

U.S. "Human Rights Diplomacy" under the Cold War Mentality —A Constructivist  
Reexamination of the Carter Administration's Response to the Human Rights  
Crisis in El Salvador in 1980

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Abstract: From the perspective of constructivist international relations theory, this article re-examines the United States' response to the human rights crisis in El Salvador in 1980. From March to December 1980, the Catholic Church in El Salvador, which held a liberation theology stance, entered into a conflict with the military because it was more sympathetic to the left. The relationship between the governments was tense, and the latter launched many secret operations against church members. In the face of this human rights crisis, the Carter administration in the United States adopted a strategy of appeasement and indifference, and continued to provide material and war preparation assistance to the right-wing government. The traditional view is based on "The dichotomous methodological framework of "realism" and "liberalism" points out that this marks the complete revival of the Cold War mentality after the Carter administration faced crises in many places around the world, completely abandoning and reversing the early "human rights diplomacy" strategy. But from the perspective of constructivist international relations From a theoretical perspective, the strategic choice of the Carter administration does not mean that the United States has completely abandoned "human rights diplomacy." On the contrary, historical facts reveal that the Cold War mentality and "human rights concerns" constructed each other at this time, and together formed a high-level ideology This means that the Carter administration's concern for "human rights" has always been framed by the Cold War mentality. It regards ideological confrontation as a higher means of realizing so-called "human rights" and will condone allies when necessary. regarded as a compromise to achieve a larger goal. This substantial mismatch between the pursuit of human rights and rigid ideology

doomed the United States' "human rights diplomacy" toward El Salvador to have a paradoxical ending.

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From March to December 1980, a number of assassinations and secret operations against church members took place in El Salvador, a Central American country, causing international shock. These incidents not only further plunged El Salvador, shrouded in the shadow of civil war, into social divisions, but also because in addition to the Supreme Leader of the Catholic Church in El Salvador, Óscar Romero, the assassins also included a number of American nuns, they have received widespread attention across borders. The focus of this article is on this series of events. The response of the Carter administration in the United States. The

series of events that occurred in El Salvador in 1980 coincided with three important historical backgrounds. One was the expansion of liberation theology in Latin America, which gave the Catholic Church in El Salvador a strong left-wing color and opposition to the military. There are many criticisms of the government's governance. Secondly, the socialist revolution broke out in El Salvador's neighbor Nicaragua in 1979, which inspired the left-wing forces in El Salvador. It also made the dominant right-wing political forces and the American supporters behind them feel that threats, coupled with the context of the "Cold War" that was still characterized by sharp ideological opposition, sporadic conflicts were amplified into a national civil war (1979-1992) that lasted for nearly 13 years and involved domestic left-right and left-wing forces as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. year), became a microcosm of the final stage of the "Global Cold War" in Latin America. Thirdly, the United States, as an important influence projection country in Central America, was in the term of President Carter at that time. In response to the public's response to the public's criticism of its predecessor, Richard Nixon- The Ford administration's accusations of "unethical diplomacy" y advocated the inclusion of more "human rights" factors in policy considerations, and therefore launched a number of human rights monitoring of right-wing allies or client regimes in Latin America. Of these three historical backgrounds, the first triggered the tragedy of the church people in El Salvador, and the second and third ones overlapped with each other and jointly affected the Carter administration's response to this

El Salvador is not a major country in the region in the traditional sense. Therefore, studies that specifically discuss the United States, especially the United States' policy toward El Salvador during the Carter administration, are very limited at home and abroad. Moreover, due to limited research perspectives, these studies have certain shortcomings. y Regarding the policy towards El Salvador at the end of the Carter administration, which is the core focus of this article, Arthur Miller believes that in the early days of the Carter administration, the Carter administration pursued "human rights diplomacy" in the strict sense towards El Salvador, which was a foreign policy that gave priority to idealism. However, in the later period, it obviously turned to emphasizing reality. Geopolitical interests have abandoned the early idealistic undertones, marking the "loss of priority of human rights concerns." y Adam Wilsman pointed out that the Carter administration's late policy toward Samoa showed that the "Cold War elements" in the United States

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y Walter Isaacson "Morality" in Thomas Paterson and Dennis Merrill (eds) y yyyyyyyyyyy yyy yyyyyyyyyyy lations: Documents and Essays Vol 2y Washington DC: Heath and Company 1995 pp 631 - 635

y Arthur Miller y "Jimmy Carter's Policy Toward" The El Salvador Civil War: The Demise of Human R yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy Artment of Historyy Cambridge: Harvard Univer site 2017 pp 10 - 67

Defeating the "human rights advocates" is a comprehensive return of the former's agenda. Brian De Heisserer even believed that the late Carter administration's policy towards El Salvador was one of the sources of the United States' long-term "barbaric intervention" diplomatic behavior in El Salvador. The only one in the country An academic monograph on El Salvador also adopted the "reality-ideal" dichotomy observation logic similar to that of American scholars. It believed that the Carter administration shifted from idealism in the beginning to realist politics in the later period, which reflected the so-called "anti-start and tail-end" of human rights diplomacy. " and the United States' consistent ambition to serve as the "leader of the Western Hemisphere" ỹ

The core views of the above-mentioned research discussions tend to believe that there are two versions of the U.S. government's policy toward El Salvador, "one before and one after". That is, before 1980, it focused on human rights diplomacy ("ideal") and emphasized the priority of morality and rules over interests. , vigorously criticized human rights violations, and after a series of anti-church human rights crises in 1980, the policy quickly shifted to the completely opposite second version, that is, Cold War priority ("reality"), which made the United States less sensitive to human rights violations. The anti-Soviet "Second/Third Revolutionary Government Committee" provided continuous support, which reflected the shortness and insincerity of the Carter administration's "human rights diplomacy."

This dichotomous observational perspective between "reality" and "ideal" echoes the long-standing thinking framework in international relations theory—in addition to the insightful critical theory of Marxism, for a long period of time, international relations Relational theory has long had the contention and intersection of the two major theoretical schools of "realism" and "liberalism". As the Cold War came to an end in the 1990s, and the academic level was viewed by other disciplines such as sociology, linguistics, philosophy, etc. Nourished by the field, a more novel and profound trend of thought has emerged in the field of international relations theory. The "constructivist" school of international relations theory represented by Alexander Wendt provides a possibility for the transcendence of the two major systems. According to constructivism From the perspective of this school, the so-called "anarchy" between countries does not necessarily lead to a struggle power political structure in which "people are wolves against people", nor does it necessarily evolve into a set of coordinated and standardized international systems. On the contrary, the "anarchy" state between countries makes it possible for various patterns to emerge, including hostility, competition, coordination and cooperation. And what kind of international relations will evolve depends on the "stage" Each actor's cognition of itself and each other and the various interactions based on this cognition. Robert Keohane believes that what distinguishes constructivism from the two previous schools is that liberalism

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ỹ Adam Wilsmany "Our Enemy's Enemy: Human Rights and the U S Intervention in El Salvador 1977-1992" of History ỹ Nashville: Vanderbilt University ỹ 2014 ỹ p 156

ỹ Brian D'Haeseleer ỹ "The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency in El Salvador 1979-1992" of ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ỹ ty ỹ 2015, p 29 Su Zhilong: «Research on U.S. Policy

ỹ towards El Salvador, 1979-1992», Master's Thesis, Department of History, Shaanxi Normal University, 2011,

ỹ page 18. Alexander Wendt ỹ "Anarchy Is What States Make" so of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics ỹ in International Organization ỹ Vol 46 ỹ 1992 ỹ pp 391 - 425

Both liberalism and realism take "rationality" as their starting point and fundamental premise, and believe that international relations are the result of maximizing interests after careful planning by "rational people". Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of "irrational" factors and recognizes concepts, the great value of knowledge and cognition in international relations. In short, even interests are not entirely a material objective existence, but a "constructed thing" mixed with a lot of subjectivity. For individuals with different concepts, status and backgrounds often have different interpretations.

Combining the archival materials that have been disclosed, this article believes that compared with the "reality-ideal" dichotomy in the existing literature, the "constructivist" approach may be a better perspective for understanding the Carter administration's policy towards El Salvador, because from the perspective of historical facts it can be seen that the "human rights" factor has considerable continuity in the Carter administration's policy towards El Salvador. The idealistic element has never lost its place in American public opinion due to the continuous efforts of transnational religious actors such as the Catholic media. However, the rigid "road map" constructed by Cold War ideology and the so-called "lessons" of Nicaragua's socialist revolution made the Carter administration insist that maintaining the status quo of military rule in El Salvador was the long-term best way to restore stability and realize human rights. In 1980, the government's policy toward El Salvador is based on the rigid "Cold War" ideology that constructs the so-called "ideal" of human rights.

#### "Human Rights Diplomacy" and the Carter Administration's Early Policy toward El Salvador

In November 1976, Democrat Jimmy Carter, who held high the banner of idealism, defeated former President Gerald Ford, who continued the realist foreign policy, and was successfully elected as the 39th President of the United States. His "commitment to human rights" appeared in his inauguration speech at the ceremony, the United States in the late 1970s faced many difficulties. Economically, the "energy crisis" that broke out after the Fourth Middle East War and the long-term "stagflation" problem were hindering the development of the United States. Politically, ethnic conflicts, a series of events such as the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal are gradually damaging the credibility of the U.S. government. In diplomacy, although the realist diplomatic strategy established by Nixon-Kissinger has achieved outstanding results in areas such as the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union and the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. However, it brought political chaos and continuation of war in places such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Chile. In addition, during the Nixon and Ford administrations, politicians blatantly bypassed legal procedures and favored the undemocratic approach of "secret diplomacy."

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Robert Keohane and State Power, Boulder: Westview, 1989, pp. 160 - 162; Edward Brett, US Catholic Press on Central America, Westview Press, 2002, pp. 61 - 82 [US]. Written by Jimmy Carter, translated by Lu Junfu and

others: «Loyal to the Faith—Memoirs of an American President» Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1985, page 175.

Jimmy Carter, "Jimmy Carter's Presidential Project," January 20, 1977.

The U.S. government's "realist immorality" in the political and diplomatic fields has been increasingly criticized by public opinion. The criticism has not only caused the United States to lose its sense of moral responsibility, but also seriously damaged the reputation of the United States in the world. Such public opinion continuously accumulated and finally pushed Carter, a devout Southern Baptist Christian, into the White House in 1977 - people looked forward to the new president's idealism and "human rights priority" proposition. It can inject more moral color into American politics, which was previously overly fond of power politics.

The early diplomatic practices of the Carter administration did indeed place "human rights" as a priority as stated in its inaugural speech. The diplomatic policy of "human rights first" also received a relatively timely response in its governance process. Since the 1930s, although El Salvador has the guise of a "democratic country", it has been living under the rule of a military oligarchy. Until the second half of the 1970s, due to the fact that El Salvador's geographical location was not the core and the military government was also on the anti-Soviet issue. The United States has a high degree of consistency and has long been indifferent to the country's domestic political situation. This situation changed after Carter came to power. In February 1977, El Salvador held another national election. The candidate of the military government, General Carlos Romero (Carlos Romero), announced that they had won with an absolute advantage of two to one, but the people did not recognize this. On February 28, 1977, the "Lipota Plaza Massacre" occurred in the capital San Salvador, and the military government immediately abolished all constitutional rights. The country was declared to be in a state of martial law. During the state of martial law, bloodshed often occurred. Dozens of people, including left-wing liberation theologian and Jesuit Rutilio Grande, died unfortunately.

Different from the indifferent attitude of previous U.S. governments, the Carter administration, which had just taken office for a short time, responded immediately. On March 9, 1977, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives quickly held a hearing on the situation in El Salvador to hear questions about the country's military junta. There was evidence of massive fraud. The next day, the Carter administration invoked Sections 116 and 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act to terminate U.S. military and economic assistance to El Salvador. In this regard, it had long been accustomed to the "policy of indifference" of its ally, the United States. El Salvador's military administration

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Jimmy Carter "Our Nation's Past and Future": Address Acceptance of the Present Nomination at The Democratic National Convention in New York City" in *The American Presidency Project* July 15, 1976

Michael Little *A War of Information: The Conflict between Public and Private US Foreign Policy on El Salvador 1979-1992* New York: University Press of America 1994 p 33

In order to distinguish him from the Catholic Archbishop of El Salvador Oscar Romero (scar Romero), hereafter Carlos Romero is called "General Romero" and Oscar Romero is called "Bishop Romero".

New York Times February 22 1977 Washington Post February 28 1977 Miami Herald

March 15 1977 Department of State and research in Rights in Latin American Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company 17 Washington Post March 10 1977 Michael Little *A War of Information: The Conflict between Public and Private US Foreign Policy on El Salvador 1979 - 1992* New York:

University Press of America 1994 p 34

The government was extremely dissatisfied. They declared that they would voluntarily give up U.S. aid on the grounds of "national dignity" to protest U.S. interference in the political situation in El Salvador.

The United States also continued to increase its pressure: in late March 1977, the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador was recalled as a solemn protest. In May, U.S. State Department officials summoned Bertrand Galindo, the ambassador of El Salvador to the Organization of American States, in Washington. Bertrand Galindo informed him that the United States had decided to postpone the Inter-American Development Bank's loan for water conservancy construction in El Salvador due to the human rights crisis in El Salvador. Unión De GUERREROS BLANCOS) will be revealed to the government's priests of the Jesus who supports the left wing under the condon of the government. Appointed a new ambassador to El Salvador to express the Carter administration's strong dissatisfaction with the military government of El Salvador. After the above series of pressures, the military government of El Salvador finally softened its position. The new president, General Carlos Romero, on

July 18, 1977 Publicly speaking out, condemning the actions of the "White Fighter Alliance" as "terrorist" acts that the government will not support. Compared with the previous official propaganda that has always advocated the "anti-leftist" goal first, this statement is obviously a big step forward. In the same year On September 8, General Romero further expressed his intention to improve to the United States - after being invited to participate in the signing ceremony of the "Panama Canal Permanent Neutrality and Operation Treaty", another important result of Carter's "human rights diplomacy", General Romero gave a clear assurance to the Carter administration that the Carter administration was determined to make improvements on "human rights" and "Honduras borders," two core issues of concern to the United States, and very much welcomed "the establishment of a special agency by the United Nations or the Organization of American States." The Commission on Human Rights went to El Salvador to witness the tremendous progress that has been made there in the past two months." In response, Carter himself responded positively. At the end of September 1977, after the assessment team made a report that the human rights situation in El Salvador had indeed improved significantly. The Carter administration also changed

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Washington Post March 18 1977 New York Time March 18  
 1977 William Luers "Next Steps with El Salvador" March 18 1977 in Digital National Security Archive Company 1-3  
 Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Of Central American Affairs Sador Bertrand Galindo May 10 1977 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information  
 Post May 22  
 1977 Washington Post July 17 1977 Washington Post July 23  
 1977 The Inter-Agency Committee  
 on Human rights and foreign economical assistance Summary of the Decisions Taken by the Interter - A Gency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Ec Onomic Assistance May - October 1977  
 October 21 1977 in Argentina Declassification Project OFFICE OF the Director of National Intelligence p 8



In addition, the perverse actions of the then president, General Romero, made the situation worse: in the face of the growing opposition from the people, General Romero not only publicly refused to discuss reforms for the next election, but also used high-pressure methods to suppress the rising demonstrations. Demonstration power. During a demonstration on September 14, 1979, General Romero ordered the National Guard and plainclothes police to open fire on the people, resulting in the death and injury of many Salvadorans. An American journalist was also affected. Such an extreme behavior not only seriously violated the Carter administration, which was holding high the banner of "human rights diplomacy" at this time, and caused the United States to make the judgment that "Romero is no longer capable of leading the country through the current crisis", it also caused El Salvador to The left-wing and even right-wing forces in the country were greatly dissatisfied. From the perspective of the Salvadoran right-wing, General Romero's reckless actions would undoubtedly further inflame tensions and prematurely spread the revolutionary wave in Nicaragua to El Salvador. The dissatisfaction finally erupted in October 1979. It turned into an actual coup d'etat - the Salvadoran youth uprising force led by two military officers set out from the border provinces of El Salvador, Chalatenango and San Miguel, and seized control of the San Salvador military camp on the 15th. General Romero was deposed and exiled. Subsequently, the "Revolutionary Government Council", a military-civilian coalition taking the "middle way", took control of the country.

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collapse of the military government that has long cooperated with the United States and the coming to power of a coalition government with left-wing elements are obviously not in line with the geopolitical and ideological interests of the United States in its "own backyard" under the bipolar pattern. However, because this coup happened to occur in the special context of Carter's "human rights diplomacy" policy, the United States therefore welcomed the establishment of the new regime. No matter what the purpose, it can be said that the Carter government transcended ideological barriers and supported the centrist government of El Salvador. Its human rights Foreign policy has reached a peak.

However, the situation in El Salvador soon took a turn. Shortly after the revolutionary military government, which claimed to be neutral, came to power, the contradictions within the coalition government were quickly exposed. Among them, the political positions of the three civilian politicians were relatively harmonious. It has a tolerant attitude towards left-wing forces, and the military "real power" represented by Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, one of the uprising officers, and Defense Minister Jose Guillermo

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• New York Times, September 15

• 1979 Frank Devin e "Amid Golpe Rumors" October 10, 1979" in Digital National Security Archive Mation and Learning Company, p 2

• Max Manwaring and Court Prisk ( eds ) El Salvador at War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988, pp 29 - 30

• United States Embassy, El Salvador, "Coup in El Salvador: Situation Report," October 15, 1979" in Digital National Security Archive est Information and Learning Company, pp 1 - 2, Washington Post, October 16, 1979

• United States Embassy, El Salvador, "Salvadoran Armed Forces :President Romero Falls," October 16, 1979" in Digital National Security y Archive Company, pp 1 - 2, New York Times, October 17, 1979



They refused to make any compromises to the left, and they could not tolerate the land reform plan promised when the new government came to power. Faced with the real power control of the right-wing officers in the coalition government, the left-wing organizations in El Salvador completely gave up their previous efforts to "Any illusion that the "Revolutionary Government Committee" has the ability to coordinate the contradictions between the parties left the negotiating table - the four main resistance forces formed the "Revolutionary Mass Coordination Committee" on their own in January 1980 to coordinate actions. Three civilian politicians and dozens of civilian bureaucrats also left the government under pressure in the middle of that month, and power returned to the hands of the right-wing military. As a result, El Salvador's politics entered the period of the "Second Revolutionary Government Council" that returned to conservativeness. The right-wing military government and the left-wing guerrillas This also started the chaos of sharp confrontations and frequent bloody revenge between the military and military government. Among them, Roberto D'Aubuisson, the leader of the far-right armed organization "Death Squad" who firmly supports the military government and maintains secret ties with it. He is at the forefront of the repressive activities

It was the highly popular Catholic Church in El Salvador and its Archbishop Oscar Romero who tried to stand out in this chaos to ease tensions and continue to speak out for the poor. Although in Latin American political life before the 1960s, The power of the church is often linked to the right-wing conservative forces. However, since the theme of "church self-renovation" was raised at the "Second Vatican Council" (referred to as "Vatican II") in 1962, more and more clergy have He began to think about the possibility and necessity of speaking out for the poor and the powerless. In response to the new spirit of the Second Vatican Council, at the end of August 1968, bishops from major Latin American dioceses gathered in Medellin, Colombia. Together, the Second Latin American Bishops Conference (referred to as the "Medellin Conference") was held. The Medellin Conference eventually formed four programmatic documents (collectively known as the "Medellin Documents"), each on "Justice" Issues such as "peace," "family," and "poverty" were resolved. The new ideas of "Vatican II" and the "Medellin Council" reversed the previous traditional power combination of "Church-Rich-Right" in Latin America, making The left-wing theological thought later known as "liberation theology" spread in Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and other places

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Raymond Bonner Weakness and Deceit: U S Poli cy and El Salvador New York: Times Books p 162 United States Embassy

es Toward Unity and Coordination January 14 1980 in Digital National Security Archive oQuest Information and Learning Company pp 1 - 3

Miami Herald January 4 1980 New York Times January 5 1980 William

Leo Grande kyard: The United States in Central America 19 92 Chapel

Hill: Universe of North Carolina Press 2000 p 49

Ye Jianhui: «What is liberation theology?», published in «Religion and American Society», Issue 2,

2016, pp. 95-112, Latin American Bishops "Medellin Documents" in Joseph Gremillon (ed) The Gospel of Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching Pope John Maryknoll: Orbis Books 1974 pp 445 - 476

Later , this idea spread to El Salvador and took root in rural missionary work. The Jesuit Jesuit Lutio Grande, the standard bearer of Liberation Theology, frequently went to the countryside to organize "Sacramental Meetings" to spread revolutionary ideas to farmers. Grande His virtue has also been appreciated by many senior figures in the Salvadoran church, including his old friend from the San José de la Montagna Seminary in his early years and Archbishop Oscar Romero of the Archdiocese of San Salvador.

As a priest who was educated in the Roman Catholic Church, Romero's religious stance in his early years was very conservative. It was this conservative theological stance that earned him high praise from the right-wing military government, and he was elected archbishop of El Salvador in 1977. However, the aforementioned human rights crisis brought about by the 1977 election, especially the "martyrdom" of Grande's assassination in front of his eyes during this crisis, completely reversed Bishop Romero's religious stance and made him a liberator. The most important spokesman for theology in El Salvador. In the weeks after Grande was assassinated, Romero not only changed his previous conservative and elitist religious image and openly spoke out to the military government, he also resisted the pressure of the Holy See nuncio and established a relationship with the domestic The right-wing media maliciously accused him of being a "communist, subversive and lunatic" and publicly held a grand mass for Grande in the central square of San Salvador. From then on, Bishop Romero became the most popular supporter of Salvadoran civilians and the oppressed. A firm support force, while the military government always regards it as a thorn in its side and a thorn in its flesh.

The collapse of General Romero's government in 1979 and the subsequent coming to power of the conciliatory "First Revolutionary Government Council" gave Bishop Romero even more hope. However, as mentioned above, the "First Revolutionary Government Council" was short-lived and died the following year. The right-wing conservative "Second Revolutionary Government Council" that came to power in January quickly deviated from the moderate moderate path of its predecessors, and El Salvador's political life returned to the chaotic state before the revolution. Faced with such a huge setback, Bishop Romero's religious position and political life levels have intensified activities, published

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Zhang Huang, author: «Liberation Theology: Contemporary Latin American Christian Socialist Thoughts», Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2006, page 5, [French]

Salvador Luet, translated by Zhang Jinjian: «Marxism and Liberation Theology (V)»: Christianity and the Origin of the Revolutionary Struggle in El Source», published in "Marxism Research", Issue 6, 1996, pp. 91-92.

David Tombs, Latin America, Liberation Theo Logy Boston: Brill Academic Publications 2002 p 163

Miami Herald March 15 1977

Maria Lopez Vigil y toresy 1995y pp 76 - 77 Óscar Romeroy

Irene Hodgs on (trans )y y Shepard' y Diaryy : Catholic Fund for Oversea

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Óscar Romeroy Irene Hodgson ( trans )y A Shepard ' s Diaryy Irene Hodgsony London: Catholic Fund for Overseas Development y 1993y p 352 According to

statistics, in 1980 the secret armed forces "death squads" About 500 people are killed every month, see [US] Lynn Foster Author, Translated by Zhang Sengen et al.: "History of Mesoamerica", Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Press, 2011, Page 276

He made a series of public appeals and issued an open letter directly to the US government, which had an ambiguous attitude towards the "Second Revolutionary Government Committee". However, President Carter never gave a direct reply.

Bishop Romero's public stance and corresponding speeches eventually led to his public assassination on March 24, 1980. A bombing also occurred during his subsequent funeral, killing at least 40 Salvadorans and injuring about 70 others. Ten of them were killed by gunfire and two were killed in a stampede. To this day, the "Bishop Romero case" is still being delayed by many parties and has not been thoroughly investigated. No suspect has been prosecuted. However, in the future, the CIA  
 However, an internal investigation showed that the far-right armed organization "Death Squad", which is inextricably linked to the right-wing government, needs to be responsible. In the report of the "Truth Commission" jointly organized by the United Nations and the Government of El Salvador in 1993, the commission Experts even directly asserted that Bishop Romero was killed under the personal instruction of D'Aubuisson and organized by four of his capable subordinates. The subsequent tragedy that occurred at Bishop Romero's funeral was also allegedly secretly carried out in El Salvador. It was carried out under the organization of the security forces. However, D'Aubuisson and others were briefly arrested and then released hastily in mid-May of the same year. Other related suspects were never offended.

On November 27, 1980, six more church members with left-wing connections were tortured to death at a local school run by the Jesuits. Similar tragedies soon affected non-Salvadorian church members. Among them, the most influential was The "Fourth Amendment" incident occurred on December 3 of the same year, resulting in the tragic death of four American citizens.

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Óscar Romero Irene Hodgson (trans) A Shepard's Diary London: Catholic Fund for Overseas Development 1993 p 77  
 Óscar Romero Voice of the Voices: The Four Pastoral Letters and Other Statements Maryknol: Orbis Books 1985 pp 177 - 187  
 United States States Embassy Salvador "Archbishop's Homily March 23 1980" in Digital National Security Archive est Information and Learning Company pp 1 - 4

United States Embassy El Salvador "Text of Archbishop's ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ary 19 1980" in Digital National Security Archive roQuest Information and Learning Company p 1

New York Times March 25 1980 pp 17 8 Washington Post March 25 1980 pp A1 - A12 Directorate of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency El Salvador: D'Aubuisson's Error Activities March 2 1984" Central Intelligence Agency's Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room pp 1 - 4 <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs> [2023-10-13] Commission on the Truth for El Salvador "From Madness to

Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador March 29 1993" e Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims p 131 <https://undocs.org/S/25500> [2023-08-13]

United States Embassy El Salvador "Archbishop's Assassination: Site Report 4 / 17 April 1980" in Digital National Security Archive roQuest Information and Learning Company p 2

WASHINGTON POST May 15 1980 Washington POST May 16 1980

UNITED STATES EMBASSY El Salvador "FDR Leadership ASSASSINATED November 28 1980" in Digital Natives SECURITY ARCHIVE y PROQUEST INFORMATION AND LEARNING COP 1-4

Similar to the "Bishop Romero Case", the right-wing government of El Salvador's investigation into the "Four Nuns Case" also appeared to be very slow and rash: the full trial of the entire case was delayed until the spring of 1981, until May 9 of the same year. Only six officers directly related to the case were arrested and brought to justice. During the subsequent trial, the military tried their best to cover up and downplay the incident. In the end, the case was not concluded until the end of May 1984. Among them, only 5 low-level officers were found guilty of murder, and the instructions from higher-level officials according to the former were not traced at all. Three of the above-mentioned five key criminals were even convicted of murder because of the so-called "well-reformed" He was released after serving his sentence in 2011. It is not difficult to see

from the above historical facts that the right-wing military government of El Salvador was very responsible for the human rights tragedy of church members under the influence of liberation theology, and its attitude towards handling the aftermath was also quite dismissive. In this regard, the Carter administration will still fail to fulfill its campaign promise of "human rights diplomacy" and impose human rights sanctions on the right-wing military government as it did in the early days of the administration? At least from the surface historical facts, the answer to this question is no - in response to the "Roman Rights Diplomacy" Regarding the case of Bishop Romero, although the U.S. Embassy issued a statement the day after the assassination of the bishop, calling Bishop Romero's death a "serious crime that offends the people of El Salvador and the world", it was also released on the same day. John Bushnell, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for American Affairs, testified before the House Appropriations Committee and endorsed Carter's huge economic aid allocation to the right-wing government of El Salvador. The motion was soon formally passed by Congress. And it was implemented the next month. Similarly, after the "Four Sisters Case" occurred in December, although the US government

United States Embassy El Salvador "Murder of Three American Nuns and One American Lay Missionary" December 5, 1980 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company 1-11 1980 Washington Post December 5, 1980

Federal Bureau of Investigation of Investigation of the Churchwomen's Trial on June 15, 1983 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company 1-9

United States Embassy El Salvador "El Salvador: Arrest of Spectators in Murdered Churchwomen Case" May 9, 1981 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company 1

Russell Crandall The Salvador Option: The United States in El Salvador Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016 pp

163-166 United States Embassy El Salvador "Churchwomen's Trial: All Five Defendants Guilty as Charged" May 25, 1984 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company 1-6

Commission on the Truth for El Salvador "From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador" March 29, 1993 Resources for the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims 13]

United States Embassy El Salvador "Death of Archbishop Romero" Text of Embassy Press Statement March 25, 1980 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 1-2

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations Applications for 1979 March 25, 1980 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 3-17

For a time, it expressed serious concern and declared on December 5 that it would suspend all aid to El Salvador. However, less than 10 days after the tragedy, the Carter administration quickly resumed aid to El Salvador after a very incomplete government reorganization. On January 16, the eve of the expiration of his presidential term, Carter even provided an additional US\$5 million in emergency military aid to El Salvador.

Based on the above facts, many scholars have made the judgment that under the international background such as the victory of the Nicaraguan revolution, the Carter administration completely abandoned its earlier "human rights diplomacy" policy at the end of the administration and turned one-sided to the conservative thinking of "Cold War Priority", and paved the way for the subsequent "low-intensity war" strategy that advocated confrontation during the Reagan administration. However, the author believes that rather than highlighting the huge change in the U.S. policy toward El Salvador in 1980, it is better to say that "human rights diplomacy" is a form of diplomacy. The policy has a relatively stable internal continuity. At the same time, rather than emphasizing the sharp opposition between "human rights diplomacy" and the Cold War mentality, it is better to say that the two are actually highly mutually constructed and have a considerable degree of continuity. The following article attempts to adopt constructivism, especially constructivism, reinterpret this event using the "road map" model of ism.

New interpretation from the perspective of three constructivists and its practical significance

According to Wang Lixin's point of view, ideology can affect the "construction" of a country's foreign policy through a total of four modes, namely the "lens mode", "fence mode", "seesaw mode" (or "tug of war mode") and "roadmap mode". Combined with specific historical data, this article believes that the "road map model" is more suitable for explaining the Carter administration's response to the human rights crisis in El

Salvador in 1980. The "road map model" can be summarized by Max Weber's discussion: "Not ideas, but matter. Physical and spiritual interests directly dominate human behavior. However, the 'world image' generated by thoughts is like a switchman, often determining the trajectory of interest-driven behavior." In other words, even if realism and liberal institutionalism are admitted The core idea of it is that the "interests" of material and values are the decisive factors of a country's foreign policy. However, if you dig deeper, you will find that the decisive change of "interests"

Department of State "Suspension of U S Aid" December 5, 1980 in Digital National Security Archive and ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 1-2

Department of State "Response to Suggestion That United States Restoration Aid to El Salvador" December 22, 1980 in Digital National Security Archive and ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 1-2

Department of State "Emergency Military Aid to El Salvador" January 16, 1980 in Digital National Security Archive and ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 1 - 3

Wang Li's new book: «Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy», Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007, pp.

32-42, Max Weber "Social Psychology of the World's Religions" in H H Gerth and C Wright Mills ( eds ) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology New York: Oxford University Press 1958 p 280

Quantity itself is a product under the influence of ideology - it is ideology that outlines the "road map" for people to define and obtain interests, and guides people to identify and pursue "interests" constructed by concepts one after another. Just like Ollas revealed by Holsti, an individual's cognitive style and belief system play a decisive role in their decision-making and behavioral processes. In this specific case of El Salvador, it can also be inferred that

Let's talk about it

First, let's look at the aspect of objectivity. As mentioned above, although the assassination of Bishop Romero and the funeral tragedy happened first, and the US economic aid of 5.7 million US dollars to El Salvador followed closely, this does not mean that the aid is against the right wing. The military government's connivance and rewards. On the contrary, the aid act actually contains a historical antecedent that far precedes the emergency. At the same time, its purpose is precisely to promote "human rights" in El Salvador, not the opposite. As early as 1980, when the "Second Revolutionary Government Council" came to power in January 1980, the U.S. State Department stated to the media that the United States' expectation for the new government of El Salvador was to help it carry out reforms that "rescue the poor, promote human rights, and advance democracy." Here, only on this basis can material assistance be provided to El Salvador. In early March 1980, when proposing a specific amount of aid to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, the U.S. Department of Defense also emphasized again that the aid would be limited to "non-lethal" items such as vehicles and communications equipment. equipment, and will be committed to simultaneously opposing extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing forces in El Salvador and promoting human rights. Even at the appropriation hearing held after the "Bishop Romero case" tragedy, Deputy Secretary of State John Bushnell repeatedly stated: "We have no intention of restarting the supply of lethal equipment to El Salvador. The assistance will mainly be used for transportation and communication purposes." It can be seen from this that, rather than a priori belief, the Carter administration continued to provide assistance to the right-wing military junta of El Salvador after the human rights crisis. It is based on the "Cold War mentality" to support the interests of anti-communist allies. It is better to realize that at the critical moment when the Carter administration is struggling to deal with the crises in Iran and Afghanistan and has no way to deal with the crisis, the original intention of assisting the current government of El Salvador is to stabilize the existing situation. From a certain perspective To a greater extent, it is more conducive to stabilizing the situation in the country and preventing further deterioration of its human rights situation.

Secondly, in addition to losing objectivity on the actual motivations of aid, it is believed that the Carter administration in 1980

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Ole Holsti "The Belief System and National Images" 62 pp 244 - 252 Department of State "Economics and Military

Aid to El Salvador January 17 1980 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company

Department of Defense that Implementation of FY 1980 IMET and FMS Financing for El Salvador and Honduras Requires Reprogramming \$ 5.7 Million in FMS for El Salvador March 3 1980 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company 1-2

Jimmy Carter Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President New York: Bantam Books 1982 pp 585 - 586

However, it lacked comprehensiveness in its view of "human rights diplomacy" towards El Salvador. After a number of cases against people who sympathized with left-wing churches occurred in 1980, the Carter administration was seen as siding with the right-wing conservative government, but at the same time it needed to be recognized. The Carter administration in 1980 continued its emphasis on "human rights diplomacy" in many aspects: First, in the arrangement of foreign policymakers for El Salvador, the Carter administration continued its team of diplomats who valued "human rights diplomacy." Second, in terms of specific foreign policy decisions towards El Salvador, the Carter administration

Although the government's foreign policy has all the negative aspects mentioned above, it also has many positive elements.

First, in terms of personnel, the diplomatic team that formulated and implemented the policy toward El Salvador in 1980 under the Carter administration was by no means a group of conservatives who adhered to ideological dogma. In a sense, the "human rights diplomacy" of the Carter administration was not diminished. On the contrary, it has been strengthened. For example, Robert Pastor, who served as the senior adviser for Latin American and Caribbean affairs on the US National Security Council from 1977 to 1981, was the maker and promoter of a series of decisions such as "aid to El Salvador". Although there is a lack of proof that there is no direct documentation of his exact position at the moment of decision-making, but from the public articles published after he left office, we can still get a glimpse of his attitude. As Pastor said, the nature of the regime in El Salvador itself is different from what President Reagan called "Global strategic balance" has nothing to do with it. In another article published in "The New Republic", Pastor even pointed out that blindly opposing the left in El Salvador is ineffective. Only through peace negotiations can El Salvador be freed. The situation finally "led to victory".<sup>2</sup> From this, it is not difficult to see that Pastor is by no means a dogmatist who adheres to the Cold War mentality. In the policy choice of reconciling the contradictions between the parties and the Cold War priority, Pastor's decision-making tendency is obviously The former is especially true when looking at the personnel situation of the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. Far from weakening its commitment to "human rights diplomacy" in 1980, the Carter administration intensified its focus on human rights issues—because it was here that At the beginning of the year, in order to deal with the possible political conflicts caused by the conservative "Second Revolutionary Government Council" coming to power, the U.S. State Department replaced Frank Devine, the former ambassador who was not very enthusiastic about human rights diplomacy, and replaced him with a diplomacy that paid more attention to human rights situations. Officer Robert White. After being transferred to El Salvador, White still continued his sympathy for the people at the bottom and his concern for the human rights situation.

Second, in terms of the specific policies of the Carter administration towards El Salvador, it is also necessary to realize that in addition to "showing indifference to the tragedy of human rights" in 1980, the Carter administration also continued to exert pressure on the right-wing "Second

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Robert Pastor's "Our Real Interests in Central America" in *The Atlantic* Robert Pastor's "Winning Through Negotiation" in *The New Republic* March 17, 1982 p 13 Washington Post March 8, 1985 Betty Glad's "An Outsider in the White House" : Jimmy Carter Advisors and the Marking of American Foreign Policy Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2009 p 245 United States Embassy El Salvador "Preliminary Assessment of the Situation" March 19, 1980 in Digital National Security Archive est Information and Learning Company p 1

The "Second Revolutionary Government Committee" accepted a land reform plan that was contrary to its original wishes. The latter was exactly what the U.S. government believed to be a good strategy that could effectively promote the improvement of human rights conditions in El Salvador. As mentioned above, the "Second Revolutionary Government" was almost entirely run by military personnel. The "Committee" indeed came to power after taking over the "First Revolutionary Government Committee" which advocated land reform. However, after it took power, the United States not only supported it but also continued to put pressure on it, requiring the latter to continue the land of its predecessor. Reform policy. Shortly after the new government of El Salvador was established, the United States continued to provide technical advice on land reform to the new government of El Salvador through the government-funded organization "American Free Labor Development Association" and dispatched the organization's staff on February 27, 1980. The chief expert, Professor Roy Prosterman of the University of Washington's Institute of Rural Development, went to El Salvador to meet with the military chief in person and presented to him the necessity and specific measures for land reform. Later provided to the El Salvador government 5.7 million US dollars in aid to Salvador, and the Carter administration has repeatedly stated that the aid will be linked to land reform. According to the U.S. vision, as long as the El Salvador government can effectively implement the land reform policy, it will be able to achieve "2/3 ~ 3/4" The rural population has been transformed from a miserable situation of almost serfs into small-scale capitalists, thereby enabling a new social system to operate. This U.S. concern based on "human rights diplomacy", coupled with the reform demands of all parties in El Salvador, ultimately Promote the "Second Revolutionary Government Committee" to release a three-phase plan between March and April 1980, gradually expropriating the farms of large landowners and distributing them to lower-level tenant farmers. Although in the following year, due to lack of planning, Due to factors such as obstruction by large landowners and simple and crude implementation methods, the actual results of land reform are very limited. However, the hope that the military government can fundamentally improve the human rights situation in El Salvador through effective land reform has always been a "one of the Carter administration's goals." "Myth". Except for supporting the right-wing military government in cases such as the "Romero Protagonist Case" and the "Four Sisters Case", the Carter administration has not relaxed its human rights requirements for the military government in other aspects.

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- United States Embassy of Salvador's Law 1980 in Digital National Security Archive est Information and Learning Company p 1
  - Department of State Bureau of Inter-American Affairs "El Salvador: Land Reform Program March 1980" in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company p 1
  - United States Embassy El Salvador "Land Reform Decree Nears Final Version March 4 1980" in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 3 - 4
  - Including Bishop Romero himself, see United States Embassy El Salvador "Arch Bishop Strongly Urges Agrarian Reformed 17 1979" in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 1 - 3
  - United States Embassy El Salvador "El Salvador: Mahano Announces Basic Agrarian Reform La March 4 1980" in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company pp 1 - 2
  - Edward Lehoucq and Harold Sims "Reform with Repression: The Land Reform in El Salvador" in ISHI Occasional Papers in Social Change Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues 1982 pp 1-14



Therefore, compared with other models under constructivist theory, the "roadmap model" is more suitable for explaining the Carter administration's response to the human rights crisis in El Salvador and its "human rights diplomacy" in 1980, because through this model, we can deeply understand that confrontation Sexual Cold War interests and the benign-looking "human rights diplomacy" are superficially the two ends of a "seesaw" and the two poles of a "tug-of-war", but in reality the two are highly mutually constructed and overlapping. According to the Cold War ideology, The confrontation between the "Western camp" and the so-called "Red camp" is not just a confrontation between two geopolitical camps based on political and economic interests. On the contrary, from the perspective of the United States, they are constructed a priori as the "democratic camp" and the so-called "evil camp" to determine the future and destiny of mankind. ¶ In addition, combined with the

analysis perspective of the "road map model", it can also be seen that American policymakers and the public under the infiltration of Cold War ideology are not clear and objective. On the contrary, the Cold War "road map", as a kind of thinking background, provides a clear but oversimplified picture of the world, that is, the hostile "red camp" is essentially a "danger", must be expelled. This is the only way for U.S. diplomatic behavior. When human rights issues are included, this Cold War "road map" can be further concretized as follows: Although human rights issues in reality are very important, once a certain situation may arise, If the left-wing government is able to take power, then the resulting Soviet-style political system will definitely bring about a more essential and extensive loss of human rights in the country. Therefore, in order to achieve greater "human rights interests", we must prevent the slightest change and resolutely contain it. ¶ In other words, for the U.S. government, the specific human rights crisis is a "minor issue", while the goal of preventing the rise of left-wing forces is "great justice." In this contrast between the so-called "minor issues" and "great justice", all the measures that can restrain left-wing forces The means used to come to power, regardless of whether they actually bring about human rights issues, can be regarded as temporarily reasonable by the United States. This transcendental concept, which was born out of the Cold War "road map", very paradoxically interprets the "road map" that is actually happening now. "Tragedy of human rights" is regarded as a necessary sacrifice to move towards a long-term ideal "human rights situation", and ignoring the actual human rights tragedy is regarded as an expedient measure to defend longer-term "human rights". Just as Carter himself commented on his treatment of the human rights situation at the end of his administration. As stated in the Strategy for Central America and the Caribbean, the reason why the United States tried every means at that time to force Nicaragua and El Salvador to stay away from Cuba and the Soviet Union and to strengthen its military power in the Caribbean was that its core goal was to protect U.S. interests in the region and To this end, continue to serve as a "defender of human rights"¶

It is not difficult to see that in President Carter's understanding, the significance of the "Cold War" between the United States and the Soviet Union in Central America was not only based on realist considerations of geopolitical interests, but also on the basis of human rights diplomacy.

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¶ George Kennan, "The Long Telegram", February 22 ¶ 1946 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm> [2022-01-29]

¶ [US] Written by Jimmy Carter, translated by Lu Junfu and others: "Loyalty to the Faith - Memoirs of an American President", Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1985, pp. 681-686.

The idealistic design of the United States is to prevent Central American countries from falling into the camp of human rights destroyers called "authoritarian oppression" by the Soviet Union through the United States' continued activities as a "defender of human rights." It is based on this stubborn and conscious awareness

The formal thinking logic and "road map" construction enabled many politicians, diplomats and people who had previously supported human rights diplomacy to naturally support the policy of advocating Cold War priority after the human rights tragedy in El Salvador in 1980, and chose Indifferent to the current human rights tragedy, it can be seen that once the Cold War "road map" is regarded as the only way to defend human rights in the long term, "human rights diplomacy" and Cold War interests will no longer be in conflict, but will complement each other.

However, the Carter administration ignored the tragedy of human rights and supported the right-wing conservative government's "expediency measure" in the end, failing to realize the so-called longer-term interests under this "road map." In 1980, the Carter administration continued to provide assistance to the right-wing military junta in El Salvador. Coupled with the failure of the country's land reform attempt, it completely angered the left-wing forces in El Salvador from both internal and external aspects. The Republican Ronald Reagan who won the US election at the end of that year aroused the fear of the left-wing people in El Salvador, because Reagan not only Belonging to the conservatives in the American political spectrum, he even made a statement shortly after being elected, saying that the new government would increase military assistance to the right-wing government of El Salvador in order to correct the weakness of the Carter government. Under the joint efforts of the above-mentioned parties, El Salvador's domestic The crisis situation continued to escalate, and finally evolved into a full-scale civil war on January 10, 1981. It is said that more than 500 so-called "extremists" were killed in this operation. Forced by the escalation of the war situation, Carter before leaving office In the last week of the United States, the United States urgently raised its level of attention to the situation in El Salvador, and further increased its material assistance to the country's government forces. With the coming of the Reagan administration, the United States' military assistance to El Salvador further increased, and the resulting military junta The intensity of repression and guerrilla resistance has also continued to intensify - according to statistics, in 1981 alone, 1,000 people died in conflicts every month in the country, which was double the figure during the human rights crisis in 1980. This kind of human rights The tragedy continued until 1992. It can be said that the U.S. "human rights policy" under the Cold War "road map" had great limitations.

Richard Whittle Threat to El Salvador and Back Military Aid Ple dge in Congressional Quarterly February 2 1981 p 359  
 New York Times November 28 1980  
 United States Embassy El Salvador "Military Estimate" of Rebel / Government Strength / Weaknesses of February 18 1981 in Digital National Security Archive ProQuest Information and Learning Company 1  
 - 3 Arthur Miller "Jimmy Carter's Policy Toward the El Salvador Civil War: The Demise of Human Rights as a Priority" Dissertation for the Department of History Cambridge: Harvard University 2017 p 64  
 Jimmy Carter "Presidential Directives PD / NS C - 62 January 15 1981 " in The Jimmy Carter Presidency 1-3  
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[US] Written by Lynn Foster, translated by Zhang Sengen and others: "History of Mesoamerica", Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Press, 2011, page 276.

Although "diplomacy" is in line with the idealized direction of historical development outlined by its ideology, it will only cause one more huge humanitarian disaster after another in reality.

#### Four Conclusions

The many secret operations against church members in El Salvador in 1980 were by no means simple accidents. They were the outbreak of conflicts between churches that sympathized with the left and the right-wing conservative government influenced by liberation theology. However, for this series of "human rights" "Tragedy", the Carter administration of the United States, which has long adhered to the principle of human rights diplomacy and severely sanctioned the country's military government, unexpectedly ignored it and continued to provide material and policy support to the right-wing military government. In this regard, the traditional view is that This change marks the end of the Carter administration's "human rights diplomacy" in El Salvador. It is an external manifestation of the return of Cold War power politics after the United States faced crises in many places around the world in 1980. However, by sorting out specific historical facts and incorporating them into the construction From the research perspective of socialist international relations theory, this article draws a more profound historical re-examination, that is, the Carter administration's indifference to the "human rights crisis" in El Salvador in 1980 was by no means as simple as "the end of human rights foreign policy". On the contrary, ideological confrontation as a The ideological background deeply rooted in the minds of Americans during the Cold War constructed the United States' understanding of a series of concepts such as "human rights" and "interests". Therefore, from the beginning, "human rights diplomacy" had the same structure as "Cold War interests". Anti-Soviet and anti-communist tendencies. As "human rights destroyers" in the eyes of Americans, the "red camp" and its supporters are naturally regarded by the United States as more essential opponents of human rights diplomacy rather than collaborators, because the latter's path is not in line with the United States. The standard "road map" for the realization of human rights outlined by the Cold War ideology will only bring about greater "human rights destruction" in the future. Therefore, in order to avoid more serious human rights crises in the future and in order to fulfill the so-called "great righteousness", Bishop Romero The tragedy of the four nuns was regarded as a "minor" by the United States as a necessary sacrifice, even the elimination of the enemy's "infiltration power" - human rights diplomacy and Cold War interests achieved a paradoxical unity through the mediation of ideology.

According to the constructivist point of view, all foreign policy actions are affected by the scope of "ideas". Only by "hanging on the web of meaning weaved by oneself" can people achieve a certain degree of understanding of the disordered and random world. However, once ideas condense into rigid and fixed ideologies, the truth and the fate of living individuals will be obscured by grand narratives and grand goals. Restrain following rigid "road maps"

The impulse and seeking truth from facts may be a better way to truly promote human welfare.

(Editor Shi Peiran)