

Special Topic on Diplomacy around Major Powers

The adjustment of the U.S. “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and the response to China’s peripheral diplomacy

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Abstract: Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the status of neighborhood diplomacy in China's foreign relations has continued to increase. The strategic value of neighborhood diplomacy as a priority direction of China's diplomacy in China's overall diplomacy has been further highlighted. Xi Jinping's concepts and practices of China's neighborhood diplomacy in the new era have continued to gain New developments. In the context of the overlapping effects of the COVID-19 epidemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has tightened its policy toward China by adjusting its "Indo-Pacific Strategy." This has not only led to a serious setback in Sino-US relations, but has also strongly disturbed China's surrounding environment. The "Indo-Pacific Strategy" promoted by the United States in China's surrounding areas has adopted a "snake in the mountains" posture. This strategy has the defects of multi-point layout and lack of focus in the use of means and geographical distribution. It is difficult to give full play to the U.S. alliance system. However, it still has certain destructive effects on China's surrounding environment. This is mainly reflected in the changes in the strategies of major actors in China's surrounding areas in response to the strategic adjustment of the United States. This has added new uncertainties to China's interactions with neighboring countries. In the context of intensified conflicts between China and the United States, China needs to pay more attention to managing its peripheral areas. This requires China to change its thinking on peripheral security work, realize a change in thinking from maintaining peripheral stability to shaping security order, and strengthen its ability to shape and lead the peripheral order.

Build a partnership support system for China's peripheral security architecture.

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Since the Biden administration came to power, the United States has further promoted the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and its China policy has become more confrontational. Sino-U.S. relations have become increasingly inelastic. The downward trend in Sino-U.S. relations not only means that China and the United States are facing challenges in the way of interaction. In-depth adjustments have also made China's peripheral diplomacy face greater challenges. From the perspective of the relationship combination between China and the United States and China's neighboring countries, the confrontation between China and the United States has directly led to increased security pressure in China's peripheral diplomatic environment. At the same time, it has also indirectly affected China's neighboring countries. The implementation effect of foreign policy. Therefore, China's strategy for neighboring regions not only shoulders the task of developing relations with neighboring countries, but also the task of maintaining China's peripheral environment. The advancement of the strategy faces pressure from the confrontational actions of the United States. How to avoid China's confrontation with neighboring countries? The interference and destruction of peripheral relations by the United States and its alliance system is an important goal of China's peripheral diplomacy. External factors from others will largely affect the future development and evolution of China's peripheral diplomacy. This makes it difficult to analyze and judge the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy". " layout and its impact on the relations between China's neighboring countries and China have become the key for China to strengthen its game with the United States and deepen its management of its surrounding areas.

1. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the status and role of peripheral diplomacy in China's overall diplomacy has been strengthened.

For more than 70 years since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government has always attached great importance to diplomacy in neighboring areas and has always regarded peripheral areas as the focus and priority direction of China's overall diplomacy. Especially since entering Xi Jinping's new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, with the international situation The development and evolution of the country and the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics have entered a new stage. China's peripheral strategy and practice have continued to gain new developments. Under the guidance of Xi Jinping's Thought on Neighboring Diplomacy, China's partnerships with neighboring countries have been qualitatively improved, and economic and trade relations have bucked the trend. Hotspot relations have been effectively managed and controlled. The tone of "neighboring countries are always the priority" has laid a good foundation for the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China's foreign relations have developed rapidly. China has paid more attention to its peripheral diplomacy. The status of peripheral areas as a priority direction of China's diplomacy has become more prominent. From the perspective of the spatial dimension of China's foreign work layout, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that "no matter in terms of geographical location, nature From the perspective of environment or mutual relations, the surrounding areas are of extremely important strategic significance to our country." "The surrounding areas are our place of settlement and our reliable strategic support." From the perspective of the time dimension of realizing the historical task of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, Xi Jinping The General Secretary emphasized that the strategic goals of China's peripheral diplomacy are to obey and serve the realization of the "Two Centenary Goals" and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, to comprehensively develop relations with neighboring countries, to consolidate good-neighborly friendship, to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, and to maintain peace and harmony. Make good use of the important strategic opportunity period for China's development and maintain

¹ «Wang Yi said that neighboring countries have always been a priority for China's diplomacy», Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2019 July 18, 2019 http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2019-07/18/content_5411457.html [2023-01-25]

national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and strive to make the political relations between neighboring countries and China more friendly, the economic ties stronger, the security cooperation deeper, and the people-to-people ties closer. The primary status of neighboring countries in the overall framework of China's diplomacy in the new era has been further confirmed and highlighted.

Due to the importance of neighboring diplomacy, when dealing with neighboring diplomatic relations, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized the need to "be good to neighbors and partner with neighbors, adhere to good-neighborliness, security and prosperity, and highlight the principles of amity, sincerity, benefit and tolerance." We should use the general policy of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness" to respond calmly to changes in the neighborhood. The realization of the neighborhood strategy cannot be separated from the implementation of specific strategies. Under the guidance of the general policy, we should lead multilateralism and promote integration. Specific strategies such as the process of economic transformation and the provision of public goods have been continuously implemented. The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that "Currently, changes in the world, changes in the times, and changes in history are unfolding in an unprecedented way." China insists on "implementing a more proactive We will build a high-standard free trade zone network for the world, accelerate the construction of pilot free trade zones and Hainan Free Trade Port, and jointly build the 'One Belt and One Road' initiative to become a popular international public product and international cooperation platform." At the same time, China also "actively participates in the reform and construction of the global governance system, practices the global governance concept of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, and adheres to true multilateralism." It "opposes all forms of unilateralism, and opposes the establishment of camps and exclusivity against specific countries. Small circles: Promote multilateral mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to play a better role; expand the influence of cooperation mechanisms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and enhance the representation and voice of emerging market countries and developing countries in global affairs." These practical policies reflect China's positive attitude, enhance its international influence, increase its voice, moral leadership, and shared destiny.

Before and after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China's diplomatic environment has undergone great changes. Facing opportunities The situation coexisting with challenges objectively requires that China's peripheral work must keep pace with the times and be more proactive. In order to promote peripheral diplomacy to a new level, as an important part of the peripheral strategy, the concept of "neighboring community with a shared future" came into being. Xi Jinping said It puts forward requirements for continuously expanding and deepening the strategic layout of diplomacy under the new situation, pointing out that "we must focus on strengthening publicity work, public diplomacy, people-to-people diplomacy, and people-to-people exchanges with neighboring countries, making friends and forming good relationships, and sharing the Chinese dream with the people of neighboring countries. The desire to live a better life is aligned with the development prospects of the region, so that the awareness of a community with a shared future can take root in neighboring countries." The above discussion marks the peripheral diplomatic work of "amity, sincerity, benefit, and tolerance" and "neighboring community with a shared future"

Compiled by the Chinese Communist Party History Society: «Historical Dictionary Series of the Communist Party of China», Beijing: Communist Party History Publishing

House, Party Building Reading Publishing House, 2019, Xi Jinping: «Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to comprehensively build a modern socialist country . Unity and Struggle - Report at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China » Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, October 25, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.html [2023-01-25]

Proposition and formation of new ideas

Since then, Xi Jinping's Guiding Thought on Neighborhood Diplomacy has creatively put forward a series of specific ideas and propositions that are compatible with the goals of neighborhood diplomacy and put them into practice. Highlighting moral principles is a common feature of these ideas and practices. China has always held high the banner of development. On the issue of development, China has never pursued the development of one country. "Our party is determined to achieve the eternal great cause of the Chinese nation and is committed to the lofty cause of human peace and development." It has always adhered to the foreign policy purpose of safeguarding world peace and promoting common development, and is committed to Promoting the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind. After the outbreak of the new crown epidemic, in the face of the epidemic sweeping the world, China insisted that "the virus respects no borders. Only when all countries are out of the epidemic can the final victory of the global anti-epidemic be achieved." Facing the post-epidemic era development and security deficit, China insists on developing friendly cooperation with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, promotes the building of a new type of international relations, deepens and expands a global partnership of equality, openness, and cooperation, and is committed to expanding the convergence of interests with all countries. Guided by this policy, China actively promotes Sino-Russian friendly cooperation, improves regional order in Northeast Asia, deepens international cooperation in Southeast Asia, promotes dialogue and consultation in South Asia, and deepens political mutual trust in Central Asia.

With the promulgation of important concepts and specific ideas about China's neighborhood diplomacy, China's neighborhood diplomacy has also achieved a series of practical achievements. China's influence in the Asia-Pacific region has further increased, diversified development has become a consensus, and the appeal of multilateralism has been strengthened. In 2020, in the process of fighting the COVID-19 epidemic since the beginning of this year, China has taken the lead in effectively controlling the epidemic, achieving domestic economic recovery and resuming work and production, laying a material foundation for assisting Asia-Pacific countries in fighting the epidemic. On the one hand, China relies on its complete manufacturing system to provide assistance to the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, ASEAN countries provide necessary medical supplies. On the other hand, through participating in the "China-ROK Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism", "China-ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers' Meeting on COVID-19" and "ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea ('10+3') Bilateral and multilateral epidemic control mechanisms such as the Extraordinary Leaders' Meeting to Combat the COVID-19 Epidemic, as well as a series of important and "fast lanes" for urgently needed personnel exchanges, etc., to further enhance the cohesion of regional countries through deepening anti-epidemic exchanges and cooperation. With the deepening of cooperation among countries in the region to respond to the epidemic, the consensus on building a "human health and health community" continues to be accepted by Asia-Pacific countries, the connotation of the "Belt and Road" initiative has been enriched and developed.

Xi Jinping: «Strive for a good surrounding environment for my country's development and promote my country's development to benefit more neighboring countries», published in People's Daily, Page 1, October 26, 2013. Xi Jinping: «Hold high the

great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and build a comprehensive society and unite and struggle to build a modern socialist country - Report at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China » Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, October 25, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.html [2023-01-25]

«Starting a new journey of peripheral diplomacy in the post-epidemic era—State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi accepted an exclusive interview with a reporter from Xinhua News Agency», Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, October 16, 2020, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zl_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/kjgzbdflyq_699171/202010/20201016_9278750.shtml [2023-01-25]

In terms of regional economic cooperation, China has further strengthened its economic and trade relations with neighboring countries and provided diversified economic public goods to neighboring countries. As a regional power, China relies on its own economic size to promote cooperation with neighboring countries in the process of anti-globalization. trade development. In 2020, China and ASEAN will achieve the goal of becoming each other's largest trading partners. The scale of bilateral trade will exceed US\$700 billion, firmly occupying the core position of the regional economy. At the same time, China is also the fourth largest source of foreign investment in ASEAN, with an average annual The growth rate of investment is more than 20%, which has effectively promoted the economic development of ASEAN. Faced with the severe situation of the United States and the West pursuing unilateralism based on their own selfish interests, undermining the process of globalization, leading to a decline in global growth momentum and a downturn in the economic situation, China It has assumed more responsibilities for providing regional public goods and put forward a variety of regional and global cooperation concepts including the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. Most countries in the region have formulated bilateral development plans with China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the China-Myanmar Economy Corridor-related cooperation continues to deepen, driving a large amount of capital and technology to neighboring countries, greatly accelerating the infrastructure construction process in these countries.

In terms of regional integration, China has taken advantage of its advantageous position in the Asian production network to deepen its relations with neighboring countries based on industrial clusters. At the end of 2020, China and the ten ASEAN countries, as well as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, officially signed the "Regional Agreement" Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement» (RCEP), RCEP has become the free trade agreement with the largest population, the largest economic and trade scale, and the most development potential in the world. Its signing will greatly accelerate the process of regional economic integration. In terms of economic cooperation, China has strategic benefits The main measurement method of expected assessment is based on absolute added value, and does not pay special attention to the relative relationship between China and Asia-Pacific countries in the benefits of cooperation. From China's perspective, as long as the general trend of deepening regional cooperation remains stable, China can always benefit from cooperation. Compared with neighboring countries, it is not particularly important how much China has benefited. In this process, China has actively catered to the inherent desire of developing countries to "come out of backwardness and develop rapidly" and has won the respect and support of more countries. The vigorous and promising diplomatic strategy has laid a solid foundation for China to resist the increasing strategic squeeze of the United States in its peripheral areas.

2. Research on peripheral diplomacy during the period of great development of peripheral diplomacy: focus and research hotspots

The rapid rise in the popularity of China's peripheral diplomacy has brought more abundant cases to the international relations academic community for the study of China's peripheral diplomacy, stimulated academic discussions, and produced a large number of research results, mainly focusing on two major aspects: First, on Make an overall judgment on China's peripheral diplomacy, including the basic trend of China's peripheral strategic environment, the strategic adjustment of China's peripheral diplomacy and the key variables affecting China's peripheral diplomacy. The second is to conduct a multi-faceted and systematic countermeasure analysis on China's peripheral diplomacy, covering geopolitics. security, regional economic cooperation and comprehensive strategies. In terms of

making an overall judgment on China's peripheral strategy, the academic community pays close attention to the current situation of peripheral diplomacy.

This is a prerequisite issue for the study of China's peripheral diplomacy. Regarding the basic trend of China's peripheral strategic environment, academic circles generally believe that China's peripheral environment has been deteriorating in recent years. Zhou Fangyin pointed out that China's peripheral strategic environment is not optimistic, and China-U.S. neighbors Changes in the power structure have caused China to face dual pressures from the United States and neighboring countries. The regional dual structure has caused China to bear huge pressures of different natures in both the economic and security fields. Chen Xiaoding further proposed that the global pressure caused by the growth of power Dual structural contradictions with the regional level have fundamentally restricted China's effectiveness in improving its relations with neighboring countries. At the same time, highly overlapping systems, competition and low levels of regional identity have exacerbated the deterioration of the peripheral environment.

In terms of the adjustment of China's peripheral strategy, academic circles have placed more emphasis on the factors and formation mechanisms of China's "active shaping". Gao Cheng believes that in the context of China's rise, China's peripheral strategy is adjusting in the general direction of proactive action. In the face of peripheral forces In line with the changes in the pattern of interests, we must proactively shape a peripheral cooperation order that is "self-centered" and has the ability to expand and deepen in order to gain influence commensurate with the growth of China's strength. This is a strategic need for China as a great country to achieve national rejuvenation. Wang Junsheng pointed out that since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, due to the increased importance of peripheral diplomacy in China's overall diplomacy, the Chinese government has placed peripheral diplomacy in an equally important position as major power diplomacy. China's diplomacy has changed from the previous "one focus" to "Two Focuses" Zhou Guiyin divides the current general framework or general layout of China's peripheral diplomacy and even overall diplomacy into three aspects: first, the planning and efforts of the new type of major power relations; second, the peripheral relations guided by the concept of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness" Diplomatic planning and measures, and the third is the strategic layout and project promotion under the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. Finally, the academic community

attaches great importance to analyzing the influencing factors of China's peripheral strategy and believes that major power factors are the key variables that affect China's peripheral diplomacy. Sun Xuefeng and Zhang Xikun believe that The strategic credibility of the United States in China's periphery and China's strategic appeasement of its neighbors are two major factors that affect the interaction between China and neighboring countries. The "America First" policy implemented during the Trump administration has led to the decline in the strategic credibility of the United States. In addition, China continues to Strengthening strategic appeasement has created a gratifying situation in which China's relations with neighboring countries are stabilizing and improving. As the strategic competition between China and the United States intensifies, the recovery of U.S. strategic credibility will help China continue to improve its relations with neighboring countries.

Zhou Fangyin: «Trends of the Peripheral Environment and China's Peripheral Strategic Choice», published in «Foreign Affairs Review (Journal of China Foreign Affairs University)», 2014 Issue 1, Pages 28 - 42 y Issue 8, Pages 37 - 55

Chen Xiaoding: "Regional Public Goods and the Strategic Connotation of China's New Concept of Neighborhood Diplomacy", published in "World Economy and Politics", 2016

Gao Cheng: "Changes in the Peripheral

Situation and Strategic Adjustment in the Context of China's Rise", Published in "International Economic Review", Issue 2, 2014 Issue, yPage 32-48 Wang Junsheng: «Reshaping strategic focus: China's

peripheral diplomacy since the 18th National Congress», published in «Contemporary World and Socialism», 2017 Issue 2, 2016, pages 167-173.

Zhou Guiyin: "The current situation and future priorities of China's peripheral diplomacy", published in "Southeast Asian Studies", Issue 1, 2017, No. 75 - 91 pages

Bringing uncertainty. Zhao Gancheng emphasized that India is China's most important neighbor in the southwest and is also a constant in the evolution of the strategic situation in China's peripheral areas. However, with the rapid rise of India, it has had an unpredictable impact on China's peripheral strategy. It is rising rapidly

In terms of evaluating and analyzing the specific action strategies of China's peripheral diplomacy, in recent years, academic circles have achieved fruitful results in the study of China's peripheral governance strategies. Most of the research starts from geopolitics, regional systems and comprehensive ideas, not only focusing on analyzing existing strategies, gains and losses, and put forward many innovative countermeasures and suggestions.

In terms of geopolitical security, Dang Ruifeng and Zeng Chen believe that a friendly and peaceful surrounding environment can be created through the strategies of "Northern Cooperation," "Western Advance," "Southern Integration," and "Eastern Stability" strategies. Shen Dingli proposed a "double-ring strategy": The first ring is China's first peripheral area, that is, with China as the center, the 20 countries directly adjacent to China, including 14 land neighbors and 6 maritime neighbors. The second ring area consists of countries outside the first ring and is composed of Asian countries that directly border China, including Iran and other countries. China should adopt a strategy of "cooperation and expansion." Zhang Wenmu proposed that the countries that can become the pivot countries in China's strategic "game spectrum" in China's interaction with its neighbors include North Korea in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia Indonesia and Iran in Southwest Asia, and emphasizes that Iran's geopolitical situation has great "bridgehead" significance for China's western frontier security, and Indonesia has the effect of "central flowering" of China's Southeast Asia policy. In terms of regional economic

cooperation, academic circles have also proposed to shape the order in China's periphery by building a new international cooperation mechanism. Fu Mengzi believes that China does not need to be a subverter of the existing order in its periphery, but should continue to participate in the existing order and play a constructive role and become a responsible power. While becoming a major power, we should improve regional and peripheral order by building new mechanisms. Wang Junsheng discussed its relationship with China's peripheral strategy from the perspective of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. He believed that the "One Belt, One Road" initiative has greater significance in promoting China's peripheral strategy in the new era. Advantages. Under the "One Belt, One Road" framework, China's peripheral areas will increasingly become an independent field of China's diplomacy. In fact, its peripheral areas will become an important strategic resource for China to achieve its rise, and will greatly improve China's relationship with peripheral

Sun Xuefeng, Zhang Xikun: «Sino-US strategic choices and changes in China's peripheral environment», published in «Modern International Relations», Issue 5, 2019, pages 10-16.

Zhao Gancheng: «The Indian Factor in China's Peripheral Strategy» Published in "International Perspectives", Issue 2, 2014, pp. 34-46. Dang Ruifeng, Zeng Chen: "China's Diplomatic Strategic Pattern - Surroundings Are First", Published in "Southeast Asia Perspectives", Issue 8, 2007 Issue, pp. 68-72. Shen Dingli:

“Double-ring strategy of China's peripheral diplomacy”, published in "Contemporary Asia-Pacific", Issue 1, 2009, pp. 25-26. Zhang Wenmu:

“Heaven is far away, but China is far away” “Very close” - the rules and characteristics of geopolitical interaction between China and neighboring countries and regions Click», Published in "World Economy and Politics", Issue 1, 2013, Pages 5-39.

Fu Mengzi: "Thoughts on China's Peripheral Strategic Issues", published in "Modern International Relations", Issue 10, 2013, pp. 20-21.

Political and security mutual trust among neighboring countries. ̄ Chen Zhaoyuan pointed out that China's diplomatic strategy towards neighboring countries can start from the construction of free trade area partners. On the one hand, it releases the signal of open economy and good neighborliness, and on the other hand, it strengthens partnerships and international institutional competition in terms of institutional rules. ̄

There are also some scholars who try to build a bridge between traditional geopolitical research and regional economic cooperation research, focusing more on overall thinking, emphasizing comprehensive strategies, and achieving peripheral diplomacy goals through systematic and diversified means. On a theoretical level, Zhai Kun believes that China's peripheral strategy should be continuously innovated under the guidance of the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, with the common ideal of promoting the construction of a "neighboring community with a shared future" and the common path of exploring "harmony of regional relations". ̄ Lu Guangsheng and Bie Mengjie believe that in the current new environment where Sino-U.S. relations are full of uncertainties, and the peripheral areas are generally stable and have obvious development advantages, China should regard its peripheral areas as the focus of building a new type of international relations. In the new peripheral relations with "interests-responsibility-norms" as the core Under the guidance of theory, we should build a new type of peripheral relations and a community with a shared future. ̄ On a practical level, Liu Feng pointed out that due to the multiplicity of strategic goals and the diversity of means, the "goal-means mismatch" usually affects China's peripheral strategic decision-making and implementation. China needs to determine the priority of peripheral strategic goals, ensure the diversity and flexibility of resource investment and means, strengthen domestic resource allocation and departmental coordination, and seek support from external forces as much as possible to ensure the realization of strategic goals. ̄ Zhao Kejin pointed out that China should focus its strategic periphery on enhancing China's strategic credibility and authoritative recognition, and on building a geopolitical network. On the basis of firmly grasping the common interests of the region, China should promote infrastructure connectivity and development plans between China and other countries. We will focus on the integration of business function networks, economic networks, social networks and institutional networks, and use international law and international institutional resources to build a new highland for China's peripheral diplomacy. Make overall plans and be more proactive on the basis of keeping a low profile, strengthen the construction of a community with a shared future for neighboring countries, balance the relationship with powerful neighboring countries, pay attention to the American factor in the "new neighborhood relations", and implement diversified and differentiated diplomacy Strategy: Providing regional security and economic public goods. 7 Ling Shengli prop

Wang Junsheng: "One Belt and One Road" and China's Peripheral Strategy in the New Era", published in «Shandong Social Sciences», Issue 8, 2015, ̄ Pages 50-56.

Chen Zhaoyuan: «Partner Selection for China's Free Trade Agreement —— Empirical Analysis Based on Diplomatic Strategy», Published in "World Economy and Politics ", Issue 7, 2019, Pages

131-153. Zhai Kun: "Inheritance and Innovation of China's Peripheral Strategy", Published in "Modern International Relations", Issue 10, 2013, pages 26-28 ̄ Lu Guangsheng, Bie Mengjie: «Construction of new peripheral relations: connotation, theory and path», Published in "International Observation", Issue 6, 2019 ̄, pages 22-43

̄ ̄ Liu Feng: «The goals, means and matching of China's peripheral diplomacy», published in "Contemporary Asia-Pacific", Issue 5, 2013, pp. 4-21.

̄ Zhao Kejin: «The focus of China's peripheral diplomacy strategy is to establish prestige and increase credibility», Published in "People's Forum", Issue

̄ 19, 2014, pp. 30-33. Wu Zhicheng: "China's peripheral diplomacy needs to pay more attention to strategic planning", Published in "Modern International Relations", Issue 1, 2015,

Pages 25-27

The "dual coordination" governance strategy of China's peripheral strategy divides China's peripheral security interests into core interests, important interests and general interests. Based on this, it adopts the idea of "major power coordination" and "institutional coordination" to go hand in hand, and uses political, economic, and Military and social means will ultimately promote the formation of a lower-level peripheral security community in China's surrounding areas.

To sum up, in recent years, research on China's peripheral diplomacy has focused on the severe peripheral diplomacy situation that China is currently facing and the analysis of corresponding countermeasures. These studies mainly adopt a Chinese perspective, especially on the strategic choices of China's peripheral diplomacy, focusing on the discussion. The rationality of the goals China hopes to achieve and its application methods. A China-centered analysis perspective helps to think about how to create a favorable peripheral diplomatic environment under the current situation. However, the new crown epidemic has superimposed the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has already suffered The global security mechanism, which has been severely impacted by the unilateralism of the United States, is further disabled and ineffective. This situation has made external environmental factors increasingly become variables that cannot be ignored in the study of China's peripheral diplomacy, especially in the study of countermeasures. Research on the external influencing factors of China's periphery has achieved certain results, but the challenges posed by environmental changes to China's periphery diplomacy and the analysis of countermeasures from this perspective are still relatively scarce and lagging behind, especially regarding the impact of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" on China's periphery. The research on the impact of regional relations is not in-depth enough. The United States' "Indo-Pacific Strategy" itself is a framework strategy that is constantly being adjusted. Its goals and means are in a continuous evolving process and require real-time attention and continuous tracking and analysis. This article focuses on analyzing the adjustment of the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and its perception and policy changes of China's neighboring countries. It not only supplements the existing research results, but also attempts to change the perspective and provide perceptions based on the perspective of the other party and a third party. and judgment

3. The United States' layout and problems in promoting the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" around China

In recent years, Sino-US relations have become increasingly complex, and the United States has intensified its suppression of China. In order to curb China's rising momentum, the United States has launched an all-round suppression of China that is called "competition" but is actually containment. Strategically, it relies on the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" to weave containment. In terms of security, it continues to carry out military provocations and tests in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait; in terms of economy, it intensifies its efforts to cut off China while obstructing normal cooperation between China and other economic partners; in terms of ideology, it carries out naked attacks on China's values and frequently attacks China. Release racist remarks. During the Ukraine crisis, the United States continued to vigorously advocate the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", which not only promoted the integration of the two strategic regions of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but also attempted to reverse the economic-focused agenda-setting orientation of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States' security

On the one hand, the comprehensive-oriented policy has led to instability in the regional situation and intensified the risk of conflict between the United States and emerging powers in the region. On the other hand, it has also caused the original regional cooperation process in the region to be interfered with by non-economic factors, increasing China's ability to exert economic influence. Advantages: Navigate the difficulty of surrounding areas.

Currently, the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the United States and the West has entered a tug-of-war stage. The winter between 2022 and 2023 has become a "critical period" that affects the direction of the conflict. The United States is vigorously promoting the use of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the European direction. The strategy of "killing two birds with one stone" by consuming Russia and weakening Europe, and at the same time forming cliques in the Asia-Pacific region, sparing no effort to exaggerate the "China threat" while creating tension in the Taiwan Strait, and trying to "bind" China and Russia into an "authoritarian axis", thus Further transforming the international community into camps and groups. The United States' great power competition strategy of simultaneously suppressing and provoking China and Russia is not only intended to weaken its opponents, but is also an important means to strengthen its ability to control its allies and consolidate its dominance in the Western world. The enemy's strategic intention to strengthen its own camp determines that the United States will not and cannot consider

relaxing its pressure on China during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. To properly respond to the strategic pressure of the United States, we must not only recognize the seriousness of the pressure exerted by the United States through the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" nature, we must also see the inherent problems in the United States' promotion of a confrontational strategy in China's surrounding areas. The "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is aggressive on the surface, but it is far from impeccable. In recent years, the implementation of the U.S. strategy has been ineffective and has been controversial both at home and abroad. ¶ In addition to major issues such as hesitation in strategic will and the pursuit of comprehensive strategic goals, there are also serious structural problems in strategic layout. The United States' "Indo-Pacific Strategy" has a grand layout, extending from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, spanning The two oceans, stretching tens of thousands of kilometers across, are actually quite similar to the "Snake of Changshan". It is difficult to give full play to the overall strength of the alliance system. "Snake of Changshan" comes from "Sun Zi Jiu Di Pian" 九地篇 "Nine Places Pian" says : "Therefore, those who are good at using troops are like those who are forthright. Those who are forthright are like the snakes of Changshan. If you strike at the head, the tail will come. If you strike at the tail, the head will come. If you strike at the tail, both the head and the tail will come." "Snake of Changshan" has been circulated in the art of war for a long time. ¶ However, the "head and tail looking at each other" effect mentioned by Sun Tzu rarely appears in military history. In most cases, it is manifested as "you can't hit even if you hit, and you can't look at the head and tail when hitting the tail." This is not because Sun Tzu's conception of the "Snake of Changshan" was wrong, but because later people often failed to correctly understand the conditions for realizing the formation and its application techniques. When using the "Snake of Changshan" formation, The most common mistake is to evenly distribute power and try to use a long array to form a comprehensive deterrent to the enemy. As long as the opponent concentrates superior forces to attack one point, it

will have the effect of making it unable to rescue them head to tail, and can break the "Changshan" ¶ From Trump to Biden, although the U.S.-led "Indo-Pacific Strategy" has made major adjustments in content and means, its essence has never overcome the mechanical use of the "snake of the mountain" posture, sexual w

There are defects in the use of means and geographical distribution of multi-point layout and lack of focus. In terms of means, the United States comprehensively uses diplomatic, economic, security, propaganda and other means to try to discredit and isolate China. It seems aggressive, but it lacks focus. The comprehensive containment is just "big thunder but little rain", revealing in front of the whole world the hysterical mentality of the United States that "will oppose China whenever it encounters China". This does not matter to Trump, but it is important to those who are trying to restore the United States' global influence and leadership. Biden, the Indo-Pacific diplomacy of "rebellion wherever China is needed" and "non-rebellion wherever China is not" cannot help the United States repair its international image, let alone obliterate China morally.

In terms of the geographical distribution of power, the United States' "Snake of Everlasting Mountains" posture is particularly obvious. The United States has pieced together a long front from Japan to India, trying to fully isolate, squeeze, and suppress the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Containing China. This strategy has great momentum, but the specific effect is limited. Even a country as powerful as the United States does not have the ability to form such a long-term military blockade against China. Mobilizing sea and air forces to carry out exhausting shuttle intimidation operations has produced deterrence. "Fatigue" has allowed more countries to see the insufficiency of the United States' strength. To a large extent, most of China's neighboring countries have not "danced" with the United States because these countries have seen that the United States no longer has overwhelming military superiority. Second, the United States Allies prefer that the conflict between the United States and China occur in other directions rather than in their own areas of interest. The decline in the credibility of U.S. hegemony and the differences in interest demands of members within the "Indo-Pacific" front will restrict its strategic effect. ¶ In the "India-Pacific" front, Under the framework of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", all members of the "Indo-Pacific" mechanism and opportunists interested in participating in this mechanism hope to see a conflict between China and the United States, but no party wants to see war on their doorstep (the Democratic Progressive Party authorities in Taiwan As a splinter group that hopes to achieve "independence" by seeking open intervention from the United States, it is almost the only exception). This makes it difficult for

the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" to determine the decisive region to achieve the goal of containing China. The "Quadrilateral Mechanism" of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia Except for the United States, the other members do not have global maritime power. India's maritime power is not enough to cheer up its Pacific partners. Japan and Australia can only maintain a symbolic presence in the Indian Ocean, and both sides are more willing to see China involved on the other side. Attributable conflict. This situation and the strategic speculation of its members have created a structural weakness in the "Indo-Pacific Strategy". That is, although the United States has deployed two major power configurations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it is like a barbell with strong forces at both ends. However, there is a lack of effective strategic link in the middle. As long as this strategic link hub cannot function, the two major forces will exist in isolation and cannot support each other. Strategically, the key to defeating the "Snake of Changshan" is to prevent the "Snakehead" and The "Snake Tail" operation is to seize and consolidate the strategic control of the "Snake Center" zone, which is in Southeast Asia, especially the Indochina Peninsula. Accordi

¶ Zhao Minghao: «Alliance Partner System, Composite Bloc and the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy"», published in «World Economy and Politics», Issue 6, 2022, pp. 54-55.

The dialectical thinking of the mutual influence of "topography", as long as China is in the "snake" of the "Indo-Pacific strategy" to block the containment of the United States, the "snake of Changshan" will not be able to look at each other head to tail. The United States' Pacific alliance system and the newly formed Indian Ocean security structure is just two power groups that operate separately and cannot form synergy. The strategic advantage of "1 + 1 > 2" is difficult to emerge. China's strategy has become how to deal with the United States in the main strategic direction of the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, it should check and balance India in the secondary strategic direction of the southwest. This is the traditional land and sea structure that China has dealt with for decades. China has rich experience and a large number of successful cases in this regard.

The fundamental reason why the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy" cannot escape the trap of being a "snake in the mountains" lies in the deeply ingrained mindset of U.S. strategic researchers and policymakers. The U.S. has always focused on systematic confrontation with its opponents and pursued zero-sum. The United States not only overemphasizes the structural contradictions in Sino-US relations and fails to see the possibility of Sino-US coexistence. It is also blindly confident in the strength of the United States and believes that the United States is only temporarily in conflict with China due to the wrong policy guidance during the Trump period. At a disadvantage in the competition, as long as the United States cheers up, returns to the multilateral diplomatic line, and unites its allies and partners, it can achieve the goal of containing China. This arrogance makes it difficult for the United States to formulate a clear-cut and prioritized strategy toward China.

4. Changes in the perceptions and policies of China's neighboring countries towards China in the context of the Sino-US game

The frequent malicious behavior of the United States against China has not only caused a serious setback in Sino-US relations, but also strongly disturbed China's surrounding environment. Under the coercion and inducement of the United States, some countries have wavered in their attitudes towards developing relations with China, and policies have appeared. has even given rise to anti-China sentiments among the people. Countries that adhere to the correct policy line toward China have come under increasing pressure from the United States and its allies. The adjustment of the United States' strategy toward China has become the biggest challenge faced by China's strategic periphery. External variables, considering the gap in strength and influence between China and the United States, the fact that the main battlefield of the game between the two countries is around China rather than around the United States cannot be changed in the short term.

China's periphery has become the main battlefield for the confrontation between China and the United States. The increasing strategic pressure of the United States on China will further complicate China's peripheral environment. In China's foreign strategy, the factors related to major power diplomacy and peripheral diplomacy are more complicated. China's major strategic It becomes more difficult to maintain strategic coordination between the strategic direction and the secondary strategic direction. To plan the periphery, we first need to fully and clearly understand the strategic changes of the main actors in the peripheral area in response to the strategic adjustment of the United States. Based on the principle of being lenient to the enemy, Anticipate possible risks and challenges. First, in recent years, the United States has carried out military activities in various directions and areas such as the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, Xinjiang, and Tibet.

Different issues frequently touch China's bottom line, squeezing China's core interests, and leading to changes in the response strategies of major actors in surrounding areas. On the one hand, the provocative actions of the United States are not all aimed at gaining on-the-ground advantages in confrontation with China. Some of them are mainly focused on gaining local advantages in confrontation with China. Its role is to cater to the anti-China political atmosphere in the United States and help politicians in power in the United States win electoral advantages, such as hyping up Xinjiang cotton issues. On the other hand, the United States' maximum pressure and multiple provocations also create opportunities for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and even the Indo-Pacific region. The patchwork of anti-China camps provides a reason for mobilization, and the aggressive approach strategy creates conditions for the United States to "collapse" through dialogue. In the future, the United States will place more emphasis on giving full play to its military, public opinion, and alliance advantages, and adopt more provocative measures against China. Action. The essence of the U.S.'s actions that touch China's core interests is not to seek benefits for the U.S., but to focus on increasing difficulties for China, thereby gaining a strategic advantage over China. Second, in the context of intensified conflicts between China and the United States, managing its neighbors well has become China's foreign policy. The core proposition of the strategy. The adjustment of the US strategy towards China is the embodiment of the tradition of "strength as the backing" of the US foreign strategy. International politics is essentially power politics, and the core of international relations is power relations. Although China's "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness" diplomacy. This concept is recognized by the vast majority of neighboring countries. However, if China cannot maintain a balance of power with the United States in a power confrontation, its conceptual goodwill cannot withstand the realist logic of the great power game. In the context of China's Sino-US game entering the deep water zone, To continue to promote the peripheral strategy, we must adhere to the advanced concepts of a community with a shared future for mankind and global development initiatives, and fully consider the possibility that major countries in China's neighboring regions will adopt opportunistic and pragmatic strategies against China in the face of coercion and inducement from the United States to safeguard their own interests. nature, we must not only pay attention to the danger of regional competitors increasing their policy efforts against the United States and "taking chestnuts from the fire", but also pay attention to the possibility of partners adopting hedging policies against China out of self-protection, and respond appropriately.

(1) Japan Japan is

not only the backbone of the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system, but also a major economic power in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's Asia-Pacific strategy shows that security and economic demands are mutually constraining. The concept of "Indo-Pacific" originated in Japan in 2006 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited India for the first time. Since then, Japan has been an active advocate of the "Indo-Pacific Security Alliance". Japan has also vigorously promoted the "Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement" (TPP). Even after the United States withdrew, it still spared no effort to promote the agreement. The scaled-down version is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Japan is actively moving closer to the United States in terms of security and is trying to regain its dominant position in Asia economically. However, at the same time, Japan has also been actively seeking to improve its relationship with China over the years. relations, emphasizing the importance of maintaining close economic cooperation with China and promoting the economic integration process in Northeast Asia. For example, during Shinzo Abe's visit to China in 2018, he characterized Sino-Japanese relations as "coordination."

and reached cooperation with China in third-party markets. The Japanese government's self-contradiction largely reflects the incoordination of Japan's foreign strategy in the security and economic dimensions. Although Japan's ambivalence will not affect the country's attitude on major issues Choosing sides - Japan will always take the attitude of the United States as the starting point for its foreign policy. However, Japan's reliance on Sino-Japanese economic relations still makes Tokyo do its best to avoid a complete separation from China. This also creates a problem for China and Japan. The two countries have expanded their common interests in the economic field and, if conditions permit, seek to deepen the economic integration process in Northeast Asia and even the Asia-Pacific region, which provides the possibility. Both sides can actively We should actively plan and promote bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the next stage and the "post-epidemic" era, and play a leading role in Northeast Asia taking the lead in achieving economic recovery and getting rid of the epidemic. What needs to be particularly vigilant is that Japan may increase its countermeasures under the instigation and instigation of the United States. Intervention in the Taiwan issue as a bargaining chip to balance China.

When dealing with the direction of Japan, the following judgments may become factors that China needs to consider when choosing its strategy: (1) China does not have the ability to change Japan's foreign strategic direction. No matter how much benefits Japan obtains from Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, Japan will not will abandon the U.S.-Japan alliance and instead seek to get closer to China in politics and security. (2) Japan's strategic position in China's peripheral management strategy has been declining and its marginalization process is irreversible. Japan has been The power structure of Northeast Asia, where the strong and the weak are strong, has changed. No matter how Japan relies on the power of the United States, it will not be able to regain dominance in the Asian region. (3) In the future, the competition between China and Japan will mainly revolve around the Southeast Asian regional cooperation process and Asia-Pacific economic integration and other issues. Southeast Asia will be the main battlefield for the economic competition between China and Japan. (2) South Korea The Yin Seok-yue

government of South

Korea released a series of negative voices around South Korea-US relations, the situation on the peninsula, and China-South Korea relations before and after taking office. The Yin Seok-yue government claimed that South Korea should actively shape the "Indo-Pacific" "Order" and build a solid alliance between South Korea and the United States. It is generally believed that the new South Korean regime lacks mature diplomatic experience and rational strategic thinking capabilities. China-South Korea relations may enter a difficult period. It is objective that China-South Korea relations have fallen into a new low. However, The reason is not only the inexperience of the Yin regime, but also the more important factor is that the security structure of the Korean Peninsula determines that South Korea can only choose the side of the United States. Maintaining detachment between China and the United States is not a foreign strategic choice that South Korea can envisage. Even if it pursues "The Moon Jae-in administration, which pursues "balanced diplomacy", also recognizes the importance of the South Korea-US alliance in regional peace issues. North-South confrontation is the basic pattern of the Korean Peninsula. The relationship between North Korea and

Chen Zheng and Wang Guangtao: «Swings in Hedging: The Evolution of Japan's "Indo-Pacific Strategy" under Trilateral Interaction», Published in «World Economy and Politics», Issue 6, 2022, Page 73. Yang Fei, Fang Changping: «U.S. The layout

and prospects of "Indo-Pacific" mini-multilateral cooperation», published in "Modern International Relations", Issue 10, 2022, Page 3, Li Xing: "The US-ROK Alliance and the trend of campization in Northeast Asia under the administration of Yun Xiyue", published in «Journal of Northeast Asia», Issue 5, 2022, Pages 110-111.

Zhan Debin: "South Korea's understanding and policy of the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy"", published in "Northeast Asia Forum", Issue 2, 2021, page 31.

The biggest security threat comes from the other side. The south of the Korean Peninsula is significantly stronger economically than the north. However, this advantage has not allowed South Korea to strengthen its determination and patience on the issue of reunification of the peninsula. Instead, it has catalyzed South Korea's anxiety and impatience. Because of their economic achievements, they believed that the South should unify the North, but because of military pressure, they were worried that the North would suddenly change the status quo and seek to use force to solve the problem.

South Korea's long-standing anxiety makes it difficult for any external force to get rid of North-South relations on the peninsula. Framework. Although gains in the economic field are very important to South Korea, no matter how great the economic benefits are, they cannot offset South Korea's natural anxiety in terms of security. Among the world's major powers, the only one that has made a clear commitment to ensuring South Korea's security is the United States. In this regard, it is understandable that South Korea has become the country with the strongest sense of dependence on the United States and the most gratitude among all allies of the United States. South Korea's loyal attitude towards the South Korea-US alliance is even greater than Japan's attitude towards the Japan-US alliance. Even in the face of defense cost sharing, autonomy. Despite the losses and other issues, the South Korea-US alliance remains strong. This position cannot be changed by China. In the 30 years since China and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, the economic and trade cooperation between China and South Korea has developed rapidly, but the security strategies of the two countries have always been different. On the same track, South Korea will not choose China between China and the United States because China is its important trading partner, just as China will not ignore North Korea's security feelings because of China-South Korea economic relations. In the final analysis, economic factors have a great impact on China-South Korea relations. However, the emergence of this role depends on the overall stability of the security structure in Northeast Asia. Today, as the confrontation between China and the United States intensifies, the security situation in Northeast Asia shows a deteriorating trend, and the constructive effect of economic factors has significantly declined. Simply put, South Korea is not. Because "embracing" the United States militarily can make oneself stronger, or in order to "exchange" more economic benefits from China and choose to further close the alliance with the United States, it is not unknown that the pro-American stance, especially the military support of the United States, moving closer will lead to damage to Sino-South Korean relations, but there is no other choice. China will never be able to handle the peninsula issue in accordance with South Korea's interests and demands. This has determined that when the security conflicts in Northeast Asia intensify, South Korea will definitely

gradually move towards China. The factors that need to be paid attention to in the strategic relationship with South Korea include: (1) The South Korea-US alliance is the cornerstone of South Korea's national security. In order to obtain protection from the United States, South Korea must pay a price to meet the requirements of the United States. China cannot pass a frontal approach. Incentives prompt South Korea to reduce its dependence on the United States. Whether the punishment strategy can be effective depends on South Korea's ability to withstand the long-term negative impact of damage to China-South Korea relations. (2) Becoming a developed country makes South Korea more confident. In the future, South Korea will. The possibility of active provocation is increasing. (3) South Korea is subject to the security pattern of the Korean Peninsula. The risk of taking the initiative to take confrontational measures against China outside the peninsula is low. However, providing a "bridgehead" for the United States to contain China will become a problem during the Yun Xiyue administration. Normality

© Zhao Yihei and Zheng Hua: "The Dilemma of the US-ROK Alliance from the Perspective of Power Change", published in "International Forum", Issue 4, 2020, Page 58.

(3) ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries

ASEAN as a whole has been taking a wait-and-see attitude towards the game between China and the United States. After the game between China and the United States entered the deep water zone, ASEAN expressed concern and anxiety about the intensification of the game between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, but it was difficult for itself to play a coordinating role. And do not want to become a victim of competition between major powers. It has become a logical strategic choice for ASEAN to remain moderately cautious and try to remain neutral between China and the United States. For example, on the South China Sea issue, relevant Southeast Asian countries did not follow the footsteps of the United States, but chose to wait and see. attitude, the ASEAN Regional Forum only expressed the desire to peacefully resolve the South China Sea issue. In terms of epidemic response, Southeast Asian countries did not follow the rhythm of US public opinion, but chose to cooperate with China. Among specific countries, the one that best reflects ASEAN's wait-and-see attitude The Philippines is an ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. During the Duterte administration, the Philippines emphasized that it would not choose sides between China and the United States. It opposed the return of the United States to military bases in the Philippines and did not seek confrontation with China in the South China Sea. The Philippines The new government's Vice President Sara and Duterte have a father-daughter relationship. Many scholars believe that the new Philippine regime will not easily change its balancing stance between China and the United States. Despite this, the Philippines' future South China Sea policy may still be affected by constraints from many parties. Changes have occurred. The United States' efforts to win over the new Philippine government may become a key factor affecting the Philippines' policy stance on the South China Sea issue. In the context of the game between China and the United States on the South China Sea issue and the trend is becoming increasingly tense, there are still major variables in the Philippine policy: First, many political figures and military officials in the Philippines have long been influenced by the United States. They advocate maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Philippines alliance, seeking support from the United States on the South China Sea issue, and maintaining a tough stance. Second, given that the Philippines has previously submitted disputes over sovereignty over the South China Sea to international arbitration, Against the background of rising pressure from domestic public opinion, "illegal arbitration" may still be mentioned by the Philippines again and become the basic basis for its new round of sovereignty claims and toughness against China. Thirdly, in the face of the United States' continued harassment of the Philippines Due to policy pressure, the Philippines will likely reconsider strengthening the strategic effectiveness of the US-Philippines alliance. As Sino-US friction in the South China Sea continues to escalate, it will directly or indirectly participate in US-led military operations in the South China Sea aimed at curbing China's assertion of rights in the South China Sea.

Vietnam has long taken advantage of the international community's distrust of China's strategic intentions in the South China Sea and is committed to promoting the internationalization of the South China Sea issue. Vietnam has clearly proposed to safeguard "the sovereignty of maritime islands" through strengthening international cooperation and will take the initiative to strengthen international cooperation in the field of national defense and security. Cooperation is regarded as the guiding principle of "defence, security and diplomacy" and the focus of the "international integration" strategy. The specific manifestations are as follows: First, strengthening the diplomacy of warship visits with Japan, the United States, Australia and other countries. The locations are Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, port and other ports of special significance. Secondly, while continuing to maintain close relations with Russia and India in terms of arms sales, it will accept military assistance from the United States and the West. Thirdly, it will increase cooperation with oil and gas companies from Spain, Russia and other countries in disputed waters. Oil and gas exploration and development activities (although China has taken measures to stop the above-mentioned activities, it has also suffered a lot of international criticism and "smear"). Fourth, using international public opinion to interfere with "the behavior of all parties in the South China Sea"

Code of Conduct (COC) negotiation process. Of course, there are limits to Vietnam's use of "international" means on the South China Sea issue. It basically adheres to three "no's": it will not choose sides between China and the United States, and it will not sacrifice. One-sided pursuit of the so-called "sovereignty" interests in the South China Sea will not go against the overall development of China-Vietnam relations. Vietnam has multi-layered interests and demands from China. The South China Sea dispute is only one aspect of China-Vietnam relations. Therefore, cooperation between China and Vietnam still plays a role. Although the political and defense cooperation between Vietnam and the United States on the South China Sea issue is enthusiastic, the degree of political mutual trust between Vietnam and the United States is not high, and Vietnam refuses to choose sides. It is also a fact

that cannot be ignored. In relation to the relationship between countries with disputes over maritime rights and interests, the strategic points that China may need to pay attention to include: (1) Southeast Asia is the main arena for China and the United States to deal with China's surroundings. Whether China can successfully implement the "global security initiative" and "global development" Initiative" and the smooth advancement of the "One Belt, One Road", the recognition and acceptance of China's propositions in Southeast Asia is the key. (2) China has been deeply involved in Southeast Asia for many years, and already has a good political, economic and cultural foundation, and has formed a good relationship with most countries in Southeast Asia. It has a close multi-dimensional and multi-relationship network, and is an area that is relatively beneficial to China in the balance of power, especially influence, between China and the United States. (3) In its game with the United States in Southeast Asia, China cannot only provide economic benefits or development opportunities as a means, let alone accept it. Some Southeast Asian countries have the misconception that "they rely on the United States for security and China for economy." Instead, they should emphasize the mutual support and interrelation of economic and security measures to avoid the dilemma that the greater the overseas economic stock, the greater the security pressure. ̣

(4) India Over

the years, China has always had goodwill towards India's policies, recognized and appreciated India's rapid economic development and significant improvement in its international status, and regarded India as an important player in China's process of establishing a more fair and reasonable international political and economic order. Partners are willing to try their best to appease India on major issues such as the ownership of Kashmir and other major issues of core concern to India. However, regrettably, China's efforts have not produced the expected pull. , the effect of stabilizing India. Since Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party government came to power, India's policy towards China has become increasingly tough. It has adopted an aggressive "issue diplomacy" strategy towards China, listing a list of issues that India is dissatisfied with China and asking China to solve. ̣ Use this as a basis to judge the nature of China's policy towards India and respond. ̣ India caused the Doklam incident in mid-2017. China's well-intentioned efforts to resolve the incident peacefully were misjudged by India as China's unintentional attack on China

̣ Gu Qiang and Zhang Zhaoming: «The cooperation and limitations of the United States and Vietnam on the South China Sea issue under the "cost imposition strategy"», published in «Research on Nanyang Issues», Issue 2, 2021, pp. 58-61. Ye Hailin:

̣ «The Modi government's response to A Study on China's "Issue Diplomacy" Strategy—Also Discussing India's Response to the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative from this Perspective Attitudes», Published in "Contemporary Asia-Pacific", Issue 6, 2017, Pages 24-47.

In the context of complicated U.S. relations, India can take retaliatory or even punitive actions against India's provocations. India can take advantage of China's mentality of not seeking confrontation and take larger-scale blackmail actions against China. Therefore, after the Doklam incident, India actively responded to China called for an informal meeting mechanism between the leaders of China and India. The other side increased its penetration and encroachment on the Line of Actual Control and continuously escalated cross-line provocations. By mid-2020, it led to the conflict in the Galwan Valley and the The Pangong Lake standoff resulted in casualties on both sides. India blatantly violated the relevant agreements between China and India and fired shots at the line of actual control. Its arrogance became increasingly arrogant.

Compared with Japan, India's China policy contains logical paradoxes that are of the same nature but have different manifestations. India has high expectations for the "Indo-Pacific" strategy proposed by the United States, but it has many concerns about the possible costs of supporting the U.S. strategic concept. At the same time, the duality of India's attitude toward China has gradually become apparent. India remains highly vigilant about the progress of China's "One Belt, One Road" construction in South Asia, but it is also unwilling to explicitly support the United States' containment of China at the international and regional levels. India and Hope Unlike Japan, which maintains a balance between security issues and economic issues, its foreign strategy places more emphasis on obtaining economic benefits through security means, or using the economy as a bargaining chip to increase security gains, and adopts the path of economicizing security issues or securitizing economic issues. To realize the mutual promotion of India's national interests in the security and economic fields. India's zero-sum strategic thinking towards China reduces the possibility of the two sides promoting political mutual trust through economic cooperation and improves the border dialogue between the two countries. In the future, Sino-Indian relations

will likely face greater challenges, and the difficulty of maintaining the basic stability of Sino-Indian relations will increase accordingly.

When approaching India, China needs to pay attention to the key points when setting goals and choosing strategies. Including: (1) India is not China's main strategic rival, and China is not a key driver in India's rise. The relationship between the two countries has great plasticity. China and India have different understandings and demands for the evolution of the current international landscape. China-India cooperation lacks a stable and sustainable strategic consensus. (2) China should strive to strengthen its ability to shape India, and be committed to ensuring the stability of China-India relations through various means. It should appropriately lower its strategic expectations for India and avoid using force to win. Opportunistic strategies occupy the center of India's China policy. (3) In the context of the Sino-US game, holding back India is not a reasonable policy goal for China. However, it is still possible to stabilize India. At this stage, China should consider taking proactive measures to contain it. measures to deter or hedge India's squeeze on China, rather than trying to provide benefits to India in exchange for India's goodwill toward China.

In the future, the status of peripheral areas as the primary direction of China's diplomacy will be further strengthened, and the importance of peripheral areas in China's overall diplomacy will become more prominent. China should use open peripheral diplomacy to counterbalance the United States' decoupling strategy, and counter the United States with win-win peripheral diplomacy. zero-sum strategy, which makes China's neighboring countries truly feel

Ye Haolin: «The Rise of China and Response to Challenges in Secondary Strategic Directions—Taking Sino-Indian Relations after the Doklam Incident as an Example», published in «World Economics and Politics», Issue 4, 2018, Pages 106-128.

China's development is an opportunity rather than a threat. At the same time, it is necessary to be good at using hard power, including economic and military power, to prevent some neighboring countries from misjudging China's strategic capabilities and strategic determination, and mistakenly thinking that they can compete with China and the United States. When the situation intensifies, it will blackmail China, thereby causing interference to China's advancement of its peripheral strategy. In managing its peripheral strategy in the context of the Sino-US game, China must achieve a combination of honesty and trustworthiness, prestige and benefit, and embody the responsibility of a great power under the correct concept of justice and interests.

5. Some countermeasures for China to strengthen its game against the United States and deepen its strategic periphery

As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues, the confrontational nature of the U.S. strategy toward China has become more prominent. The international and peripheral environments that China faces have undergone major changes. In the future, security pressure in China's surrounding areas will increase significantly. In the past, it was based on avoiding excessive security costs. To increase the peripheral stability maintenance strategy that affects economic development, we will have to shift to a peripheral security shaping strategy that focuses on increasing security benefits and expanding safe space. Changes in the situation and goals require China to change its thinking on peripheral security work, enhance its proactive shaping capabilities, and rely on As a strategic fulcrum country, expand the space and means of security activities, and create a peripheral security network that is "centered on me, used by me, and beneficial to me" to offset the strategic pressure exerted by the United States and its alliance system on China.

(1) Achieving a shift in thinking from maintaining peripheral stability to shaping a security order. Although

China has avoided a strategic "showdown" between China and the United States through hard work, it needs to be noted that the following negative factors affecting Sino-US relations have not been eliminated: First, China and the United States The easing of economic and trade relations is temporary. The United States has not and will not change its long-term strategy of all-round containment of China. Secondly, the confrontation between China and the United States has spread to other areas of bilateral relations. In the future, China's peripheral security, ideology, international discourse and other fields will It will become more intensified. Once again, the United States will become increasingly tough in forcing China's neighboring countries to choose sides between China and the United States. The space for strategic maneuvering between China and the United States will continue to be squeezed by the United States and its alliance system. Finally, as China and the United States As the trend of confrontation intensifies, the opportunistic mentality of a small number of countries or non-state actors in China's surrounding areas who try to seek benefits from China by actively creating friction will become more and

more obvious, leading to an increase in the probability of security emergencies in China's surrounding areas. For many years, in the "diplomacy" Guided by the idea of "serving economic construction", China's peripheral security strategy mainly aims to avoid security incidents that affect the peaceful and stable environment required for China's economic development. Once similar incidents related to China occur, regardless of the cause and nature, China's main response methods will eventually return to controlling the situation. For issues that have nothing to do with China but involve conflicts between neighboring countries, China mainly adopts a middle position to avoid getting too involved, such as the Preah Vihear Temple dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. On non-traditional security issues that do not involve conflicts between countries, China provides uncontroversial technical

It uses technological and material support to reflect its international status and

national responsibility. This approach has ensured for a long time that China will not pay excessive security costs in neighboring areas and avoid becoming a security focus. To a certain extent, it has reduced the anxiety of neighboring countries about China's rise. However, the strategy of maintaining stability in the periphery also limits China's ability to expand its security interests and expand its security space. At the same time, China's unwillingness to have security incidents in its periphery may be exploited by some countries and become their attempt to worsen China's situation by creating security incidents. The root cause of blackmailing China is the security status of its surrounding countries. The passive maintenance of stability by controlling the situation after the fact may cause China's economic interests far away from the country's borders to continue to encounter challenges in neighboring countries. Some countries may even attempt to use this as an excuse to seek inappropriate benefits from China

that are inconsistent with their strength. In the context of the increasingly complex surrounding environment, if China continues to focus on maintaining stability in its surrounding areas, it will neither be able to achieve stability nor ensure security. It needs to be noted that stability in its surrounding areas does not equal its own security. A stable situation that is unfavorable to itself is actually harmful. As a resurgent power that is on the rise and whose national reunification has not yet been achieved, China's relative stability in its surrounding areas is only an external condition for China to increase its strength in a peaceful way. It is neither The goal itself, let alone long-term strategic tasks. As China's own economic and security interests expand beyond its national borders, and the contradiction between the dominant force in the current international system and China deepens (both of which are inevitable for China's strength to increase (consequences caused)), China cannot avoid and does not need to avoid the confrontation and conflicts between hegemonic countries and rising countries in the international system due to their increasingly close strength. At the same time, China's ability to control the surrounding situation will inevitably and must increase. Therefore, China We should strive to achieve the synchronization of the expansion of economic interest space and the expansion of strategic security space, and enhance the ability and willingness to proactively shape the peripheral security order. (2) Strengthening the awareness

and ability to proactively shape the peripheral security order. China's leading role in shaping

the peripheral security order does not mean This means that China must be committed to establishing a security alliance system in its surrounding areas that protects its own security and excludes other major powers. At least at the current stage, China has no need for this, and in fact does not have the ability to do so. China's strategic goals range from low to high, from now to The mid-term should be set as follows: The first stage is to prevent the United States from establishing a common alliance system against China around China, and to prevent the United States from inducing or coercing China's neighboring countries to side with the United States and isolate China. The second stage is to establish and jointly build the "One Belt, One Road" Promote a compatible peripheral security network, realize the mutual adaptation of strategic security space and economic interest space, and have the ability and means to safeguard the safety and economic interests of overseas personnel through security, especially military means. The third stage is to establish a China-led peripheral security system. Provide security guarantees for neighboring countries and correct the misconception among neighboring countries that they "rely on China economically and rely on the United States for security."

In order to achieve the above goals in a step-by-step and phased manner, China may consider strengthening capacity building in the following areas: (1) Military aspects, including overseas rapid deployment and intervention capabilities, area denial and anti-access

capabilities, overseas large-scale delivery capabilities, and overseas non-contact targeted clearance capabilities; (2) Intelligence, including early warning capabilities, emergency communication capabilities, and network building systems; (3) Material and technical aspects, normalized overseas operation support facilities and system, (4) In terms of diplomacy, a regional small multilateral security dialogue platform with China as the mainstay, and a legal framework for bilateral or small multilateral security assurances. (5) In terms of international discourse, an independent international discourse dissemination and sharing platform, flexible and international Ability to guide public opinion

Strengthening the above-mentioned capacity building is a dynamic process that requires the alternation of capacity accumulation and power use. There is no possibility that China will satisfy all the above-mentioned power needs and then use power one by one according to the situation. The leading countries in the international system will not give China time to wait. There is a time window when everything is ready and then the strategy can be calmly implemented. The improvement of capabilities is achieved in the process of using capabilities. The use of capabilities will inevitably bring about backlash and even a certain degree of conflict risk. However, overcoming this backlash will also bring consequences to China. The benefits of enhanced regional credibility. Neighboring countries do not expect China to be able to repel the US strategic pressure in a short period of time. In fact, as long as China demonstrates its strong determination to resist through uncompromising stalemate, it will be enough to continuously strengthen China's Strategic credibility, and strive for more proactive cooperation from strategic partners, thereby conducive to the construction of China's peripheral security network.

(3) Building a partner support system for China's peripheral security architecture.

Based on the security threats China faces, it needs to be recognized that China does not need a collective security system similar to NATO, nor does China have the ability to lead a regional security alliance. China's expansion The main path to achieve security borders, enhance security capabilities, and shape regional security order should be to build a predominantly bilateral peripheral security cooperation network with the help of strategic pivot countries in different directions.

Actively shaping the peripheral security order is inseparable from the support of strategic partners and the support of the cooperation system. It should be noted that the layout of strategic partners does not need to be comprehensive, nor does it mean that the more partners, the better. Specifically, looking at the world, Russia as a A world power with outstanding military and diplomatic capabilities, it has important consensus with China on overall issues related to the international order and is China's primary cooperative partner. Over the years, China and Russia have enjoyed good political and security relations. What is lacking is the people-to-people exchanges between the two countries. The degree of friendship and mutual trust. In particular, it should be noted that there is a tendency to doubt each other to varying degrees among the intellectual elites of China and Russia. This needs to be guided by both sides from the perspective of public opinion. In addition, in diplomacy, both sides should be on a global scale. Strengthen coordination against the U.S.'s behavior that disrupts the international security order, and avoid the behavior of one side trying to ease relations with the U.S. by condoning and supporting the U.S.'s stance on relevant issues when the other side is confronting the U.S. In order to provide the United States with the opportunity to "pull one and fight one", in

addition to Russia's strategic partnership as a global power, China should also choose different regional strategic partners and partnership frameworks according to different regional strategic directions. In Central Asia The direction should be to adhere to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as the main partner framework and stabilize the basic strategic pattern of Central Asia through Sino-Russian relations.

It uses Pakistan as a strategic fulcrum in the direction of South Asia to offset the US Central and South Asia strategy and the Indo-Pacific strategy through China-Pakistan cooperation and the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and prevent India from gaining regional dominance in the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region with the permission of the United States. While insisting on deepening overall cooperation with ASEAN in the direction of Southeast Asia, it will focus on strengthening cooperation with Indonesia, Myanmar, and Cambodia to show China's responsibility as a major power and its respect for the regional pattern and return of friendly forces to other swing countries in the region. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam have set examples. In the direction of Northeast Asia, we should continue to support North Korea's efforts to maintain independence and security, so as to maintain the balance of the geopolitical security pattern in Northeast Asia and achieve situation stability with a balance of power.

China should strengthen bilateral security interactions with the above-mentioned countries, appropriately expand the normal presence of military forces in the direction when the time is ripe, improve the level of intelligence cooperation, increase the reserve of military and security capabilities, and build a legal framework for bilateral-focused security cooperation. It is worthwhile. It should be noted that cooperation with the above-mentioned countries cannot be just action and not talk, or more action and less talk, and be content with providing material support. Instead, it should be both talk and action, so as to gain moral height for China's actions and clearly demonstrate its responsibility as a great power. China should put itself at the center and build a radial regional security architecture through bilateral security cooperation, and rely on this architecture to launch a long-term game with the Indo-Pacific security alliance system promoted by the United States.

In short, in the context of the United States intensifying global division and confrontation after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China must pay more attention to managing its peripheral areas and strengthen its ability to shape and lead the peripheral order. As early as 2014, at the Central Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference, the Party Central Committee established It has identified peripheral areas as the primary direction of China's diplomatic work. This is a further clarification of the party's diplomatic policy of "big countries are key, peripheral areas are primary, and developing countries are foundation." The rise of any big country first means the improvement of the ability to shape peripheral situations. To enhance China's participation in the affairs of neighboring regions, we must not only consider the environmental needs of China's economic growth, but also focus on providing public goods to neighboring regions and building the capacity to shape peripheral order, so as to meet the increasing demands of peripheral regions for China in terms of economic development and order stability. needs, and strive to form a closer composite community between China and surrounding areas.

(Editor Huang Nian)