

Special Topics in Brazilian Studies

## Brazil's strategic environment and strategic choices — Brazil's international strategic outlook after Lula's return

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**Abstract:** The 2022 election is the most divisive election in Brazil, and Lula's victory means that Brazil's domestic and foreign affairs will face substantial adjustments. The article believes that although Lula will continue the international outlook and strategic thinking of his ruling period in the early 21st century, However, new changes in the international strategic environment have caused Brazil to face new challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, Brazil faces the risk of "marginalization" in the global economy. The trend of "deintegration" in Latin America has increased. The global governance crisis has exerted a great influence on Brazil's multilateral diplomacy. On the other hand, in the context of great power competition, the strategic importance of emerging powers such as Brazil has increased significantly. In view of this, Brazil's international strategic adjustment will place more emphasis on shaping the identity of a great power and improving regional representation. At the global level, great power diplomacy, South-South cooperation and participation in global governance will be the three core contents. Especially in its relations with major countries, Brazil will place more emphasis on reciprocity and reciprocity. At the regional level, the priority goals focus on strengthening South American identity and leadership. Regional governance, hedging against the US "Monroe Doctrine" and enhancing its regional representation. Overall, Brazil's international strategic adjustment is relatively beneficial to China's diplomacy. In order to promote the development of China-Brazil strategic partnership, the article puts forward four directions Policy recommendations, among which, more attention should be paid to Brazil's core interests at the regional and global levels.

**Keywords:** Brazil's international strategy, strategic environment, national identity, regional community.

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Brazil is an important representative of emerging markets and developing countries. Its international strategic choices can have a relatively important impact on the trend of global geopolitics and international relations. After Lula wins the presidential election in 2022, how will Brazil's international strategy be adjusted? ? This is a topic that can trigger extensive international discussion and is also the core question that this article aims to answer.

Since entering the 21st century, Brazil's international strategy has had significant phased characteristics. During the period when the Workers' Party was in power (especially between 2003 and 2010 when Lula was in power), it was "active and confident" and "seeking independence through diplomatic diversification" It is a prominent feature of Brazil's national strategy. During Bolsonaro's administration, Brazil's diplomacy turned to "anti-globalism" and eventually fell into a situation of "international isolation". Obviously, the fundamental reason for this huge contrast lies in the two countries. There are huge differences in the worldview and strategic thinking of the two presidents. Specifically, Lula emphasized that globalism and multilateralism are important ways for Brazil to enhance its international participation and extend its national interests, while Bolsonaro regarded globalism as a "political conspiracy." It can be seen that Brazil's international strategy after Lula's return is fundamentally different from that during the Bolsonaro period. However, amid global changes over the past century and deep adjustments to the international system, Brazil's international strategy in the new era is bound to include new aspects. Element content, which means that Brazil's international strategy after Lula's return will also be somewhat different from its previous two terms.

#### A new trend in the international strategic environment

The basic logic of international strategy means that in a specific international strategic environment, a country uses strategic thinking to formulate its own strategic goals based on its own strength and self-interest, and uses certain foreign policy means to strive to achieve its own strategic goals. Therefore, Elements that are often included in the international strategic analysis framework include strategic environment, national strength, national interests, strategic thinking, strategic goals, strategic means, etc. In a limited time span, national strength, national interests, strategic goals and other factors can maintain relative stability, while the strategic environment, strategic thinking and strategic means will show greater variability. It is not difficult to understand the changes in the strategic environment. In the context of the accelerating transformation of the international system, due to various and frequent uncertainties Affected by factors, the vulnerability of the international and regional strategic environment has increased significantly. Strategy

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On the one hand, changes in thinking and strategic means are strongly related to changes in governments; on the other hand, they will also undergo significant adjustments due to changes in the strategic environment. Overall, the current international strategic environment shows the following major change trends.

(1) Economic globalization has slowed down, and the risk of "marginalization" of the Brazilian economy has

intensified. After the outbreak of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and the European debt crisis, the global economy has not achieved real growth in 10 years.

For a long time, affected by this, populism has significantly increased in the three-dimensional political ecology of the country, region, and the world. Although populism has two different orientations, left and right, they all hold varying degrees of rejection of economic globalization. This is There is a significant contrast with the convergent policy environment in the early stage of the third wave of economic globalization, which in turn reflects the wide adjustment of domestic and foreign policies, resulting in greater uncertainty. This is also in line with the policy continuation required by economic globalization. At the same time, another huge challenge facing economic globalization is the interference and distortion of globalization by the United States. The fundamental reason is that emerging powers represented by China can more effectively use the third wave of Economic globalization has led to the rapid accumulation of national wealth. Under this situation, continuing hegemony and containing competitors have become the two consensus goals of American domestic politics. Since Trump took office, the United States has actually been promoting the goal of containing China. The interference of this policy orientation on economic globalization is reflected at two levels: First, as the world's largest economic power and the traditional leader of economic globalization, the United States excludes The global agenda is bound to distort economic globalization. Secondly, China is the world's second largest economy, the largest trader of goods, and the second largest consumer market. Its contribution to world economic growth has ranked first for many years, and it is also one of the 120 largest economies in the world. As the largest trading partner and important source of investment for many countries and regions, the United States' "de-China" policy in the fields of rules, technology, and industries will inhibit the momentum of economic globalization.

Judging from the history of Brazilian economic development, there is a significant positive correlation between the growth of national wealth and economic globalization. At the beginning of the 21st century, during the rapid advancement of economic globalization, the Brazilian economy relied on its comparative advantages in bulk products. The size of the economy quadrupled from 2002 to 2011, reaching a historical peak of US\$262 trillion in 2011, while per capita GDP achieved an average annual growth rate of 27% from 2006 to 2010, well ahead of high-income earners. However, since 2011, Brazil has experienced a decade of sustained economic downturn. The economic size has shrunk by 38.5% between 2011 and 2021. Per capita GDP has shrunk, and Brazil's share of the world economy has dropped from 354% to 167%. In addition, exported globally

Shrink 43.2%

In terms of population, Brazil is the economic power with the lowest proportion. The average proportion from 2010 to 2019 was about 12%. Moreover, the Brazilian economy shows significant "de-industrialization" characteristics. The proportion of exports of manufacturing products has increased from

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See the World Bank database // [World Bank Data](#) / [DP MKTP CD? locations = BR \[2022 - 12 - 12\]](#)

From 0.74% in the period 2000 to 2009, it dropped to 0.66% in the period from 2010 to 2019. On the contrary, the proportion of exports of agricultural products increased from 3.90% to 5.11%. Obviously, the Brazilian economy is currently in a downward trend. The global economy is facing significant risks of "marginalization", which is in huge contrast with the increasing proportion of other major emerging economies in the global economy. (2) The intensity of the game between great powers has increased, and the strategic importance of emerging powers such as Brazil has

increased. The changes in the rising international power system have profoundly affected the morphological characteristics of major power relations, especially in the relationship between established powers and rising powers. In 2017, the first US "National Security Strategy Report" after Trump took office. It believes that China and Russia are the primary challenges facing the United States, and emphasizes the need to carry out comprehensive strategic competition with China, and the areas of competition cover economics, politics, diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and international order. After Biden took office, he also announced in 2021 the "Interim National Security Strategic Guidelines", "National Defense Strategy 2022" and "National Security Strategy 2022" emphasize that China is "the only country capable of combining economic, diplomatic, military and technological power and launching a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system." Competitors actively build an "alliance and partner system" and strive to increase the intensity of strategic competition with China through "composite camps" and "rules checks and balances". As the intensity of competition among major powers increases, international relations face more complex interference factors, especially as the dominant party in the current international order, the United States and Western countries, are violating international rules in order to contain competitors, which will undoubtedly cause greater interference to international relations. The

majority of developing countries will face a more complex international cooperation environment, and even to a certain extent, they are forced to face the pressure of choice from developed countries in the United States and the West to "take sides". At the same time, developing countries are also facing more proactive strategic autonomy. On the one hand, these countries are facing the game between major powers. In terms of politics, economy, and culture and other fields, they maintain strong strategic autonomy, which helps balance the exclusive group political ecology, the "club" of developed economies and the so-called Western "liberal democracy" values alliance that the United States is trying to create. On the other hand, these countries most of them first focus on their own development issues and are more open to competition between China and the United States in the fields of development models and external governance models. Based on this logic, Brazil believes that maintaining "active neutrality" in the competition between China and the United States is most in line with its own geopolitics and economic interests. However, this depends on Brazil's own political external situation.

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Renato Baumann "Globalização e o Brasil" em Revista de Economia Política 42 No. 3 July - Setembro 2022 p. 602 Wu Xinbo: "On Sino-US Strategic Competition" in "World Economy and

Politics" 2020 No. 5 Issue No. Pages 104 - 112. Zhao Minghao: "The Biden administration and the direction of US strategic competition

with China", published in "Peace and Development", Issue 3, 2021, Issue 19 -

It also requires Brazil to formulate a clear strategic arrangement with broad consensus. (3) The contradiction between supply and

demand in global governance is highlighted, and the space of multilateralism is being squeezed. Currently, the

dilemma of global governance mainly stems from two sets of supply and demand contradictions. The first set of supply and demand contradictions It lies in the contradiction between the arduous tasks of global governance and the declining ability and willingness of the leaders of the governance system to provide public goods. Some scholars pointed out that the governance of global issues requires the collective action of all countries. However, some countries have confrontational and veto due to their internal systems. They are unable to provide definite and coherent commitments, support and actions on global issues. If such countries are major powers in international relations and veto politics arise within them, the quality of global governance and international cooperation will inevitably be affected. At this stage, affected by political polarization, narrow nationalism, protectionism, and populism in developed countries in the United States and Europe are increasingly on the rise. In the process of participating in globalization, more emphasis is placed on maximizing national interests, participating in global governance, and providing public goods. Their willingness and ability have been greatly reduced, and there has even been a phenomenon of arbitrarily withdrawing from international multilateral cooperation mechanisms. This is in huge contrast with the situation of developed countries leading global governance in the rapid development stage of economic globalization. The solution of global problems faces a significant contradiction between supply and demand. Another set of contradictions between supply and demand is reflected in the unwillingness of the dominant parties in the global governance system to accept new participants. In the process of transformation of the international system, the majority of emerging markets and developing countries have put forward reasonable demands for participation in global governance, requiring Western developed countries to Reform the global rules system dominated by the developed countries, change the global governance rules that are oriented to the interests of developed countries, and pay more full attention to the interest demands of developing countries (and even all mankind). On the one hand, it can objectively reflect new changes in the international power system, and on the other hand, it can objectively reflect the new changes in the international power system. On the one hand, it emphasizes the construction of a more fair and reasonable global governance system. However, as the balance of global power changes and its own strength is relatively weakened, the United States hopes to continue to dominate global governance at less cost, which increases the need for effective global governance and global governance. It is difficult for governance changes to be consistent with the transformation of the international system, so that the global governance mechanism reflects a lag that is disproportionate to the global power structure. It can be seen that emerging countries do not yet have equal participation rights in global affairs decision-making or are not treated fairly. Developed countries not only have security anxiety caused by the transfer of power, but also worry about whether they can continue to control the existing mechanisms. They even question whether emerging powers will act in accordance with the established rules after entering the mechanism and whether they are willing to assume international responsibilities. These Factors have contributed to another set of contradictions between supply and demand, that is, in the international decision-making system, the contradiction between the participation needs of developing countries and the limited power transfer of developed countries.

苏畅歌 著  
《全球治理体系变革中的挑战与前景》，载《当代世界》，2021年第7期，第57页。  
苏畅歌、董中举：《国际体系变革与全球治理改革》，载《南开大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）  
2018年第1期，第128页。

Su Changge: «Global governance transformation under the great changes: Challenges and prospects», in "Contemporary World", Issue 7, 2021, page 57. Wu

Zhicheng, Dong Z Zhuang: "Transformation of the international system and global governance reform", in «Journal of Nankai University» (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

The core issue reflected in the above two sets of contradictions between supply and demand is that multilateralism faces huge challenges, which restricts the vast number of developing countries in expanding global participation and promoting the democratic reform of global governance. Brazilian diplomacy has a tradition of multilateralism, and strengthening global multilateral participation is also an important step for Brazil. It is an important way to enhance international influence. It can be seen that the current global governance crisis constitutes a restrictive condition for Brazil's international strategy, because the retreat of multilateralism "has a particularly adverse impact on countries that do not have technological, economic or military advantages."

(4) The construction of community in developing regions has been significantly strengthened. The integration construction of Latin America is facing phased difficulties. With the rise of emerging countries, the integration of developing regions has shown an active trend. The reason is that on the one hand, it stems from the economic development of developing countries. The rapid advancement of globalization has shown a more advantageous growth momentum. The division of labor in the global value chain has also provided greater space for cooperation among developing countries. On the other hand, economic growth has enhanced the awareness of strategic autonomy of developing countries. In seeking their own While maintaining autonomy in economic development, developing countries have increased their political demands for regional collective identity. This not only forms an effective support for regional economic cooperation, but also expands the actual connotation of regional integration. In the transformation of the international system In the process, a large number of medium, small and micro-sized countries have elevated the construction of regional mechanisms to a higher priority, which reflects the proactive response of "peripheral" countries to the "polarization" trend of the international power structure. What is particularly noteworthy is that this kind of Regional communities that "integrate parts into wholes" have increasingly become an important part of the diplomatic strategies of major powers. For example, ASEAN is an important starting point for the "Indo-Pacific strategy" of the United States, Europe, Japan and other countries. At the same time, ASEAN is also an important part of China's "Indo-Pacific Strategy". The priority option of the peripheral diplomacy strategy. Therefore, the "leverage" role of regional communities in global geopolitics will become more prominent. From a specific practice point of view, as a representative of small and medium-sized countries in the region, ASEAN tries to avoid being a player in the game of great powers. "chess piece" and "pawn", but strive to play a "bridge" role in the dialogue between major powers.

During the left-wing collective governance cycle at the beginning of the 21st century, Latin American countries formed a broader political consensus in promoting regional communities and made two breakthrough attempts: one was the establishment of the Union of South American Nations, and the other was the establishment of the Union of South American Nations. The establishment of the Community of Caribbean States (referred to as "CELAC"), both embody the policy logic of building collective identity, and have also become important platforms for dialogue with extra-regional forces. However, during the period from 2019 to 2022, the political changes in Latin American countries have Due to the impact of inconsistent cycles, Latin America's regional integration construction has experienced phased regression, reflecting the "de-integration" and political changes at the economic and trade levels.

Relações Internacionais - CEBRI 2022, p 11 Zhang Jie: «ASEAN's strengthening

of strategic independence is beneficial to regional stability and development», contained in «Guangming Daily» Page 16, May 17, 2022. Zhou Zhiwei: «How to treat the

two sides in the triangular relationship between China, the United States and Latin America Group Structural Contradictions», Published in "Contemporary World", Issue 4, 2018,

"Fragmentation" at the political level, especially since the Bolsonaro government has successively adopted the "withdrawal" approach, such as withdrawing from the Union of South American Nations in April 2019 and suspending participation in related activities of CELAC in January 2020. These are serious deviations from the tradition of prioritizing regional integration in Brazilian diplomacy. It can be seen from this that during Bolsonaro's administration, Brazil's role in the regional integration process changed from the original "leader" to a "saboteur". It has had a significant negative impact on Latin America's regional integration. Under this situation, Latin America's collective identity has been weakening in stages, which is in huge contrast with the trend of strengthening community building in developing regions around the world. Affected by this, Brazil's ability to conduct cross-regional dialogue and participate in global governance through regional integration organizations has shrunk.

## 2. Brazil's international strategic goals and prospects

A country's identity is a decisive factor affecting its international strategic thinking and strategic goals.

As a regional power striving for international recognition, Brazil's national identity is mainly reflected in the following four levels: First, it is an emerging power with size advantages, a stable geopolitical environment, and significant regional influence; second, Countries with Western cultural traditions and values. Third, they are peripheral powers that have economic first-mover advantages and take the lead in industrialization. Fourth, they are major developing countries with diplomatic soft power advantages. However, the identity recognition of these countries has not been recognized by the international community. Full recognition of society. On the one hand, the Western world is not very accepting of Brazilian culture and values. Brazil is usually regarded as the "backward West". Even during Bolsonaro's administration, Brazil emphasized pro-Western cultural values, but The Western world also faces a situation of diplomatic isolation. On the other hand, Latin American neighbors believe that Brazil is more inclined to pursue the status of "the spokesperson of the southern world" and do not agree that Brazil is a regional power representing Latin America. In addition, since the two world wars, Judging from the formation process of the international power system, Brazil's demands as a great power have never been recognized by the international community. Therefore, in the face of major changes in the global strategic environment, the top priority of Brazil's international strategy is to strengthen the construction of national identity and enhance the international community's recognition of Brazil's national identity. Recognition, especially

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Zhou Zhiwei: «National Identity, Collective Identity and Incentive Mechanism—Analysis of Brazil's Core Motives for Participating in BRICS», published in «Latin American Studies», Issue 5, 2022, Pages 20-39.





First, maintain cooperative relations with the United States, but emphasize the equality and reciprocity of bilateral relations. During Lula's first two terms, Brazil adhered to the policy of "reciprocity and pragmatism" in its relations with the United States. Brazil-US relations Although there is cooperation, the two countries have structural contradictions at the regional and global levels, and there are also obvious gaps in bilateral relations. Since Bolsonaro came to power in 2019, Brazil-US relations have shown the distinctive feature of "automatic alliance". Bilateral cooperation mechanisms Fully activated. Especially during the Trump administration, the United States granted Brazil the status of a "major non-NATO ally" and security cooperation became a priority area for the United States to strengthen cooperation with Brazil.

The fundamental reason why Bolsonaro adopts the "automatic alliance" strategy with the United States is that he emphasizes the "Western attributes" of Brazil's system, culture, and values. Bolsonaro even announced that he would give up developing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO), national status. On the contrary, Lula positioned Brazil as a "peripheral power" and a "developing power", emphasizing Brazil's subordinate status in the international system and its status as a reformer. Based on this international view, Lula is bound to once again characterize Brazil as a country. Developing countries, and Brazil is both a major country in Latin America and an important force in promoting the reform of the global governance system. Therefore, after Lula's return, Brazil will once again return to strategic independence, multilateralism and other diplomatic principles. For example, in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Lula He publicly criticized NATO and the EU for increasing pressure on Russia, and pointed out that the Biden administration has been "inciting war." In addition, Lula attaches great importance to the construction of the South American defense system and aims to balance the United States' security hegemony in South America. Therefore, Lula After the return of the United States, it will not only slow down its security cooperation with the United States, but also take a clear-cut stance against the United States' power bullying.

In recent years, from Trump to Biden, the United States has successively launched policy programs for Latin America such as the "American Growth Plan", "Rebuilding a Better World", and the "American Economic Prosperity Partnership Plan", emphasizing the principles of democracy and transparent cooperation. One of them The purpose is to limit the pace and space of cooperation between Latin American countries and China. Although the United States is Brazil's second largest trading partner, the bilateral trade structure is not highly complementary and the trade fluctuates greatly. In the same period, China-Brazil trade was For example, from 2011 to 2021, the average annual growth rate of bilateral trade between Brazil and the United States was only 18%, and the average annual growth rate was as high as 76%. The growth rate of Brazil-U.S. trade was obviously lower than that of China-Brazil trade. In terms of investment, the enthusiasm for U.S. investment in Brazil has dropped significantly. In Brazil, The investment stock has gradually been surpassed by China. The future Lula government will clearly oppose the politicization of economic and trade issues and will place more emphasis on the principles of efficiency and reciprocity in economic cooperation with the United States.

Second, increase diplomatic efforts towards major powers outside the region to offset the strategic pressure from the United States on Brazil. It is expected that the Lula administration will increase the importance of strategic cooperation with major developing countries outside the region, such as China and Russia, and the EU. China has maintained Brazil's strategic cooperation with China and Russia for 13 consecutive years. The largest trading partner status, this kind of economic interests-driven, political

See the statistical database of the Brazilian Ministry of Economy. <https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/pt/comex-vi-s> [2022-12-02]

The China-Brazil comprehensive strategic partnership guaranteed by mutual trust meets the strategic needs of both parties. During the period when the Labor Party was in power (2003-2016), China and Brazil had a high level of political mutual trust. During the period of opposition, the Labor Party and the Communist Party of China maintained close relations. The interaction reflects Lula and his Labor Party's high recognition of the Chinese system and the Chinese model. At the same time, China-Brazil economic and trade relations have always maintained an efficient pace of cooperation. In 2021, China-Brazil trade reached a record high of US\$1,640.6 billion, accounting for 36.3% of China-Latin America trade that year. exist At the investment level, from 2005 to 2021, Brazil was the fourth largest market for China's overseas direct investment, second only to the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. In 2021, Brazil became the largest market for China's overseas investment, accounting for 10% of China's overseas direct investment that year. 136% of direct investment y In addition, the Labor Party also highly recognizes China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative. Bochman, director of the party's core think tank "Lula Institute" said, "China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative is The world has provided valuable experience and provided a new perspective for solving today's world problems." y It can be seen that strengthening economic and trade cooperation with China will become the top priority of the Lula government's economic agenda.

Russia is also an important strategic partner of Brazil. Lula has greatly strengthened political mutual trust with Russia, especially strengthening strategic coordination with Russia under the BRICS framework. The Bolsonaro government has also adopted a relatively pro-friendly approach in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In the next four years, the Lula government will continue its strategic coordination with Russia, especially deepening cooperation in the fields of food security and fertilizer supply chains. Regarding the EU, the Lula government will focus on climate cooperation and repair relations with the EU. bilateral relations with major countries, and promote the free trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union to take effect as soon as possible. In short, through strategic cooperation with major foreign countries and the European Union, Brazil, on the one hand, enhances Brazil's role in the foreign policies of these countries and regions. importance, on the other hand, it aims to balance the influence of the United States in Brazil (or even Latin America).

Third, attach importance to strategic collaboration with other emerging economies and strengthen its identity as a "spokesperson for emerging countries." Since the mid-1990s, Brazil's national identity has been adjusted from a "first world country" to a "third world country." Affected by this, strengthening cooperation with developing countries and reforming the unjust international political and economic order through the overall strength of developing countries has become Brazil's mainstream strategic understanding. During Lula's first two terms, Brazil's international strategy was relatively prominent. The innovation lies in strengthening cooperation with developing countries, and deepening strategic collaboration with emerging powers is a crucial part of it. Therefore

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y «BRICS "Year of China" provides "BRICS solutions" for building a new international order», People's Daily Online, June 20, 2022

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y Zhou Zhiwei: «Why Brazil is more "warm" towards Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict», published in «World Knowledge», Issue 8, 2022,

It can be expected that in the next four years, Brazil may strive for international recognition among other emerging markets and developing country groups as a promoter of South-South cooperation and a mediator of geopolitical conflicts. Lula said during the campaign that he would restore Cooperation with Latin America and Africa, strengthening Mercosur, rebuilding the Union of South American Nations, and revitalizing the CELAC and BRICS mechanisms. Therefore, South-South cooperation will take priority over North-South cooperation in the diplomatic agenda of the Lula government. With this, At the same time, Lula will continue to act as a mediator in geopolitical conflicts

His identity has gained international reputation in Latin America and countries outside the region. From 2003 to 2010, Lula played an active coordinating role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks and the Iranian nuclear negotiations, and took the lead in presiding over the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Haiti. According to this logic, Lula After its return, it may actively promote negotiations between the two parties in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In addition, the Lula government may once again play an important role in the Haitian crisis, thereby expanding Brazil's participation in global and regional security governance and promoting the construction of a regional security community.

Fourth, strengthen creative participation in the reform of the global governance system. In his first two terms, Lula worked hard to promote the reform agenda of the United Nations Security Council, hoping to help Brazil obtain a permanent member of the Security Council. In the next four years, the Lula government will very likely It is possible to increase diplomatic investment in the issue of "membership". On the one hand, the reform of the United Nations Security Council will be put back on the agenda through the "Group of Four", and on the other hand, it will promote the reform of the United Nations through multilateral mechanisms such as the Group of 20 and BRICS. Agenda, both paths aim to strengthen Brazil's candidacy as a global power. At the same time, as emerging markets and developing countries have generated demands for representation, agenda setting and rule reshaping at the global governance level, Lu Latin American governments will not only strengthen communication and coordination with Latin American countries in the global economy, public health, environment and climate change, and digital economic governance, and promote the formation of Latin American country plans, but may also unite more developing countries and use the G20, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and other international organizational platforms, enhance the international voice, agenda-setting and rule-making rights, and promote the reform and improvement of the global governance system.

(2) Strategic deployment at the regional level In

addition to its status as a "middle power", Brazil also has the dual attributes of a regional power and a developing country. Regional strategy is an important basis for it to break through its status as a "peripheral power" and enhance its global voice. It is also The top priority of Brazil's international strategy. Since the re-democratization in the 1980s, regional strategy has been the component that best embodies Brazil's international strategic thinking. For example, in the late 1980s, the relationship between Brazil and Argentina shifted from competition to

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ÿ Zhou Zhiwei: «Brazil and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Analysis from the Perspective of Security Governance», published in «Latin American Studies», 2021 Issue 4, 2016, pages 63-76.

ÿ The "Group of Four" refers to the four countries composed of Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India, which "strive to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council".

\*Members of the Council\* is an informal multilateral coordination mechanism with a common goal.

The transformation of cooperation, Brazil's resistance to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) around the 21st century, and the advancement of the South American integration agenda in the first decade of the 21st century, all fully reflect Brazil's strategic logic in promoting the construction of regional communities. The next four years In 2016, Brazil's regional strategic goals include specific connotations such as strengthening South American identity, leading regional governance, hedging the United States' "Monroe Doctrine", and strengthening its own regional representation.

First, strengthen the geographical concept of "South America" and promote the common identity of South American countries.

After the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area in 1994, the geographical concept of "Latin America" gradually differentiated into "North America" and "South America". The concept of sub-region. Brazil has also adjusted its geographical identity from "Latin America" to "South America" and strives to build the identity of the South American Community with Brazil as the core, and use this as an important basis for its participation in the international multipolar power system. During his administration from 2003 to 2010, "multipolarity" was the core content of Lula's international outlook. Since Brazil does not have the hard power advantages of other major countries, the only way for Brazil to take the initiative in the multipolar structure is to promote the realization of South America. integration and strive for the position of "one pole" in the "multipolar" structure. Based on this idea, Lula promoted the establishment of the Community of South American Nations (later renamed the "Union of South American Nations") in 2004 and founded It established the Bank of the South, proposed the Initiative for Infrastructure Integration of South America (IIRSA), and promoted the cross-regional dialogue mechanism between South America and other regions. 3. However, due to the inconsistency of the political ecological cycles of South American countries, especially in 2019-2022 During the year, in response to the legitimacy issue of the Maduro government in Venezuela, South American countries were in a highly political polarization situation. This regional integration process with strong political overtones stalled or even regressed. As Brazil gradually "occurred" in the global economy, Marginalization", strengthening the integration construction of South America will become an important way for Brazil to avoid further "falling behind". On the one hand, Brazil urgently needs to resolve the ideological deadlock with its regional neighbors and improve relations with its neighbors, especially Argentina. On the other hand, it is to lead the cooperation in South America, strengthen the integration construction of South America, realize a more integrated "South American Community", and continue to promote dialogue between South America and major countries outside the region, and play a leading role in regional and global affairs. To shape the identity of the "South American Pole" in China. Marco Garcia, who once served as Lula's special assistant for international affairs, emphasized the importance of South America when talking about the prevalence of unilateralism in the United States, the strengthening of the EU's status, and the strengthening of China's —In the international environment with the rise of India and Russia, Brazil must seek to form alliances with its South American neighbors who have similar historical backgrounds, common values, and comple

Celso Amorim 1999 No 2020 pp 8-11 Zhou Zhiwei: "Brazilian International Strategy Research: Concept, Practice and Evaluation", published in "Jin Yang

Academic Journal» Issue 4, 2019, Issue 80 - 88 pages

Such as the South America-Africa Summit (ASA), the South America-Arab Summit (ASPA), etc. "Sul-

America" Ano 17 No 17 Abril - Junho de 2008 pp 22 - 28

According to this logic, with Lula's return and Latin America re-entering the cycle of left-wing collective governance, the Brazilian government is bound to strengthen the construction of the Union of South American Nations and promote the integration of other sub-regional cooperation mechanisms.

Second, strengthen the identity of a regional power and more proactively fulfill its responsibilities as a regional power. Territorial area, population and economic volume determine Brazil's status as a regional power in South America and even Latin America. Expanding influence and shaping the identity of a regional power through peripheral diplomacy has always been Brazil's goal. The basic goal of the regional strategy. During his administration from 2003 to 2010, Lula greatly strengthened Brazil's leading role in regional affairs. For example, he actively coordinated the conflict between Venezuela and Colombia, led many Latin American countries in the implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Haiti, and increased the investment intensity in Latin America, etc. In the next four years, increasing Brazil's leading participation in regional governance and leading the development of regional integration will be an important part of the Lula government's regional strategy. Specifically, the Lula government will actively mediate regional disputes and promote the integration of regional countries in the fields of politics, economy, military, education, culture, science and technology. In addition, the Lula government may use the Venezuelan crisis and Amazon rainforest protection as a breakthrough to enhance Brazil's role in the region. Playing a leading role in governance, on the other hand, reversing the diplomatic isolation caused by the Bolsonaro government and improving Brazil's international image.

Third, strengthen Latin American regionalism and resist the "Monroe Doctrine" of the United States. For a long time, Latin America has been regarded as the "backyard" of the United States. As early as 1823, the United States proposed the "Monroe Doctrine" and gradually consolidated and maintained its own hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Since Trump took office, the U.S. policy towards Latin America has reflected the resurgence of the "Monroe Doctrine". In response, Latin American countries have always had strong demands for regionalist policies and strive to explore the development path of regional integration. Aims to reduce economic dependence on the United States by expanding the common market and close internal political and economic ties, and maintain the country's independence through joint self-reliance. Brazil is an advocate and promoter of regionalism in Latin America. Lula's first two terms (2003) -2010) made a major breakthrough in regional integration construction, and even promoted the defense integration of South America, trying to weaken the leading role of the United States in the security governance system of South America, and also supported the construction of the CELAC. Based on the above logic, The Lula government will actively advocate Latin American regionalism, strengthen the construction of regional organizations such as the Union of South American Nations and the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean, and proactively respond to the resurgence of the US "Monroe Doctrine" by strengthening the political consensus of regional unity and self-reliance.

Fourth, enhance Brazil's role as a "fulcrum country" in the strategies of major powers outside the region toward Latin America. At the regional strategic level, Brazil limits the influence of the United States by deepening unity and cooperation with Latin American countries on the one hand, and on the other hand by promoting cooperation with China and The cooperative relationship between Russia, India, and the European Union has enhanced Brazil's status as a "fulcrum country" in the Latin American strategy of major foreign countries, thereby highlighting Brazil's representativeness in Latin America. For example, during the Labor Party's administration from 2003 to 2016, Brazil and The EU has strengthened its strategic partnership. The purpose is not only to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between the two parties in the fields of international security, energy, transportation, science and technology, but also to enhance the importance of Brazil in the EU's policy towards Latin America and South America.

And strengthen Brazil's leading role in the region to serve its regional and global strategies. At the same time, Brazil has also become a priority partner of the United States, Japan, Russia, India and other major countries in Latin America. In the next four years, the Lula government will return to the multilateral, pragmatic, and balanced diplomatic tradition. It is expected to strengthen cooperation with China, the European Union, India, Russia and other major powers outside the region in Latin America. It will further strengthen Brazil's representation in Latin America, thereby enhancing the recognition of Brazil's regional and regional interests by major power groups. Recognition of international influence. In view of the reality of the game between great powers, Brazilian academic circles generally believe that "avoiding involvement in Sino-US competition" is the most pragmatic choice for Brazil. However, from the perspective of Brazil's status as a "peripheral power", Brazil's interest demands greater consistency with developing countries, and Brazil's economic and trade closeness with Asia has exceeded its economic and trade relations with Western countries. Therefore, whether it is based on the pragmatic logic of economic and trade relations or the logic of policy choices based on international strategy, China and India should all be Brazil's priority partners. In addition, the Asia-Pacific region is the focus of the current great power competition, and Brazil is one of the few emerging powers that is "not involved in the geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific." This can not only help Brazil effectively avoid great power competition, but also it is also possible to maximize interests in the competition between major powers through multilateralism.

### 3. Policy ideas for deepening China-Pakistan strategic partnership

Brazil has great power ambitions and is a developing country. Its diplomatic tradition and values focus on multilateral cooperation and ideology. There are differences in geopolitical competition and development characteristics with the United States. In fact, there is a mainstream understanding in Brazilian strategic circles: Brazil is not Belonging to the West, strengthening cooperation with China and other emerging powers is Brazil's way out. In addition, multilateralism is also widely considered to be "the path most conducive to Brazil's participation in global governance" and is also an important tradition of Brazilian diplomacy. With Lula With the return to power, Brazil's diplomatic autonomy will be significantly enhanced, and its diplomatic priorities will also return to South Africa from the phased "alliance with the United States". South Africa has a tradition of cooperation, which provides favorable conditions for China to deepen its strategic partnership with Brazil.

Among the relations between China and other major countries (including emerging powers), China-Pakistan relations are a "model of South-South relations" that has developed relatively rapidly, has no obvious conflicts of interest, and has not experienced major ups and downs. After entering the 21st century, China-Pakistan relations are on the rise. As two emerging powers in the region, the regional and international influence of China and Brazil has been greatly improved. Their status in the international system is gradually transitioning from a "peripheral country" to a "center country". The relationship between the two countries has increasingly become an international relationship. A group of major country relations with important influence in China, Brazil has also always

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It is an important partner in China's South-South cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. Therefore, the China-Pakistan comprehensive strategic partnership has triple strategic significance of bilateral, regional and global multilateral.

Overall, the importance of Brazil in China's overall foreign strategy in the next stage is mainly reflected in five levels: Brazil is an important partner for China in safeguarding world peace and development, resisting the countercurrent of globalization, and building a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind. Brazil is an expanded market for China to plan a new pattern of opening up to the outside world, promote the "dual circulation" system, jointly build the "One Belt and One Road", and ensure the supply security of strategic resources (food and energy). Brazil is an expanding market for China to achieve sustainable development, avoid development difficulties, and An object of mutual learning to improve the effectiveness of national governance. Brazil is China's support force in promoting the reform of the global governance system, promoting the "China Plan", and improving the effectiveness of international communication. In view of this, China can learn from the following four points in particular when carrying out its diplomatic work with Brazil. Important ideas

First, attach importance to Brazil's core interests at the regional and global levels. According to the universal logic of international relations, the development of relations between countries should be a process based on the integration of interests of both parties. Moreover, the degree of consistency of interests is a decisive factor in determining bilateral relations. The key factor of efficiency. There is no conflict between China and Brazil at the level of their respective core interests. Both countries also hope to win each other's support for their core interests. After Lula's return, Brazil's core interests will change from the "core interests" of the Bolsonaro period. "Integrating into the Western system" has been transformed into "seeking a breakthrough in international identity." In order to strive for greater strategic autonomy, Brazil will reflect clearer policy demands, such as the shaping of regional powers, the construction of regional integration, and the representation of developing countries. pursuit of the North-South dialogue coordination role, etc. Brazil's above-mentioned demands do not constitute a direct interference with China's international strategy. In view of this, China should actively support Brazil to play a more important role at the regional and global levels, and support Brazil and other Latin American countries oppose hegemonism and external power politics.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Brazilian Labor Party government played an active coordinating role in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and the Syrian crisis. During the 2022 election campaign, Lula also expressed that "Brazil will play a positive role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict." The idea of "coordinating role" in itself fully reflects Lula's international strategic layout. As a "fellow traveler" in the reform of the international system, China should support Brazil's active actions in international affairs. In addition, there is a high probability that the Lula government will become more Attention should be paid to the issue of "membership" and the public relations efforts for major countries including China should be increased. The issue of Brazil's "membership" is likely to become an important issue in bilateral dialogue. In fact, the policies of China and Brazil on the reform of the United Nations The orientation is consistent and there is room for strengthening collaboration. For example, the declarations of the previous BRICS summits clearly support Brazil, India, and South Africa in playing a more important role in the United Nations. Therefore, China can insist on using the BRICS as a forum for consultations with the above three countries. The main platform for the "Permanent Membership" agenda.

Second, take advantage of the favorable opportunity of Lula's return to strengthen policy coordination and consolidate strategic mutual trust. Lula and his Labor Party have a broader consensus with China in terms of values and worldview, and this

It is also the area where the structural contradictions between Brazil and the United States are most prominent. In the stage of increasing competition between China and the United States, the "left turn" of Brazil and Latin America provides a good opportunity for China to deepen China-Brazil cooperation, China-Latin America cooperation, and eliminate interference from the United States. In the next stage, China can, on the one hand, strengthen multi-level public diplomacy with Brazil, strengthen position coordination with Brazil on issues involving China-Latin America cooperation, Sino-US competition, and global affairs, and jointly maintain a favorable bilateral and multilateral cooperation environment. On the other hand, China can strengthen its multi-level public diplomacy with Brazil. On the one hand, China should unequivocally support Brazil and Latin America's demands for independence and unity and self-reliance, and support the integration construction of Latin America.

Third, continue the high efficiency of bilateral economic and trade cooperation and promote Brazil's participation in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. The "dividends" of cooperation with China are a key factor in determining Latin America's attitude towards China. Since the 21st century, China-Brazil economic and trade relations have withstood the international financial crisis, Despite severe challenges such as the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic, we have always maintained an efficient pace of cooperation. From the current point of view, economic and people's livelihood issues are the biggest challenge to the Lula government. From this, it can be predicted that strengthening economic and trade cooperation with China will inevitably become a priority agenda for Brazil. In Latin America Among the 25 countries that have diplomatic relations with China, Brazil is one of the four countries that has not yet signed a "Belt and Road" cooperation agreement with China. The reason is mainly due to the long-lasting political chaos in Brazil since 2016. In recent years, Lula and labor The party highly recognizes the "Belt and Road" initiative and has also expressed its willingness to join the "Belt and Road" initiative, releasing policy ideas for formulating long-term cooperation plans with China. Under this situation, China can take the initiative to promote bilateral cooperation "One Belt, One Road" strategic dialogue, striving to promote Brazil's participation in "One Belt, One Road" cooperation.

Fourth, strengthen cooperation in global governance and consolidate the common identity of China and Brazil. At the international strategic level, reforming the current international order and realizing a multi-polar international structure are the most significant "similar items" between China and Brazil. The interests of both parties are related. Global governance cooperation is the "growth point" for deepening cooperation between China and Brazil. Brazil's diplomatic tradition and values are mainly multilateral cooperation and de-ideologicalization. There are differences in development characteristics and structural contradictions with the United States. These all determine the differences between China and Brazil. Brazil and Brazil have more common interests on global issues and their positions are closer. In addition, in the category of developing countries, the cooperation mechanism between Brazil and China is more comprehensive and three-dimensional, and the two countries' participation in international multilateral mechanisms is also more meaningful. In view of this, during Lula's administration, China can strengthen policy coordination with Brazil on major global issues. Especially in the context of intensified competition among major powers, Brazil should become an active partner for China's diplomacy. Targeting U.S. hegemony, Lula unanimously emphasized the principle of national equality, criticized U.S. unilateralism and interference in other countries' internal affairs, and criticized the U.S.'s approach of containing other countries through "decoupling". It can be seen that China and Brazil also have the same capabilities in relations with the United States. Large space for collaboration and cooperation

(Editor in charge Xu Rui)