

According to the established action path, the Kennedy administration is responsible for coordination The "5412 Task Force" for covert operations held a meeting on March 22, 1962, and asked CIA Director John McCone to step up his evaluation of ways to conduct covert operations in British Guiana. This initiated the covert operation against British Guiana . At the same time, the United States was preparing for the political layout after Jagan and invited Burnham to visit the United States in May. During this period, Burnham held many meetings with State Department officials and members of Congress. ÿ The content involves issues such as forming an anti-Jagan alliance to win a new round of elections and expel the Jagan government. ÿ At this point, Burnham's role as Jagan's replacement has been confirmed by Washington.

While designing specific policies, the CIA's covert operations against British Guiana had quietly started. As a follow-up arrangement for Burnham's visit to the United States, the CIA quickly established direct contact with Burnham and Daguille in June 1962, promising to provide The People's National Congress Party and the United Forces Party provided secret funds to support its anti-Jagan political activities. ÿ At this point, the covert political actions of the United States to support the opposition parties in British Guiana further spread. In July, the CIA provided information to the "5412 Task Force" " Submitted a detailed covert action plan (referred to as the "July Plan"), which involved the provision of secret financial support to opposition parties and trade union organizations in British Guiana. 5 With the introduction of the "July Plan", the United States targeted the British Guyana's covert political action plan is basically finalized.

On August 18, 1962, Kennedy summoned McCone and asked the CIA to further enrich the covert action plan that had been formulated and expel the Jagan government. 6 According to Kennedy's instructions, relevant U.S. government agencies accelerated policy deployment. On September 5, including the State Department, Officials from the CIA and other departments held a joint meeting to focus on the issue of British Guiana. Participants believed that while maintaining minimum contact with the Jagan government,

ÿ snow snow snow snow ÿ "Sh snowflake a snowflake s a snowflake"g

ŷ ŷŷŷŷŷ ŷŷŷŷŷŷŷ ŷŷŷŷŷŷ ŷ ŷŷ

— ӱӱ —

At the same time, the United States should step up efforts to improve and advance the covert plan against British Guiana. Based on the secrecy of covert operations, the meeting did not discuss the specific details of the covert plan. ÿ Judging from the policy practice of the United States, while taking covert operations against the target country, Maintaining a certain degree of open contact with the target country's government is a cover for the United States to carry out covert operations. Kennedy's instructions and the discussions at the Joint Government Meeting once again showed that covert operations are the main means by which the United States seeks to subvert the Jagan government. In

short, preventing It was the stated policy goal of the United States for Jagan to take charge of British Guiana after independence. Within this framework, the short-term policy of co-optation was ultimately an illusion created by the United States to advance the goal of regime change. It was also a political maneuver by the United States to coordinate its subversion plan. In the face of the Georgetown riots, the United States took the opportunity to abandon its inconsistent policy of co-optation, and at the same time stepped up the formulation and improvement of a hidden plan to overthrow the Jagan government. With the introduction of the "July Plan", the United States' policy on British Guiana comprehensively progressed. Entering the track of implementing regime change, the United States' policy plans and covert actions to subvert the Jagan government gradually spread.

3 Covert Political Actions in the United States and the General Strike in British Guiana

Just as the United States stepped up its covert intervention operations against British Guiana, the Cuban Missile Crisis came unexpectedly in October 1962. Taking advantage of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States tried its best to drum up international communist activities in British Guiana, claiming that Guyana would It became the bridgehead for the Soviet bloc to advance into the South American continent. More importantly, the Cuban Missile Crisis strengthened the United States' policy stance against the Jagan government: any trace of Castro's influence in the Western Hemisphere must be destroyed. It can be seen from this that the use of Cuban missiles crisis, the United States further exaggerated the infiltration and threat of communism in order to create an international

public opinion environment for subverting the Jagan government. While using the Cuban missile crisis to create a tense international atmosphere, the United States also lost no time in provoking internal conflicts in British Guiana and stepped up efforts to To promote covert operations to overthrow the Jagan government. As the Labor Relations Bill proposed by the Jagan government caused serious dissatisfaction and opposition, the CIA took advantage of it and made a decision in October 1962: to plan and launch a new campaign in British Guiana. A round of general strikes . In order to implement this action, the CIA quickly designed and formulated a covert action plan that relied on the largest labor union organization in the United States - the Federation of Labor-CIO as the main implementation platform, code-named "Operation Flypast" (Operation Flypast). ), the purpose is to secretly transfer funds through the AFL-CIO to instigate and support

超丁美油研究 Issue 3, 2022

The pro-Western British Guiana trade union organization launched a general strike, thereby helping to subvert the Jagan government. Up to this point, in addition to secretly funding and openly supporting the British Guiana opposition parties represented by Burnham, they secretly instigated the British Guiana The general strike launched by the trade unions against Jagan became a covert subversion of the CIA. The key links and main starting points of the overturning action.

Among the many trade union organizations in British Guiana, the British Guiana Trade Union Council (BGTUC) is the political tool used by the United States to shake up the Jagan government. As the largest right-wing trade union organization in British Guiana, the British Guiana The Guyana Council of Trade Unions has maintained long-term close ties with the AFL-CIO and other American trade union organizations. The US CIA also maintains long-term close ties with the British Guiana Council of Trade Unions through the AFL-CIO and its affiliated American Association for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Direct contacts were establishedÿ , thereby laying the organizational foundation for the CIA to use labor unions to carry out covert operations to subvert the Jagan government. As the political activity platform of the AFL-CIO in Latin America, the American Free Labor Development Association based on the CIA and the AFL-CIO It provided training to British Guiana Council of Trade Unions leaders and young workers, exaggerating the dangers of communism, and even teaching street politics, violence and subversive techniques. Among all countries and regions in the Western Hemisphere, British Guiana was the largest federation of trade unions. - the region with the highest proportion of training provided by the Federation of CIO and the American Federation of Labor and Development. In order to prepare for a general strike, the Federation of American Federation for the Development of Liberal Labor invited Richard E., leader of the Council of Trade Unions of British Guiana, on the instructions of the CIA and the AFL-CIO. Richard Ismael secretly visited the United States to teach him the experience of leading and organizing strikes. 5 Based on the policy consideration of providing covert political financial support to the British Guiana Trade Union Council and other British Guiana trade union organizations selected by the United States, the CIA The "Gotha Foundation" was also specially set up as a cover organization and secret fund transmission channel to fund trade union organizations such as the British Guiana Council of Trade Unions to carry out political, propaganda and subversive activities against Jagan. This shows that in the early stage The CIA's secret infiltration and political layout are the premise and basis for the CIA to formulate and implement the "fixed-point overflight operation".

ÿ γνανά γνανά το προτικό προτικό το προτ 

ŸŸŸ ŸŸŸŸŸŸ

<u>ŷŷŷŷŷŷŷ ŷŷŷŷŷ ŷŷŷŷ</u> ÿ ŷ ŷ ŷŷŷŷŷŷŷ; ŷŷŷŷŷŷŷ ŷŷŷŷŷ ŷ ŷŷ

<u>ÿÿÿÿÿÿ ÿÿÿÿÿ ÿ ÿÿÿ</u>

— ÿÿ —

By evaluating the early penetration and personnel training, the United States believed that the conditions were ripe for launching a new round of general strikes. In order to plan a new general strike, the AFL-CIO representatives sent to British Guiana worked with the leaders of the British Guiana Council of Trade Unions A series of secret talks and collusions were held to discuss the strike plan. ÿ With the behind-the-scenes instructions of the CIA and the secret support of American trade union organizations such as the AFL-CIO, the British Guiana Trade Union Council launched a new round of general strikes in April 1963. Strike. At this point, the "Operation Targeted Overflight" planned by the CIA was fully launched. Provoking a general strike in British Guiana became the most important political method used by the United States to subvert the Jagan government. ÿ

In order to support the general strike in British Guiana, the United States not only provided technical training and policy guidance to strike organizers, but also used the secret funding channel established by the CIA - the "Gosa Foundation", or through the American Free Labor Development Association and the Federation of Labor - The CIO and other channels provided support for the strike with funds, food and medical supplies. In a top-secret document dated April 24, 1963, the CIA admitted that without sufficient financial support, the general strike could not even last a week. For this reason, 4 The "5412 Task Force" meeting on September 25 decided that the CIA should continue to provide secret financial support to ensure the continuation of the general strike. According to incomplete statistics, during the entire general strike, the CIA only provided information to strike organizers through the AFL-CIO. The secret funds transferred exceeded US\$1 million. Therefore, in the political action of instigating the general strike and intensifying the conflict by covert means, the covert funds provided by the CIA to the anti-Jagan government trade union organizations played a key role. ÿ In this sense "Operation Targeted Overflight" was a subversive activity carried out by the CIA using trade union organizations in British Guiana, mainly through covert political actions. It was a large-scale covert attack launched by the Kennedy administration against Jagan and his People's Progressive Partyÿ, British The general strike in Guyana was the result of the CIA's "Operation Targeted Overflight."

In addition, in accordance with the instructions of the CIA, American trade union organizations such as the AFL-CIO also exerted pressure on the Jagan government from outside, instigating trade union organizations in the Caribbean to take joint actions to disrupt British Guiana's import and export trade, especially blocking the import and export trade of British Guiana. The import of food and oil from British Guiana has led to the increasing shortage of food and oil supplies in British Guiana, and the society has become increasingly unstable. In a sense, it is subverting the

ÿ 20202020 2020202 2 2020202 2020202 2020202 20202 20202 20202 20202 20202 20202 20202 20202 20202 20202 2020 2

ÿ in supporting the US government's subversion of the Jagan regime, see Ronald Radoshÿ American Labor and United States For eign Policyÿ New York: Random House 1969ÿ pp 39 ÿÿ ÿÿÿ

超丁美油研究 Issue 3, 2022

During the Jagan government, American trade union organizations such as the AFL-CIO played a role in covering up and coordinating the subversive activities of the CIA and were tools for covert subversive activities in

the United States. ÿ As the general strike progressed, the CIA took new measures to Further exacerbating the social crisis. On the one hand, under the arrangements of the CIA and American labor unions, the general strike escalated into violent activities, including explosions, arson, and attacks on government office buildings. On the other hand, in response to the strong development of the general strike controlled behind the scenes in the United States, The CIA also carried out a series of covert propaganda operations against the Jagan government, including forging letters written by Jagan's wife to the Communist Party and publishing them. In addition, the CIA also sent and distributed letters to British Guiana through undisclosed channels. Books, movies and pamphlets, covering topics such as promoting democratic freedoms and labor movements in the United States and other Western countries, and smearing the Soviet Union, Cuba and the international communist movement. At this point, the covert propaganda actions of the United States have been vigorously spread, and they

have become a plan to coordinate and support covert political actions. important means. In order to assess the progress of the general strike and the problems it faced, Kennedy chaired a meeting at the White House to discuss the issue of British Guiana on June 21, 1963. As the driving force behind the scenes, the CIA admitted frankly without mentioning its own role. This round of strikes was covertly supported by American labor unions. The CIA also complained that the British government actually took measures to support Jagan during the strike, including using British troops stationed in British Guiana to serve as cargo for Cuban and Soviet ships carrying food and fuel. Provide protection, etc. In view of this, Rusk called the British urgently after the meeting, saying that the British side's measures were unacceptable. At the same time, he urged the British side to change its policy and

take effective measures to expel the Jagan government before British Guiana became independent. ÿ The British side was late
The delay in responding to the United States' request to postpone British Guiana's independence plan to 1964 aroused strong dissatisfaction
in the United States. On June 30, 1963, Kennedy and Macmillan met in London, and British Guiana became one of the core issues
discussed. 1. However, the two sides still did not agree on a common policy. Macmillan insisted that British Guiana must complete the
independence process as scheduled. Kennedy emphasized that the British could not withdraw on their own and leave a communist regime
in the Western Hemisphere. This in turn triggered conflicts in the Caribbean and even the world. For this reason, the United States
requested to further postpone the independence arrangements and processes of British Guiana. ÿ Faced with the serious crisis caused by
the general strike and the continued increasing pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom had to rethink its strategy and immediately Adjusted his position. On July

GROOW Presents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Cha ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ ress of Kansas 2008, p 65 For a list of books and films about covert CIA propaganda operations against British Guiana, see "CIA Covert" ÿ

— ӱӱ —

ÿ Robert W Coxÿ "Labor and Hegemony" in Interna ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ ÿÿÿÿ iliam Bloom

У Interventions since World War Monroe: Common C OURAGE PRESSÿ 1995ÿ pp 108 - 113ÿ МЙСНАЕL

It agreed to postpone British Guiana's independence plan to 1964 and hold a new round of elections before independence, with the purpose of forcing Jagan to resign. ÿ At this point, there was a major change in British policy and it was willing to cooperate with the United States. Forcing Jagan to step down, thereby creating a new opportunity for the United States to seek to subvert the Jagan government.

In short, after entering October 1962, the United States' policy actions to subvert the Jagan government were fully implemented. Among them, covert political action methods including secret financial support and policy guidance were used to incite the pro-Western British Guiana trade union organizations to launch a massacre. Strikes are the main tool and means of subversive actions in the United States. Under the secret control of the CIA and labor unions, the general strike that broke out in British Guiana in April 1963 lasted for more than 80 days, intensifying its political turmoil and social crisis to the greatest extent, and destroying It has established the ruling foundation of the Jagan governmentÿ and thus created more favorable conditions for the United States' policy actions to subvert the Jagan government.

4. Regime changes in the United States and British Guiana

After entering 1964, the Johnson administration of the United States continued the policies of the Kennedy administration, continued to support the pro-Western leaders and political organizations in British Guiana, and opposed the Jagan government. To this end, the "303 Committee" responsible for covert operations followed President Johnson's instructions and The established policy of the United States authorizes the CIA to continue to provide covert financial support and training to pro-Western political organizations such as the People's National Congress Party of British Guiana to help them compete in the upcoming 1964 elections. In addition, instigating ongoing strikes through covert means is also It is an important part of the CIA's secret financial support plan.

On February 12, 1964, Home, who was already the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, met with President Johnson in Washington. British Guiana became one of the important topics of discussion. Both parties reconfirmed that independent British Guiana must not be under the control of Jagan. ÿ At the same time, the internal situation in British Guiana became more complicated. In early February, the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Federation, which supported the People's Progressive Party, launched a large-scale strike and demonstration, and attracted the Sugar Workers' Federation to join it, and then fought against the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Federation. In the face of a new round of political turmoil, the United States believes that the strike launched by Jagan's supporters is an action taken by the People's Progressive Party to strengthen Jagan's ruling base and force the opposition parties to surrender. Its purpose is to undermine the upcoming election, so it must be counterattacked. In view of this, the CIA lost no opportunity to launch

ÿÿÿÿ"ÿ ÿÿ ÿÿÿÿÿÿ ÿÿ ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ

超丁美海研究 Issue 3, 2022

Adding fuel to the flames, on the one hand, they stepped up the provision of intelligence support to opposition political parties; on the other hand, they continued to funnel funds to anti-Jagan trade union organizations through the AFL-CIO and other institutions, inciting them to create and aggravate social unrest, and even provoke violence. ÿ

Deteriorating the situation in British Guiana. ÿ In order to exaggerate the tension and cooperate with the launch of covert political operations, the CIA launched a new covert propaganda operation. To this end, the AFL-CIO, in accordance with the instructions of the CIA, assisted the British Guiana Trade Union Council to establish the "Labor "Voice" radio station, founded the "Labor Advocate" newspaper, used communication channels to support Burnham and the People's National Congress Party, and attacked Jagan and the People's Progressive Party. ÿ In terms of propaganda content, the United States also strangled For example, on March 27, 1964, the State Department secretly instructed the AFL-CIO to join forces with the British Guiana Council of Trade Unions without revealing the U.S. government's intention to interfere, falsely claiming that the Jagan government was trying to deport the U.S. government. The People's Progressive Party also prevented unfriendly foreign trade union leaders from entering the country in order to launch a maximum propaganda offensive. At the same time, the opposition parties also widely distributed leaflets defaming Jagan and the People's Progressive Party. political badges and other propaganda materials in order to further stir up the situation. ÿ It can be seen from this that the in-depth spread of covert propaganda operations means that the United States' secret subversive activities have further escalated, and it has become an important way to coordinate covert politic

From the perspective of the United States, the elections at the end of 1964 created a rare opportunity to oust Jagan and achieve U.S. policy goals. The cooperation between the People's National Congress Party and the United Forces Party was the key to defeating Jagan and winning the election. To this end, The United States intensified its policy actions. In April 1964, the United States secretly sent political consultants to British Guiana to actively bring together the People's National Congress Party and the United Forces Party to form an electoral alliance to jointly fight against the Jagan camp. Under the guidance of the American political consultants Under secret contacts and arrangements, Burnham and Daguille held two talks on April 24 and April 28 and reached a consensus, promising to cooperate closely during the election.ÿ

After May 1964, the confrontation between the Jagan camp and the anti-Jagan camp further escalated. Strikes and demonstrations continued one after another, which led to violence and even property damage and casualties. In order to cheer up the opposition, the U.S. State Department launched a On March 13, Burnham was informed through Delmar R Carlson, the new Consul General in Georgetown, claiming that if the People's Progressive Party tried to continue to be in charge of Guyana, the United States would never sit idly by. At the same time, the State Department instructed Carlson to communicate with relevant parties. people (whose names have not yet been declassified), with the purpose of further finalizing support for Burnham and other opposition parties.

— ÿÿ —

## Specific stepsÿÿ

There is no doubt that the chaos in British Guiana is the result of deliberate instigation by the United States. From the perspective of the United States, the chaos in British Guiana shows that the United States is on the right track and is far from realizing the goal of expelling Jagan and his People's Progressive Party. The goal is not far away. Therefore, both the United States and the United Kingdom expressed opposition to Jagan's proposal to call on the United Nations to investigate the situation in British Guiana. The United States' intention is very clear; to avoid interference by the intervention of the United Nations

in moving the situation in British Guiana toward the direction expected by the United States. In order to ensure the realization of U.S. policy goals, while instigating strikes and supporting the electoral offensive of opposition parties, the CIA also formulated a paramilitary action plan in June 1964, with the purpose of secretly training 100 people in Venezuela by the CIA. It can be seen that the CIA has prepared a variety of covert action plans for British Guiana, which shows that the United States is determined to overthrow the Jagan government . Political will and policy skillsy

Jagan was well aware that the United States was an important external factor affecting the situation in British Guiana. In order to ease the crisis and once again try to improve relations with the United States, Jagan proposed in early July 1964 to send a mission to visit Washington, but was rejected by the United States. From the perspective of the United States, accepting the visit of Jagan's mission would send the wrong signal and damage the relationship between the United States and the opposition in British Guiana. At the same time, Jagan's proposal to establish a coalition between the People's Progressive Party and the People's National Congress before the election The United States also expressed its clear opposition to the British side when it came to the proposal of the opposition parties to form a joint camp. The United States believed that the joint camp before the election was a strategy of the People's Progressive Party to postpone the election. It was political blackmail by Jagan and would be harmful to the people. The electoral prospects of the National Congress Party and the United Forces Party were adversely affected, jeopardizing their efforts to replace the Jagan government. Under the influence of the United States, the United Kingdom accepted the United States' position and rejected Jagan's proposal to form a joint camp. It can be seen from this that In order to achieve the goal of using the election to oust Jagan, the United States not only supported the opposition parties and trade union organizations in British Guiana through covert actions, but also made careful diplomatic arrangements. Reveals the political tactics of U.S. foreign intervention.

The election in British Guiana entered a fierce stage in October 1964. The opposition political parties launched a final sprint to win the election. In order to support the opposition parties' electoral offensive, the CIA provided information to the opposition parties and the trade union organizations they controlled through secret channels. New financial support. At the same time, the United States

ÿ

ÿ

ÿ

VVV VV VVVVVVV

ÿ 

— ÿÿ —

括丁美海研究 Issue 3, 2022

The government also began making plans to provide assistance to Burnham after the election.

On December 7, 1964, the elections in British Guiana were held as scheduled, but the results were not as expected by the United States. The People's Progressive Party led by Jagan won 45.6% of the vote and 24 parliamentary seats. The People's National Party led by Burnham The Congress Party won 405% of the votes and 22 parliamentary seats, and the United Forces Party led by Daguille won 125% of the votes and 7 parliamentary seats. Although the British government did not like Burnham, it was forced by the United States to Under pressure, the British Governor-General still announced that, in accordance with the constitutional traditions of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, he would appoint Burnham as prime minister and form a coalition government with the United Forces Party led by Daguil. Faced with the British move, Jagan was forced to announce his resignation. ÿ At this point, the United States had achieved its goal of overthrowing the Jagan government and fostering a pro-American and anti-communist regime. The U.S. State Department even claimed that the 1964 election results laid the foundation for British Guiana to become independent without the risk of communist control. ÿ Despite the United States' wanton It is exaggerated that Burnham's coming to power is a victory for democracy, but the actual situation is that the Burnham regime has implemented a dictatorship for a long time. Out of considerations of pursuing a Cold War strategy and supporting pro-American regimes in Latin America, the U.S. government sabotaged the Burnham regime. The actions of democracy turned a deaf earÿ, which reveals the essence of the policy of the United States to pursue the Cold War strategy in the name of democracy.

In short, in order to support the election campaigns of opposition parties, the United States has adopted a series of policy measures. On the one hand, the United States continues to provide secret financial support to pro-Western British Guiana political organizations and trade union organizations such as the People's National Congress Party through covert political actions. and policy guidance to help the opposition parties win the 1964 election. On the other hand, the United States continued to use political and diplomatic means to suppress the Jagan camp, and at the same time urged the United Kingdom to cooperate with the United States to jointly expel the Jagan government. With the help of a combination of covert and overt actions, In this way, the United States achieved its policy goal of overthrowing the Jagan government and fostering a pro-American regime.

To sum up, the 1964 British Guiana incident was the result of the United States' Cold War and containment strategy in the Americas. It was a major event in which the United States implanted its Cold War strategy and anti-communist policy into the Caribbean political process. Typical cases of using political action as the main form of policy to instigate regime change in other countries.

(Editor in charge Xu Rui)

<sup>1 23</sup> SUGB 1964 1968 62 32ÿ 884ÿ 992 93ÿ 494 analytics G analyz

ÿ 2 s analytics c Note Note: 2 Yes Yes Noteÿ Note Note: s scientific s scientific g 205 ÿ 138 snowflake 0 snowflake s snowflake